Todays Lecture

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Todays Lecture

• Alvin Goldman
• Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• A few things about this paper.
• (i) It is hardits not just you.
• (ii) Dont worry about the minute of the account
  (i.e. the discussions of a certain object c at
  time t having a set of properties J and being in
  a DOE or distance-orientation-environment
  relation R to S). It is enough to understand the
  general details of this account.
• (iii) When trying to understand the paper try to
  relate it to some of the discussion we have
  already had about Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and
  Russell.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• The first paragraph nicely sets up some of the
  basic parameters of the paper.
• (1) This is not a general analysis of knowledge.
  This paper only concerns perceptual knowledge.
  Goldman even admits that the analysis in this
  paper is partial even when considering perceptual
  knowledge (it concerns non-inferential perceptual
  knowledge).
• (2) It will involve an appeal to the relevant
  causal processes of belief formation or
  maintenance to explicate (non-inferential
  perceptual) knowledge.
• (3) It does not require that Ss belief that p is
  causally connected to the state of affairs p that
  makes Ss belief true (CP, p.5).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Keeping in mind the Gettier problems I spoke of
  yesterday, what Goldman is trying to do is
  provide an analysis of knowledge that
  accommodates the insight of the traditional JTB
  (justified true belief) analysis of knowledge
  while both avoiding its short comings and
  adopting a more external view of knowledge
  acquisition.
• So whatever analysis of knowledge he proffers he
  will continue to think of knowledge as true
  belief plus whatever else is needed for Ss
  belief to be knowledge.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• What Goldman has in mind as his fundamental
  position is that S knows that p if and only if
  her belief forming (and sustaining) mechanisms
  and processes are reliable.
• A mechanism or process is reliable in the
  relevant way if produces true beliefs in actual
  situations, but would produce true beliefs, or at
  least inhibit false beliefs, in relevant
  counterfactual situations (CP, p.5).
• Translated into clearer English A mechanism or
  process is reliable in the relevant way if it
  produces a belief that p when it is the case that
  p, and doesnt produce a belief that p when it is
  not the case that p.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Goldmans appeal to counterfactual sensitivity
  seems to preempt any potential Gettier problem
  for his view. After all, what you want as a
  Gettier problem to Goldmans account is a true
  reliably produced belief that is nevertheless not
  knowledge. But Goldman has defined reliability
  such that a belief forming mechanism is not
  reliable if it succumbs to Gettier problems.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Note some of the concerns Goldman raises as
  considerations for evaluating the adequacy of a
  theory of (non-inferential perceptual) knowledge.
• (1) A theory of knowledge should accord with as
  many historic uses of the term know as it can
  (CP, p.6).
• (2) It should accord with our considered
  judgments about when we would call something
  knowledge (CP, pp.8, 9).
• (3) It should leave room for skepticism (CP,
  p.16).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• (4) A theory should explain how more figurative
  uses of know came about (CP, p.16).
  Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
• (5) A theory of knowledge should accommodate its
  more primitive (CP, p.16) roots in animal
  cognition. This means that the proffered notion
  of knowledge should not be overintellectualized
  (CP, p.16).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Note that there are several thought experiments
  Goldman has in mind as he develops his analysis
  of (non-inferential perceptual) knowledge. He
  thinks we will be inclined to make certain
  judgments about Ss knowledge in each case, and
  that these judgments must be adequately
  accommodated by his final analysis.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Henry and sons drive in the country-side
  thought experiment
• We are to imagine Henry driving in the
  country-side with his son some lovely afternoon.
  Its a clear day, no haze and the windshield is
  clean enough that both Henry and his son have a
  nice panoramic view of the fields and structures
  they are passing. Henrys son is of an age where
  he enjoys his father identifying certain objects
  and structures as they pass them, and so Henry
  does so (and in so doing makes various knowledge
  claims about various features and objects in the
  area through which they are driving).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• We are to imagine two ways in which this scenario
  can go.
• In both scenarios, Henry sees a barn and
  accurately reports this to his son.
• In one scenario, all of the barns are real.
• In the other scenario, they have inadvertently
  driven into an area where, for whatever reason,
  there are barns and barn facsimiles scattered
  throughout the country-side.
• The barn facsimiles are purposely designed to
  fool travelers who may pass them while driving on
  the road.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• In the scenario in which all the barns are real,
  Goldman thinks that we will not quibble with the
  judgment that Henry knows that there is a barn in
  yonder field.
• He thinks, however, we will be disinclined to be
  so generous in the scenario where Henry sees a
  real barn and identifies it as so, but couldnt
  tell the difference between that real barn and
  the fakes in the area (CP, p.6).
• Do you agree with Goldman here? If so, why? If
  not, why not?

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Sam sees Trudy ... or is it Judy?thought
  experiment
• Were asked to imagine the following. Sam, Trudy
  and Judy live in the same town or city. These
  individuals know each other, at least enough to
  say hi. Trudy and Judy are identical twins. Sam
  knows they are identical twins. Sam meets Judy on
  the street on day and forms the belief That is
  Judy. The question is, Does he know that That
  is Judy?

