Title: Modeling monetary policy in real time: does discreteness matter
1Modeling monetary policy in real timedoes
discreteness matter?
- Andrei Sirchenko
- European University Institute, Florence, Italy
-
- This research was supported financially by the
Global Development Networks grant R05-1861,
distributed by the Economics Education and
Research Consortium. - The author is also grateful to Michael
Beenstock, Wojciech Charemza and Victor
Polterovich - for valuable comments and support
Patrick Graham, Beata Idzikowska, Jaroslaw
Jakubik, Jakub Jaworowski, Marynia Kruk, Tomasz
Lyziak, Barbara Sladkowska, Piotr Szpunar, Mark
Wynne and Reuters-Warsaw for help with getting
statistical data Joao Santos Silva for useful
suggestions and explanations TechnoNICOL for
providing a computer Timo Mitze, Alexis
Belianin, Michal Brzoza-Brzezina, Dariusz Filar,
Andrzej Slawinski and other participants at
XIIIth Spring Meeting of Young Economists and
Research Seminars at Higher School of Economics
and National Bank of Poland for useful comments.
2How do the policy interest rates respond to the
state of the economy?Do discreteness of policy
rates and real-time data matter?
3 The central bank must have a highly regular
and predictable policy rule or response pattern
that links policy actions to the state of the
economy. - William Poole, then-President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
4 It is not possible to make use of a simple
policy rule, which could be known ex ante to
market participants. - National Bank of
Poland, Monetary Policy Council
5 If practitioners in financial markets gain a
better understanding of how policy is likely to
respond to incoming information, asset prices and
bond yields will tend to respond to economic data
in ways that further the central bank's policy
objectives. - Ben Bernanke, President of the
Federal Reserve System
6- Discrete-choice approach
- Real-time data
- MPCs meetings as a unit of observation
7Frequency distribution of historical NBP
reference rate changes
8- The paper compiles a novel Polish real-time data
set incorporating historical values of about 140
economic and financial indicators, truly
available to policymakers and public at each
monthly policy meeting during the period 1998
2007
9- The decision-making meetings of monetary
authority as a unit of observation
10- This sample design carefully simulates the actual
policy-action-generating process
11Brief summary of results
12Policy regime change in 2002
- The systematic policy responses demonstrate
remarkable structural differences prior to and
after April 2002
13Sup-LR test for structural change with unknown
change pointIndependent variables GVARna_Y and
ExInf_T_MSample 1999/02 - 2006/10
14Sup-LR test for structural change with unknown
change pointIndependent variables EReu and
CPIxac_T_YM Sample 1999/02 - 2006/10
15Switch from backward- to forward-looking behavior
- In its reaction to the deviation of inflation
from the target the central bank has shifted from
the backward-looking to forward-looking behavior
16Switch from exchange rate to real activity
- Prior to 2002 the central bank reacted to the
real activity measures far less, but to the
exchange rate far more regular than later on
17Switch from backward- to forward-looking behavior
18Focus on inflation and exchange rate before 2002
19Asymmetric responses to inflationary expectations
- The central bank reacts highly asymmetrically to
the changes in inflationary expectations,
depending on whether the expected inflation is
above or below the inflation target
20Policy rule in 2002/04 - 2006/10
21No evidence for policy inertia
- The policy rate appears to be driven by the key
economic indicators without evidence for
deliberate interest-smoothing by the central bank
22Monetary policy inertia in 1999/02 - 2002/03
- The very existence of partial adjustment in the
context of policy rule in differences does not
seem to be an issue in the first sub-period at
all.
23Tests for monetary policy inertia in 2002/04 -
2006/10
P-Value
Â
0.28
0.44
24In-sample fit
- The estimated simple models explain correctly
about 95 percent of observed policy adjustments. - The reference rate appears to be changed in
response to month-to-month change in the spread
between the expected rate of inflation over the
next 12 months from Ipsos survey and the
inflation target, the annual growth rate of index
of gross domestic product (or, alternatively,
gross value added) and the positive change since
the last MPCs meeting in the 12-month WIBOR.
25Policy rule in 2002/04 - 2006/10
P-Value
Â
0.28
0.44
26Out-of-sample forecasting
- In forecasting the next twenty policy decisions
the model correctly predicts seventeen no
changes and three hikes, erroneously
forecasting only the timing of one hike with a
monthly lag and outperforming the market
anticipation, made one day prior to each policy
meeting.
27Out-of-sample forecasting of next policy decision
28Out-of-sample forecasting of next policy decision
29Summary of results
- The reported in- and out-of-sample forecasting
performance, exceeding the typical one in the
literature, is shown to be partially due to the
employed methodology, combining the use of
discrete regression approach, real-time data and
decision-making meetings of monetary authority as
a unit of observation.
