LEGISLATIVE DEMOCRACY

1
LEGISLATIVE DEMOCRACY Dr. Bill CrossDirector
of Research
Presentation to Commissioners February 19 20,
2004
2
MANDATE

• To examine and make recommendations on enhancing
  the role of the Legislative Assembly and MLAs in
  decision-making while ensuring greater
  accountability of MLAs to their constituents and
  to New Brunswickers.
• To examine and make recommendations on enhancing
  transparency and accountability in appointments
  to government agencies, boards, and commissions.

3
FOCUS OF PRESENTATION

• Role of Legislature
• and
• Role of Legislator

4
KEY QUESTION WHY LEGISLATURES?

• ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY CITIZENS ON ATHENS HILL
• TODAY PROBLEMS OF SIZE (NUMBERS AND GEOGRAPHY)
  PREVENT THIS
• COLLECTED VS. COLLECTIVE DEMOCRACY DILEMMA

5
FUNCTIONS OF LEGISLATURE

• CHOOSE A GOVERNMENT
• REPRESENTATION
• SCRUTINY/ACCOUNTABILITY
• LEGISLATE
• LINK BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC

6
1. CHOOSING GOVERNMENT

• IN OUR SYSTEM - ALMOST ALWAYS PARTY WITH MOST
  SEATS
• RARE EXCEPTIONS e.g. ONTARIO 1985
• CAN BE MINORITY OR MAJORITY GOVERNMENT (RARELY
  COALITION)
• GOVERNMENT MUST MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE OF THE
  LEGISLATURE
• SELECTION OF CABINET OUR SYSTEM PM, OTHERS
  GOVT CAUCUS PLAYS ROLE

7
2. REPRESENTATION(focus of todays presentation)

• TRUSTEE
• DELEGATE
• POLITICO

8
TRUSTEE REPRESENTATION

• LEGISLATORS RELY ON THEIR OWN WISDOM AND JUDGMENT
  
• PAROCHIAL INTERESTS SECOND TO NATIONAL INTEREST
  AS DEFINED BY LEGISLATOR
• BURKEAN VIEW OF REPRESENTATION

9
DELEGATE REPRESENTATION

• LEGISLATORS ARE VOICES OF LOCAL EXPRESSION
• ELECTED TO FOLLOW THE WISHES OF THEIR
  CONSTITUENTS
• NATIONAL INTEREST IS AGGREGATE OF LOCAL INTERESTS
• INTERESTS REPRESENTED ARE PRIMARILY GEOGRAPHIC

10
POLITICO REPRESENTATION

• LEGISLATOR AS POLITICAL OPERATIVE
• RECOGNIZES IMPORTANCE OF PARTY DISCIPLINE
• IN OUR SYSTEM PARTY DISCIPLINE NORMALLY TRUMPS
  DELEGATE AND TRUSTEE PERSPECTIVES

11
VIEWS OF VOTERS

• BELIEVE PARTY DISCIPLINE TOO STRONG
• BELIEVE LEGISLATORS OUT OF TOUCH
• EVIDENCE THAT THEY PREFER DELEGATE ROLE
• OFTEN ADMIRE THOSE WHO FUNCTION AS TRUSTEES WITH
  STRONG COMMUNICATION WITH CONSTITUENTS

12
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

• LONG TRADITION OF PARTIES RUNNING AGAINST STRONG
  PARTY DISCIPLINE AND IN FAVOUR OF DELEGATE ROLE
  FOR LEGISLATORS
• PROVINCIALLY THE FARMERS PARTIES IN EARLY 20TH
  CENTURY
• FEDERALLY THE PROGRESSIVES IN 1920s, REFORM IN
  1990s
• CONFEDERATION OF REGIONS PARTY IN NEW BRUNSWICK
  IN 1990s

13
UNITED FARMERS OF ALBERTA

• 1921 ELECTION PLATFORM
• EACH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE IS ANSWERABLE
  DIRECTLY TO THE ORGANIZATION IN THE CONSTITUENCY
  THAT ELECTED HIM.
• NOTE RESPONSIBLE NOT TO CONSTITUENTS, BUT TO
  LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

14
RESULT

• AFTER WINNING POWER, THE UFA
• QUICKLY SLID INTO THE CONVENTIONAL PARTY MODE.
• POWER HAS A WONDERFUL FASCINATION, ONCE ENJOYED
  BY A FARMERS PARTY IT WOULD BE AS CORRUPT AS
  ITS RIVALS.