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Again we have two ways in which this scenario can
  go.
• In one scenario, Sam correctly identifies Judy
  when he sees Judy and Trudy when he sees Trudy.
• In the other scenario, Sam frequently mistakes
  one sister for the other (CP, p.9).
• Goldman thinks you will grant that Sam knows in
  the former but not the latter scenario. Is he
  right?

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Oscar and Dack the dachshund thought experiment
• Were asked to imagine the following scenario.
  Oscar is standing in an open field. Dack the
  dachshund is also in the field. Upon seeing Dack,
  Oscar forms the belief that There is a dog in
  the field. It so happens that wolves frequent
  this field, though none are visible today. Oscar
  has the tendency to mistake wolves for dogs,
  which will probably get him killed someday if he
  frequents this field too much.
• Does Oscar know, upon seeing Dack, that There is
  a dog in the field?
• Goldman thinks he does, do you agree?

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Ive already said that Goldman wants to develop a
  reliabilist theory of (non-inferential)
  perceptual knowledge. S knows that p if and only
  if the belief forming (or sustaining) mechanisms
  or processes causally responsible for p are
  reliable (i.e. when p is the case, S will believe
  that p in the relevant perceptual context, and if
  p is not the case S will not believe that p in
  the relevant perceptual context).
• Another way of putting this is that S reliably
  discriminates between p and non-p when forming
  the relevant perceptual beliefs (CP, p.7).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• What does a lot of work in Goldmans account is
  the notion of relevant alternatives.
• The thought is this. Take any putative case of
  knowledge. S fails to know that p if S cannot
  eliminate an alternative possibility to the fact
  that p which is nevertheless consistent with Ss
  data or evidence (loosely construed) (CP, p.7).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Imagine you go out on one of the few clear summer
  nights in South-Western Ontario. You look up at
  the sky and see a bright celestial object with a
  steady light. Youve been told, and correctly,
  that such celestial objects are usually planets.
  Whats more, you know that one of the planets up
  at this time of the night is Saturn. Upon looking
  up at the object in the night sky you form the
  belief Thats Saturn.
• Now it turns out that it is Saturn, so you have
  formed a true belief. Also Jupiter is also in the
  sky, and you cant tell the difference between
  Jupiter and Saturn in the night sky.
• Do you know? Goldman, and others, would say that
  you dont and thats because you cant eliminate
  the possibility that what you are seeing is
  Jupiter instead.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• This seems to be a clear example of what is meant
  by alternative possibility. But, suggests
  Goldman, the alternative possibilities to which
  we should be responsive if we are to know cannot
  be understood too broadly or we will never be
  able to acquire knowledge (think of Descartes
  Malicious Omnipotent Demon).
• The alternative possibility must be a relevant
  alternative (CP, p.7).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Think back to the example of seeing Saturn. Which
  is really the relevant alternative in judging
  whether you know Thats Saturn - that you cant
  tell the difference between Saturn and Jupiter in
  the night sky, or that you cant tell the
  difference between really seeing Saturn and
  having the experience of seeing Saturn while
  under the spell of Descartes Demon?
• Is this position question begging against the
  skeptic? Should we worry if it is?

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Goldman seems to say the following about what
  makes an alternative possibility relevant. (It is
  important to note that he never definitively
  settles this dispute see his admission to this
  affect on page 9 of your CP.)
• An alternative possibility is relevant if it is
  taken seriously by those ascribing or denying
  knowledge to S (CP, p.8).
• Goldman does not think that we can determine
  exactly why the ascriber or denier of knowledge
  to S takes certain alternative possibilities
  seriously and not others. He does think that
  there are some psychological regularities that
  explain our choices on the whole (CP, pp.8-9).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• In explaining the reliability of Ss belief
  forming (or sustaining) mechanisms and processes,
  Goldman takes some time to discuss the nature of
  the counterfactual sensitivity they must possess.
• This is where he develops his analysis involving
  object c possessing properties H at time t in DOE
  relation R to S. Just ignore the details of this
  complication in the paper.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Do note the following however.
• S (non-inferentially) perceptually knows that p
  if and only if S forms a belief that p because of
  percept P which arises from the interaction of b
  with Ss noetic faculties and there is no
  perceptual equivalent to b such that S would form
  the belief p because of percept P and yet p
  would be false of the relevant objective cause c.
• because should be understood causally here, and
  the percepts ought not to differ from each other
  in their causal roles to bring about Ss belief
  that p (CP, pp.12-13).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Perhaps in clearer English
• What our analysis says is that S has perceptual
  knowledge if and only if not only does his
  perceptual mechanism produce true belief, but
  there are no relevant counterfactual situations
  in which the same belief would be produced via an
  equivalent percept and in which the belief would
  be false (CP, p.13).
• Do note that Goldman uses the notion of percept.
  This should remind you of Lockes ideas and
  Russells sense data.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• What do you think of Goldmans discussion of The
  candle in the room of mirrors thought
  experiment? (See CP, p.14).
• Remember you have a person S seeing a candle in
  front of them. They form the belief that Thats
  a candle ahead of me.
• Unfortunately, its a candle that is behind S and
  its image is being reflected by a series of
  mirrors so that it looks like it is ahead of S.