30This methodological framework carefully mimics
the actual policy-action-generating process since
- most major central banks alter interest rates by
discrete adjustments - policy decisions are naturally made using
information available in the real-time setting - they are typically made 8-12 times per year at
special policy meetings
31However, the empirical studies routinely estimate
the monetary policy rules by
- applying the regression methods for a continuous
dependent variable - using currently available series of economic
data - analyzing the systematic responses of policy
rates averages to economic data averages for a
given month or quarter
32Obviously, such practice distorts the actual
data-generating process because
- regression methods for a continuous dependent
variable are shown to be inadequate when it is
discrete - the latest versions of statistical data may
differ from the real-time ones due to revisions - time aggregation misaligns the timing of policy
decisions and availability of statistical data as
well as raises the problem of simultaneity
33The discrete-choice approach vs. Conventional
OLS regression
34Monthly averages of ex post revised datavs. the
real-time non-aggregated data
35Does real-time policy-meeting data matter?
- Yes, the use of real-time data set with the
policy-making meetings as a unit of observation
does matter in the econometric identification of
Polish monetary policy
36Comparison of policy rules, based on revised and
real-time data
37Does discreteness matter?
- Can we address the above problems by the
conventional simpler linear regression model?
38Does discreteness matter?
- Virtually all measures of fit, constructed for
the LRM (linear regression model) estimated by
OLS, cannot be applied for the OPM (ordered
probit model), and vice versa.
39Does discreteness matter?
- The likelihood functions of GLM (generalized
linear model) and OPM, have different nature and
cannot be compared either.
40Does discreteness matter?
- It seems impossible to construct a formal test
based on the likelihood to compare the LRM and
OPM. Are there any other appropriate ways to
compare them?
41Does discreteness matter?
- One possible approach is to define the expected
value of dependent variable for the OPM and
compare it with the LRM counterpart.
42Does discreteness matter?
- For the LRM E(YX) Xb
- For the OPM E(YX)
- Pr(Y-0.5X)(-0.5)
- Pr(Y-0.25X)(-0.25)
- Pr(Y0X)(0) Pr(Ygt0X)(0.50.50.25)/3
43Does discreteness matter?
- An alternative approach is to compute the
conditional distribution of rate changes by
defining the probabilities of discrete events for
the LRM and compare them with the OPM
counterparts.
44Does discreteness matter?
- Let us ignore for a moment the discreteness of
policy rate and evaluate the following simple LRM
using OLS - ?RRt Xtß et,
- where ?RRt the reference rate change, Xt -
vector of explanatory variables, and et
disturbance term, assumed to be normal iid (0,
s²).
45Does discreteness matter?
- We can define the probabilities of discrete
outcomes of ?RRt as follows - Pr (?RRt -0.50) Pr (-8 lt Xtß et lt c1)
- Pr (?RRt -0.25) Pr (c1 Xtß et lt c2)
- Pr (?RRt 0.00) Pr (c2 Xtß et lt c3)
- Pr (?RRt gt 0.25) Pr (c3 Xtß et lt 8),
- where -8 lt c1 lt c2 lt c3 lt 8 are some known fixed
cut-points.
46Does discreteness matter?
- Let us refer to such a LRM, extended to estimate
the probabilities of discrete events, as to a
rounded linear regression model (RLRM). To
compute the probabilities we just have to choose
the values of cut-points.
47Does discreteness matter?
- The probabilities of discrete outcomes for the
RLRM can be now contrasted to the corresponding
probabilities for the OPM
48Does discreteness matter?
- These measures of fit are useful in comparing
competing models, but can provide only a rough
guidance in selecting the preferred model.
Without doing a formal test, however, it is
unclear which model is the best one.
49Does discreteness matter?
- Formal comparison of RLRM and OPM can be
done by noting that the RLRM is a actually a
special case of interval regression model (IRM),
while the IRM itself is nested in the OPM. - Consequently, all three models can be
estimated by ML and, hence, may be compared
using, for example, the LR chi-square test.
50Does discreteness matter?
51Does discreteness matter?
- All tests are in favor of the OPM!
- Thus, not only does the OPM reveal considerably
better measures of fit than the RLRM and IRM, but
also it is clearly superior on the basis of
formal statistical test.
52Does discreteness matter?
- The information gained by a more complex
discrete-response technique like OPM is not
attainable with the simpler continuous-response
linear regression techniques.
53- Discreteness does matter!
54Modeling monetary policy in real timedoes
discreteness matter?
- Andrei Sirchenko
- European University Institute, Florence, Italy
-
- This research was supported financially by the
Global Development Networks grant R05-1861,
distributed by the Economics Education and
Research Consortium. - The author is also grateful to Michael
Beenstock, Wojciech Charemza and Victor
Polterovich - for valuable comments and support
Patrick Graham, Beata Idzikowska, Jaroslaw
Jakubik, Jakub Jaworowski, Marynia Kruk, Tomasz
Lyziak, Barbara Sladkowska, Piotr Szpunar, Mark
Wynne and Reuters-Warsaw for help with getting
statistical data Joao Santos Silva for useful
suggestions and explanations TechnoNICOL for
providing a computer Timo Mitze, Alexis
Belianin, Michal Brzoza-Brzezina, Dariusz Filar,
Andrzej Slawinski and other participants at
XIIIth Spring Meeting of Young Economists and
Research Seminars at Higher School of Economics
and National Bank of Poland for useful comments.
55(No Transcript)