15
CCF/NDP

• TRADITION OF LEGISLATORS BEING RESPONSIVE TO
  PARTY IN CONVENTION (NOTE NOT TO CONSTITUENTS,
  BUT TO PARTY MEMBERS)
• OCCASSIONAL SIMILAR EFFORTS IN OTHER PARTIES
  (LIBERALS, 1960s/70s)

16
IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY

• PARTY DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS ALMOST ALWAYS
  WITHER WITH PROXIMITY TO GOVERNMENT
• E.G ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS, 1990

17
PM MACKENZIE KING (1948)

• The substitution, by force or otherwise, of the
  dictates of a single political party for the
  authority of a freely elected Parliament is
  something which, in far too many countries, has
  already taken place. It is along this path that
  many nations have lost their freedom.

18
REFORM PARTY

• CONSTITUTION
• WE BELIEVE IN ACCOUNTABILITY OF ELECTED
  REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PEOPLE WHO ELECT THEM, AND
  THAT THE DUTY OF ELECTED MEMBERS TO THEIR
  CONSTITUENTS SHOULD SUPERSEDE THEIR OBLIGATIONS
  TO THEIR POLITICAL PARTIES.

19
PAUL MARTINS DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

• 3 LINE VOTING SYSTEM
• ONE LINE VOTES -- MPs FREE TO VOTE AS THEY
  SEE FIT
• TWO LINE VOTES MPs FREE TO VOTE AS THEY SEE
  FIT, CABINET AND PARL. SECRETARIES EXPECTED TO
  SUPPORT GOVERNMENT POSITION
• THREE LINE VOTES MATTERS OF CONFIDENCE, ALL
  GOVERNMENT MEMBERS EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE
  GOVERNMENT

20
ONE AND TWO LINE VOTES

• NO EXPECTATION THAT MEMBERS WILL REPRESENT THE
  VIEWS OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS
• HISTORY SHOWS THIS IS VERY DIFFICULT TO REQUIRE

21
DETERMINING CONSTITUENTS VIEWS

• LETTERS RECEIVED IN OFFICE
• EMAIL MESSAGES RECEIVED
• PHONE CALLS TO OFFICE
• PETITIONS
• FOLKS TALKED TO DURING VISIT TO RIDING
• SURE TO AMOUNT TO SMALL MINORITY OF CONSTITUENTS
• INTENSITY DILEMMA
• TOWN HALLS

22
POPULATION SIZE OF CONSTITUENCY

• CANADIAN RANGE (PROVINCES)
• 5,010 (PEI) -- 110,777 (ONTARIO)
• NEW BRUNSWICK 13,269
• NEW BRUNSWICK FEDERALLY 72,950

23
REFORM PARTY EXPERIENCE

• REFORM PARTY REQUIRED MEMBERS TO FOLLOW PARTY
  LINE UNLESS THEY COULD PROVE THAT THEIR
  CONSTITUENTS DISAGREED AND THEY WISHED TO FOLLOW
  THEIR CONSTITUENTS VIEWS
• DIFFICULTY WAS IN DETERMINING VIEWS OF THEIR
  CONSTITUENTS

24
REFORM PARTY EXPERIENCE (CONT.)

• APRIL 1994, 5 CALGARY MPs (INCLUDING MANNING)
  ORGANIZE TELEPHONE VOTE OF CONSTITUENTS, IN
  CONJUNCTION WITH CABLE TV PROGRAM, ON ISSUE OF
  PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
• ESTIMATED 20,000 VIEWED PROGRAM, 1,533 PHONED IN
  THEIR OPINIONS

25
REFORM PARTY EXPERIENCE (CONT.)

• CANADA SPEAKS PROJECT VIEWS ON CANADIAN
  FEDERALISM (SEPT./OCT. 1994)
• YOU BE THE FINANCE MINISTER (FEB. 1995)
• NEVER MORE THAN 10,000 CALLERS
• NON-REPRESENTATIVE, SELF-SELECTED PARTICIPANTS

26
MP TED WHITES PROJECT

• OBJECTIVE DETERMINE CONSTITUENTS VIEWS
  REGARDING REFORM OF YOUNG OFFENDERS ACT
• MAILED HOUSEHOLDER AND PIN TO EACH CONSTITUENT
• ADVERTISEMENTS IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER
• PARTICIPATION RATE OF LESS THAN 7 PER CENT