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• What does Goldman conclude from this thought
  experiment?
• Is this a perceptual equivalent such that S never
  successfully knows Thats a candle ahead of me?
  What does Goldman say to this?

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• Goldman finishes his paper with a brief
  discussion of what he calls Cartesian
  epistemology.
• He makes it clear that he rejects what he thinks
  is the justification requirement understood
  within the Cartesian framework (CP, p.15).

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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

• He describes two elements of Cartesian
  epistemology
• (1) S knows that p at time t only if S is
  (fully, adequately, etc.) justified at t in
  believing that p (CP, p.15).
• (2) S is justified at t in believing p only if
  either (i) p is self-warranting for S at t, or
  (ii) p is (strongly, adequately, etc.) supported
  or confirmed by propositions each of which is
  self-warranting for S at t. (CP, p.15).
• Has he rejected too much in his account?

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• We can, I think, divide Feminist concerns into
  two overlapping areas the effect of patriarchy
  on human practice and the effect of patriarchy on
  human theorizing.
• You may be more aware of Feminist critiques of
  societal practices.
• Feminists have engaged with general society to
  seek equality rights for women, people of color,
  lesbians, gays, transsexuals and the
  transgendered.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• This is still an ongoing engagement in this
  society, as we have seen with the recent dispute
  over marriage equality rights for lesbians and
  gays.
• It is still an ongoing engagement in this society
  on the issue of equal pay for equal work.
• Much work is still to be done for such equality
  rights outside of Canada too (think of
  Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, India or China).

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• Dont be too complacent about gender rights in
  Canada. Women still only make 70 cents to each
  mans dollar.
• Also, dont think that its just countries in the
  Middle or Far East that have poor human rights
  records regarding women.
• In several States in the USA it is still possible
  for a husband to force his wife to have sex with
  him and it is not considered rape under law.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• What does Feminism have to say about the effect
  of patriarchy on human theorizing?
• Consider this quote from Charles Darwin.
• Man is more courageous, pugnacious and energetic
  than woman, and has a more inventive genius. His
  brain is absolutely larger, but whether or not
  proportionately to his larger body, has not, I
  believe, been fully ascertained (Darwin,
  Charles. 1874/1998. The Descent of Man. New York
  Prometheus Books, pp.576-77.)

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• Heres more.
• Woman seems to differ from man in mental
  disposition, chiefly in her greater tenderness
  and less selfishness and this holds good even
  with savages, as is shown by a well-known passage
  in Mungo Parks Travels, and by statement made by
  many other travellers. Woman, owing to her
  maternal instincts, displays these qualities
  towards her infants in an eminent degree
  therefore it is likely that she would often
  extend them towards her fellow-creatures.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• Man is the rival of other men he delights in
  competition, and this leads to ambition which
  passes too easily into selfishness. These latter
  qualities seem to be his natural and unfortunate
  birthright. It is generally admitted that with
  woman the powers of intuition, of rapid
  perception, and perhaps imitation, are more
  strongly marked than in man but some, at least,
  of these faculties are characteristic of the
  lower races, and therefore of a past and lower
  state of civilization.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• The chief distinction in the intellectual powers
  of the two sexes is shown by mans attaining to a
  higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than
  can woman - whether requiring deep thought,
  reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the
  senses and hands.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• If two lists were made of the most eminent men
  and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music
  ..., history, science, and philosophy, with
  half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two
  lists would not bear comparison. We may also
  infer, from the law of the deviation of averages
  ... that if men are capable of a decided
  pre-eminence over women in many subjects, the
  average mental power in man must be above that of
  woman (Darwin, Charles. 1874/1998. The Descent
  of Man. New York Prometheus Books, pp.583-84.)

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• This quote from Darwin nicely encapsulates how
  women have generally been viewed for millennia
  within the Western canon of thought. Theres more
  like Darwins sentiments in the classics of
  Western philosophy and political theory.
• Note some of the ways in which Darwins comments
  touch on epistemological issues.
• The mental faculties of women are of a lower
  development than those of men.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• Darwin talks of rapid perception. This ascribes
  non-inferential perceptual abilities to women,
  while reserving powers of inference or reasoning
  for men. The same can be said for the notion of
  intuition.
• Maternal instinct. This should be a familiar
  phrase. Note that a womans knowledge of child
  care is not knowledge per se but instinct. It is
  also automatic rather than learned (as the term
  instinct implies).

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• Darwin also contends that when it comes to areas
  of inquiry (requiring deep thought, reasoning and
  imagination), men exceed the capacities of women.
• Not surprisingly, then, it is men rather than
  women who excel in science and philosophy.

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Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology

• Think back now on what we have discussed in our
  brief trek through some of the classic pieces of
  Western epistemology.
• Think of the kinds of capacities required to
  successfully know, according to the philosophers
  who have provided your readings in our texts.
• Now line this up with the kinds of sentiments
  expressed by Darwin (again typical rather than
  atypical both for his contemporaries and
  predecessors) and judge whether the epistemic
  subject was truly generic in traditional
  epistemology.