Criticisms of Benthams Quantitative Hedonism

1
Criticisms of Benthams Quantitative Hedonism

• Not all pleasures are qualitatively the same.
• Not all pleasures are intrinsically good.
• Pleasure and absence of pain are not the only
  components of well-being.
• Problem of Plural Values

2
Mental State Theories

• You might deny welfare hedonism while still
  clinging to the view that ones well-being
  consists in and only in some mental states. Kagan
  calls this view mental state theory. Welfare
  hedonism is just one version of mental state
  theory.
• The intrinsically valuable mental states may
  include calm states of mind, artistic
  experiences, catharsis, resignation etc.
• As Kagan admits (p.34), mental state theories
  have some appeal. What you dont know cant hurt
  you.

3
Mental States are Not the Only Component of
Well-being (?)

• Mental State theories, e.g., welfare hedonism,
  have been criticized.
• The critics argue that there are other things
  that make our life better off.

4
Nozicks Experience Machine

• Suppose that you are connected to an experience
  machine that electronically stimulates your
  brain, giving you whatever experiences you say
  most valuable. It will feel exactly as if you
  succeeded in business, being respected by
  people, being loved by a dream boy- or girl-
  friend, or what have you. Once you are hooked up,
  all memory of reality will disappear so you will
  not know your experiences are merely appearances.
  The machine keeps your body safe and sound.

5
Continued

• Question Is the life connected to the experience
  machine well off?
• Mental state theories, e.g., welfare hedonism,
  entail that the life is well off. The life is
  filled with what the theories take to be the only
  component of well-being intrinsically valuable
  mental states.
• However, many people (though not all) think that
  this life lacks something that makes a life well
  off.
• Then, something other than mental states--- what
  we can get only in the real external world---is
  the component of our well-being. Perhaps, really
  being respected and loved, really achieving
  something, and so on, makes us well off. This
  view entails the rejection of mental state
  theories.

6
Preference Theories (AKA Desire Satisfaction
Theories)

• The satisfaction of a persons desires makes the
  persons life well-off. Thwarting a persons
  desires makes the persons life badly off.
• A desire is satisfied just in case the very thing
  that is desired actually occurs.
• Dont confuse the satisfaction or realization of
  a desire with the feeling of satisfaction. The
  satisfaction or realization of your desire can
  occur even when it does not give you any feeling
  of satisfaction (e.g., when you do not know your
  desire is satisfied).

7
Two Attractions of Preference Theories

• Many people think that a persons well-being or
  happiness has a close connection with what the
  person desires, likes, or dislikes generally
  speaking, if what a person desires or likes
  happens, the person will become well-off.
• Some people might desire not only pleasure and
  absence of pain, but also other
  things---including the life of a developed person
  or what we can attain only in the real external
  world. Preference theories hold that these things
  are also good for those who desire them. Thus,
  preference theories can incorporate Mill and
  Nozicks insights (in addition to the view that
  pleasure and absence of pain make life well-off).
  

8
The Need of Restricting Types of Preferences
(Kagan, 37)

• A person might have desires for things that have
  noting to do with the persons life. It seems
  that their satisfaction fails to make the
  persons life well off.
• E.g. My desire that the total number of atoms in
  the universe is a prime.
• Whether the total number is a prime does nothing
  to do with my life. It is implausible to say that
  it will make my life well off.
• Preference theorists need to restrict types of
  desires to desires for things that have a certain
  relation to their possessors life.
• It is hard to say what this relation consists in.
  

9
Criticism Misinformed and Ill-made Desires do
not Make the Person Well-off

• (The blue part is the answer to Q1.)
• It seems that satisfying the following desires
  often fail to render the possessor well off
• Desires based on inaccurate or inadequate data
• E.g. Makoto wants a buff bod because he thinks
  that Sophie, whom he fancies, likes men with such
  bodies. But he is wrong. Sophie likes the nerdy,
  intellectual type. It seems that getting a buff
  bod doesnt enhance Makotos well-being because
  he wants it only to help him get Sophie and it
  doesnt do this.
• Desires created under unfavorable
  conditions---through inattention to facts,
  irrational thinking, chemical addiction,
  discouragements, pressures from others, or
  medical manipulation.

10
Desires Created under unfavorable conditions

• E.g.1 A drug addict desires to have more drugs.
• E.g.2 A doctor invents a desire creating and
  satisfying machine. It only creates (and
  satisfies, if necessary) desires that can easily
  be satisfied, such as a desire for being hooked
  to the machine, for being on the earth, for being
  controlled, for feeling good, and so on.
• It appears that the satisfaction of these desires
  do not make the persons life well off.

11
Actual vs. Ideal Preference Theories

• Thus, many preference theorists abandon actual
  preference theories and adopt ideal preference
  theories.
• Actual preference theories hold that a persons
  well-being consists in the satisfaction of the
  desires that the person actually has.
• Ideal preference theories hold that a persons
  well-being consists in the satisfaction of the
  persons desires in ideal conditions that is,
  the desires that the person would have if the
  person were accurately and fully informed, and
  were under no unfavorable condition.

12
Actual Desires vs. Desires in Ideal Conditions

• In the ideal conditions, you might not desire
  some of the things you actually desire.
• E.g. In ideal conditions, you might not have
  desires that you will see some celebrity you now
  like, or that you keep up with the fashion. That
  is, if you knew that the celeb is a jerk, or if
  you were not influenced by peer pressures, you
  might cease to want them.
• In the ideal conditions, you might have desire
  for some of the things you do not actually want
  or even hate.
• E.g. Many people do not want to eat ethnic food
  like sushi, to listen to hard rock, rap etc., or
  to live in a certain way (e.g., perhaps in their
  parents way). But they might want to do so if
  they were fully and accurately informed of the
  nature of these things.

13
Not All Satisfaction of Ones Desires Make Him
Well Off

• One of the criticisms against welfare hedonism
  still remains.
• According to preference theories, the
  satisfaction of ones sadistic desires makes him
  well off. Some think that this is unacceptable.
• Of course, preference theorists argue, as
  hedonists do, that it is acceptable because they
  can say that the satisfaction of sadistic
  preferences is on balance bad (because it has bad
  consequences).

14
Subjective vs. Objective Theories

• Preference theories are subjective theories they
  hold that what constitutes well-being depends on
  the conative states of the agent. (Conative
  states are states such as desiring, valuing,
  caring about and so forth.)
• Some people think that subjective theories, e.g.,
  preference theories are misguided in thinking
  that a persons subjective state, e.g., his or
  her desire, makes things valuable for the person.
• Why? They think that subjective theories, e.g.,
  preference theories, put the cart before the
  horse. They say that things are desired because
  they are valuable, not the reverse (i.e., they
  are valuable because they are desired).
• They claim that desires in ideal
  conditions---desires informed and created through
  favorable processes---are mere guides to
  recognize valuable things.