27
MPs POLICY MANDATE?

• NOMINATION CONTESTS ALMOST NEVER ABOUT POLICY
• DEBATES BETWEEN NOMINATION CANDIDATES ARE RARE
• GENERAL ELECTION CANDIDATES RARELY STAKE OUT
  POSITIONS DIFFERENT FROM THEIR PARTY
• MOST VOTERS PRIMARILY INFLUENCED BY PARTY AND
  LEADER NOT LOCAL CANDIDATE

28
VOTERS DILEMMA

• VOTER A FAVOURS SAME SEX MARRIAGES AND CARES
  DEEPLY ABOUT THE ISSUE. A IS A LIBERAL PARTY
  SUPPORTER
• VOTER As LOCAL LIBERAL CANDIDATE OPPOSES SAME
  SEX MARRIAGES
• NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY LEADERSHIP FAVOURS SAME
  SEX MARRIAGES AND PROMISES A FREE VOTE
• CONSERVATIVES (OPPOSE SAME SEX MARRIAGE BUT LOCAL
  CANDIDATE SUPPORTS THEM)

29
3. SCRUTINY

• LEGISLATURE SERVES AS A WATCH DOG ON THE
  GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY
• THE EXECUTIVE (CABINET) RUNS THE GOVERNMENT AND
  LEGISLATURE HOLDS THEM ACCOUNTABLE

30
SCRUTINY (CONT)

• ROLE OF SCRUTINY PRIMARILY FULFILLED BY
  OPPOSITION
• REQUIRES SUFFICIENT OPPOSITION MEMBERS
  CONNECTION TO ELECTORAL SYSTEM

31
CHALLENGE OF SMALL LEGISLATURES

• CAN HAVE ONE SIDED LEGISLATURES WITH FEW
  OPPOSITION MEMBERS
• E.G. NEW BRUNSWICK 1987, 1991, 1995
• PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, BRITISH COLUMBIA
• EFFECT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM

32
SCRUTINY (CONT.)

• GOVERNMENT BACK BENCHERS CAN PLAY SCRUTINY ROLE
  BUT USUALLY LIMITED IN EFFECTIVENESS BECAUSE OF
  AMBITION
• LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE
  (ESPECIALLY WHEN OPPOSITION IS INEFFECTIVE) E.G.
  AUDITOR GENERAL

33
SCRUTINY TOOLS

• TOOLS FOR SCRUTINY INCLUDE
• QUESTION PERIOD
• LEGISLATIVE DEBATES
• COMMITTEE WORK
• FOR GOVERNMENT BACK BENCHERS ALSO CAUCUS BUT
  THIS IS PRIVATE, NOT TRANSPARENT

34
SCRUTINY TOOLS (CONT.)

• ALL OF THESE REQUIRE THAT THE LEGISLATURE BE
  SITTING
• 2002 NUMBER OF SITTING DAYS
• PROVINCIAL RANGE
• 80 (QUEBEC) to 50 (NEW BRUNSWICK)
• MOST IN THE 50-70 RANGE
• NS 67, PEI 55, NEWFOUNDLAND 60

35
QUESTION PERIOD

• LENGTH VARIES IN CANADIAN LEGISLATURES FROM 15
  MINUTES (BC) TO 60 MINUTES (ONTARIO)
• NEW BRUNSWICK 30 MINUTES
• 6 OF 9 OTHER PROVINCES ALLOW MORE TIME
  (INCLUDING PEI AND NS)

36
QUESTION PERIOD (CONT.)

• NUMBER OF MEMBERS ASKING QUESTIONS RANGES FROM
• 2-3 DAILY IN NEWFOUNDLAND
• to
• 13-15 DAILY IN ONTARIO
• 5-6 TYPICALLY IN NEW BRUNSWICK

37
SCRUTINY AND COMMITTEES

• COMMITTEES CAN BE AN IMPORTANT CHECK ON THE
  GOVERNMENT
• EFFECTIVENESS DEPENDS ON NUMBER, STRUCTURE, HOW
  OFTEN THEY MEET
• AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE(STAFF, BUDGET)
• WHO CHOOSES COMMITTEE CHAIRS
• OPPOSITION PARTY REPRESENTATION IN COMMITTEES
• (MORE ON NB COMMITTEES IN NEXT PRESENTATION)

38
4. LEGISLATION

• WITH EXCEPTION OF PRIVATE MEMBERS BILLS,
  LEGISLATURE PASSES OR DEFEATS BUT DOES NOT
  INITIATE LEGISLATION

39
DEBATE ON LEGISLATION

• LEGISLATURE MEANT TO FULLY DEBATE GOVERNMENTS
  PROPOSED LEGISLATION
• IS THERE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR DEBATE? DOES THE
  GOVERNMENT INVOKE CLOTURE?
• COMMITTEE WORK PROVIDES ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR
  MEMBERS TO INFLUENCE LEGISLATION

40
COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING

• OUR SYSTEM IS BASED ON ADVERSARIAL APPROACH
  SIMILAR TO JUDICIAL MODEL
• LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR REAL COLLECTIVE DECISION
  MAKING
• ELECTORAL SYSTEMS FAVOURING COALITION OUTCOMES
  ENCOURAGE MORE CONSENSUS BUILDING IN LEGISLATURE

41
5. LINK BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC

• DOES LEGISLATURE REFLECT THE MAKE-UP OF PROVINCE?
• GENDER, ETHNICITY, AGE, REGION,
• LANGUAGE ETC.
• (DISCUSSED IN EARLIER PRESENTATION)

42
INTEREST REPRESENTATION

• ARE NON-GEOGRAPHICAL INTERESTS REPRESENTED IN
  LEGISLATURE?
• E.G. ENVIRONMENTALISTS, GAYS/LESBIANS, SENIORS
• ELECTORAL SYSTEM WORKS AGAINST REPRESENTATION
  OF THESE INTERESTS

43
COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION

• ARE INTERESTS HEARD DURING COMMITTEE WORK?
• EXPERT TESTIMONY, GROUP PRESENTATIONS ETC.

44
TRANSPARENCY

• IS WORK OF LEGISLATURE READILY APPARENT TO
  PUBLIC?
• TELEVISED SITTINGS, COMMITTEE WORK OPEN TO PUBLIC
• WEB ACCESS TO WORK OF MEMBERS AND COMMITTEES

45
WEB PRESENCE

• DOES LEGISLATURES HOME PAGE HAVE DIRECT LINKS TO
  MEMBERS E-MAIL? (NB YES)
• DOES LEGISLATURES HOME PAGE HAVE DIRECT LINKS TO
  MEMBERS WEB PAGES? (NB NO)
• ARE LEGISLATIVE UPDATES AND COMMITTEE REPORTS
  AVAILABLE ON WEB PAGE?

46
CONSTITUENCY WORK OF MLAs

• MUCH OF LEGISLATORS TIME AND EFFORT SPENT ON
  OMBUDSPERSON ROLE PROVIDING CONSTITUENT SERVICE
• PROVINCIAL LEGISLATORS REPORT ABOUT 40 OF THEIR
  TIME SPENT ON THIS WORK, AND CLOSE TO HALF OF
  THEIR STAFFS WORK

47
LEGISLATORS EXPECTATIONS

• LEGISLATORS OFTEN SURPRISED TO LEARN (DURING
  FIRST TERM) THAT THEY PLAY LIMITED ROLE IN POLICY
  MAKING AND THAT THEIR ROLE IS LARGELY ONE OF
  PROVIDING CONSTITUENCY SERVICE.

48
VOTERS EXPECTATIONS

• VOTERS EXPECT STRONG CONSTITUENCY SERVICE FROM
  MEMBERS.
• UNCLEAR HOW VOTERS SEE THE BALANCE BETWEEN
  CONSTITUENCY AND POLICY WORK AREA FOR RESEARCH
• THE CHOICE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM SHOULD REFLECT
  THIS BALANCE

49
RESOURCES

• PROVIDING CONSTITUENCY SERVICE REQUIRES
  RESOURCES CONSTITUENCY OFFICES, STAFF, BUDGET
• NB MEMBERS HAVE BUDGET OF 25,000
• EXAMPLES OF OTHER PROVINCES ONTARIO, 153,000
  NOVA SCOTIA, 48,000

50
RESOURCES AND POLICY CONCENTRATION

• A LACK OF RESOURCES FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS AND
  FOR COMMITTEES ADDS TO THE GOVERNING FROM THE
  CENTRE THESIS POLICY MAKING CONCENTRATION
  WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE.