Information Sharing Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina

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Information Sharing Lessons Learned from
Hurricane Katrina

• March 13, 2006

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Hurricane Katrina

• Highest Sustained Winds 175 mph
• Fatalities 1,422
• Damages 75B

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Investigations

• Our mandate was clear gather facts about the
  preparation for and response to Katrina, at all
  levels of government.

Investigate aggressively, follow the facts
wherever they may lead, and find out what went
right and what went wrong. Ask why
coordination and information sharing between
local, state, and federal governments was so
dismal.
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Investigations

• Finding Lack of communications and situational
  awareness paralyzed command and control.

Communications between DOD and DHS, and in
particularly FEMA, during the immediate week
after landfall, reflect a lack of information
sharing, near panic, and problems with process.
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Information Sharing

• What we have here is a failure to communicate.

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Panelists

• Dave Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor
• Bureau of Justice Assistance
• Harlin McEwen, Chairman
• IACP Communications and Technology Committee

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Chief Harlin R. McEwen Chairman Communications
Technology Committee International Association of
Chiefs of Police Communications Advisor Major
Cities Chiefs Association Major County Sheriffs'
Association National Sheriffs'
Association Chief of Police (Ret) City of
Ithaca, NYFBI Deputy Assistant Director (Ret)
Washington, DC [phone] ?
chiefhrm_at_pubsaf.com
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SEARCH 2006 Symposium on Justice Public Safety
Information Sharing Washington, DC March 13,
2006
Information Sharing Lessons Learned from
Hurricane Katrina
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
People plan for a disaster, and we have them
frequently. However, Katrina was a catastrophe.
She brought different challenges than the Florida
hurricanes in 2004. Sheriff Kevin Beary,
Orange County, Florida FCC Hurricane Katrina
Independent Panel, January 30, 2006
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
Although Public Safety communications are
delivered in a number of ways, most agencies rely
upon their traditional government owned or leased
land mobile radio systems. Such systems are
usually built to plan for unusual stresses.
Public Safety also relies upon commercial
cellular type services, and to a smaller degree
on satellite communications, for supplemental or
back up communications services, but
unfortunately those services are not always
reliable when public safety needs them the most.
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications

• PRIORITY 1
• Reliable Agency Specific Voice Communications
• Public Safety mission critical every day voice
  communications
• PRIORITY 2
• Reliable InterAgency Voice Communications
• This is what we commonly refer to as
  Interoperability
• PRIORITY 3
• Reliable Data Communications
• There is an increasing need for Public Safety to
  have access to secure text messaging, documents,
  photographs, diagrams, streaming video

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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
Reliable means whenever public safety personnel
need to communicate that it works !!!! 1. They
can reach the intended target directly or
through a radio tower base station or
repeater 2. There is an available radio
channel 3. The radio has power This is true at
all times and not just during disasters or
catastrophes
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications

• Reliable means that public safety must plan for
• Every day peak service times and large incidents
• Radio system disruptions such as power outages,
  tower failures, system interconnect failures
• Personal radio equipment failures
  (electrical/mechanical problems, battery failure,
  etc.)
• 4. Catastrophic wide area failures of almost
  everything

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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
Public Safety has traditionally planned for
short term events/disasters not long term
widespread catastrophes Five outcomes from
Katrina stand out in the reports so far 1.
Tower/Infrastructure Failures 2. Power Failures
Tower Sites, Dispatch Centers, Portable
Radio Batteries 3. Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) and Network Infrastructure
Failures (landline microwave) 4. Public Safety
personnel issues 5. Need for deployable systems
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
1. Tower/Infrastructure Failures Most Public
Safety radio systems are designed to account for
the possibility of a single tower site failure,
resulting from the loss of the actual tower, the
failure of a base station or repeater, and/or
loss of commercial power. In the case of
Hurricane Katrina, the affected area (parts of 4
states) was equal to the size of Great Britain,
about 90,000 square miles. When many or all
tower sites are damaged or destroyed as the
result of a catastrophic event, contingency plans
must be in place to quickly install temporary
alternative Public Safety communications. Such
plans must include prior arrangements for
bringing in temporary self-contained
communications systems including power generating
equipment that will enable delivery of basic
communications services
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
2. Power Failures For Tower Sites and Dispatch
Centers, most Public Safety agencies plan for
power failures, but generally those plans are for
24-48 hours of outage rather than several days or
weeks. Generators are usually powered by
gasoline, diesel, natural gas, or propane. Soon
after Hurricane Katrina struck it was realized
that fuel supplies were not readily available and
the natural gas supply was disrupted
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
2. Power Failures Public Safety uses
rechargeable portable radio batteries that are
limited to 8-10 hour duty cycles. Throwaway
batteries are costly and have limited storage or
shelf life. In many cases the portable radio
charging units were either destroyed or there was
no generating power to power the chargers. With
no way to charge the batteries the portable radio
units became useless. Satellite services
(SatCom) were also utilized where traditional
land mobile services were out of service but the
same issues applied to hand held satellite units
when they did not have batteries to power the
units.
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications

• Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
• Network Infrastructure Failures (Landline
  Microwave)
• The failure of the PSTN created massive outages
  in Public Safety land mobile communications
  networks and 911 services. Most land mobile
  systems depend on interconnection through the
  PSTN or by microwave links, many of which were
  destroyed or out of power and inoperable.

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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
4. Public Safety personnel issues The failure
to plan for personnel problems resulting from a
disaster or a catastrophic event like Katrina is
a major problem. Public Safety has to be
prepared to support their personnel in first
assuring that their families are out of harms
way. This is essential if they are to be
expected to attend to their public safety
functions. There must be plans to feed, clothe
and house personnel during and after disasters
and catastrophic events.
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
5. Need for deployable communications
systems We need deployable systems that can be
brought into an area where communications
infrastructure is inoperable or has been
destroyed. Commercial services do have what are
known as Cellular Systems on Wheels (COWS) but in
large scale catastrophes like Katrina there are
simply not enough of them and we need similar
deployable systems that are available to replace
traditional public safety communications.
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Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For
Emergency Communications
The lessons learned can easily apply to any short
term disaster or long term catastrophic event,
whether a natural disaster such as a hurricane,
tornado, flood, forest fire, earthquake, or a
terrorist attack such as the events of 9/11. The
lessons tell us to be prepared for more than the
short time outages that we have traditionally
planned for
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Our spirit
bent, but not broken
Slidell Police Radio Tower
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Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March
13, 2006 Additional Observations
Public Safety today faces increased and more
complex communications requirements. Public
Safety still must handle the criminal
investigations, responses to traffic accidents,
firefighting and emergency medical situations
that we have always faced day-to-day. In
addition, we are planning for increased
prevention and response activities related to
natural disasters like Katrina, and to address
potential terrorist activities. Most day-to-day
operations require better coordination among
departments within a jurisdiction while
preparation for disasters and catastrophic events
require better communications across multiple
levels of government. Existing communications
must be maintained and improved. It must be
recognized that there is simply not enough local,
state and federal funds to provide for the
wholesale replacement of Public Safety
communications systems as some have proposed.
However, new tools are being developed which will
enhance current capabilities.
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Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March
13, 2006 Additional Observations

• Moving into the 21st century, we have the
  advantage of some key resources such as new
  spectrum and ingenuity.
• New spectrum and necessity spur ingenuity, both
  by Public Safety agencies and by our industry
  partners.
• Some examples are
• New Gateway or Patching products that allow for
  the interconnection of systems on difference
  radio bands and to connect systems of different
  vintages and manufacturers.
• New broadband equipment is becoming available for
  operation in the 4.9 GHz band. Also,
  manufacturers are discussing ways to integrate
  4.9 systems with traditional systems through IP
  connections. Our Public Safety agencies are
  testing these new options and developing ways to
  use these tools to help protect the public.

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Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March
13, 2006 Additional Observations

• The 700 MHz band has generated the manufacture of
  standardized dual band voice radios covering both
  the 700 and 800 MHz spectrum. This means that
  Public Safety agencies can start to build up 700
  MHz capability at the same time they expand or
  replace their 800 MHz radios. We never had this
  opportunity in moving from VHF to UHF or UHF to
  800 MHz.
• The legislation to clear 700 MHz by February,
  2009, has also given rise to increased Public
  Safety and industry discussions on technology for
  data. The National Public Safety
  Telecommunications Council (NPSTC) has developed
  a recommendation that would provide Public Safety
  users the flexibility to deploy either wideband
  or broadband data systems to match their needs.
  We look forward to the FCC opening a rulemaking
  on this issue and if approved, we should see
  further development of both wideband and
  broadband data equipment at 700 MHz over the next
  two to three years.

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Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March
13, 2006 Additional Observations

• Both satellite operators and radio manufacturers
  are developing ways to deploy satellite as a
  backup to provide communications when natural
  disasters like Katrina disable portions of the
  traditional land mobile radio infrastructure.
• Public Safety users and manufacturers are
  examining how commercial networks and dedicated
  private networks could be better leveraged and
  connected to provide more seamless mobility.
• All of these new ingenious tools will require
  funding to implement. We are working with
  Congress and the Administration to help increase
  the awareness of funding requirements.
• Finally, these new communications tools and
  potential funding increases provide a foundation.
  People - that is the Public Safety administrators
  and rank and file - are essential in deploying
  these advances to benefit the public we serve.
  Agencies are increasingly focused on planning and
  training to help improve Public Safety
  communications, both operability and
  interoperability.

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DHS/DOJ Katrina Rapid Assessment Teams

• Mississippi and Louisiana Teams

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DHS-DOJ Rapid Assessment Team

• Respond quickly to law enforcement needs
• Utilize personnel with specialized backgrounds
• New approach
• Multi-agency collaboration response
• Focused assessment and evaluation
• Listen to those affected on their turf
• Summarize findings - create play book for the
  future

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Lessons learned

• Complete collapse of justice system
• Law enforcement, Courts, Corrections
• Prosecution and Public Defenders
• Support services
• FEMA knowledge of rules imperative
• donated items can affect reimbursements
• housing for justice system employees
• awareness of forms and deadlines (60 days)
• Day-to-day funding a major issue
• Training is and will be an ongoing issue
• Stress, post traumatic shock, and psychological
  issues will be a predominant need
• Preparation, communication, and knowledge

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Recommendations

• Maintain and expand the multi-agency approach to
  assist criminal justice agencies in disaster
  situations
• Teams could help complete FEMA project worksheets
  to address public safety issues and expedite the
  process
• Develop a team approach between BJAs SAA, DHS
  SAA, State EOC, and FEMA representatives
• Provide technical assistance, e.g. data recovery
• Use a non-partisan facilitator to bring groups to
  table

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Information Sharing Lessons Learned from
Hurricane Katrina

• Dan Hawkins, Director
• SEARCH Public Safety Programs

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White House Report

• Critical Challenge Communications
• Communications challenges across the Gulf
  Coast region in Hurricane Katrinas wake were
  more a problem of basic operability than one of
  equipment or system interoperability.
• The complete devastation of the communications
  infrastructure left emergency responders and
  citizens without a reliable network across which
  they could coordinate.
• Although Federal, State, and local agencies had
  communications plans and assets in place, these
  plans and assets were neither sufficient nor
  adequately integrated to respond effectively to
  the disaster. - p. 55

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White House Report

• Critical Challenge Communications
• Federal, State, and local governments have not
  yet completed a comprehensive strategy to improve
  operability and interoperability to meet the
  needs of emergency responders. This inability to
  connect multiple communications plans and
  architectures clearly impeded coordination and
  communication at the Federal, State, and local
  levels. A
• comprehensive, national emergency communications
  strategy is needed to confront the challenges of
  incorporating existing equipment and practices
  into a constantly changing technological and
  cultural environment. - p. 56

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White House Report

• Military Assistance
• lack of an integrated command structure for
  both active duty and National Guard forces
  exacerbated communications and coordination
  issues during the initial response
• Similar issues of bifurcated operations and
  interoperability challenges were also present
  between the military and civilian leadership.
  This lack of inter-operable communications was
  apparent at the tactical level, resulting from
  the fact that emergency responders, National
  Guard, and active duty military use different
  equipment. - p. 43

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White House Report

• Lesson Learned
• The Department of Homeland Security should review
  our current laws, policies, plans, and strategies
  relevant to communications.
• Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland
  Security Council, with support from the Office of
  Science and Technology Policy, should develop a
  National Emergency Communications Strategy that
  supports communications operability and
  interoperability. - p. 44

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White House Report

• Recommendation Information Sharing
• Establish a National Information and Knowledge
  Management System.
• Departments and agencies, working with the NOC
  and the Program Manager for Information Sharing,
  should develop a national system of information
  management to provide a common operating picture
  which allows for the processing and timely
  provisioning of interagency infor-mation sources
  - p. 92

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• Discussion
• and
• Questions

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Lessons Learned Plan for Disruptions

• Progressive loss of routine systems
• Plan for overload and disruptions. Have a
  'emergency traffic' only plan. Move localized
  operations off the system.
• Plan for site trunking and conventional
  operations for systems normally trunked
• Plan for a single channel agency-wide. For what?
  Dispatch, intelligence, logistics support,
  cross-incident command coordination?
• Plan for ad hoc communications. Direct, analog
  simplex is the most basic, resilient form of
  radio communications. Katrina showed that
  agencies without plans to revert to direct
  communications lost a lot more than their
  infrastructure. The amateur radio service is a
  broad, pliable resource that can be leveraged
  more than it is in most jurisdictions. At the
  end of the world, cockroaches and hams will be
  left.

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Lessons Learned Plan for Disruptions

• Complete loss of routine systems
• Satellite telephones can be worth their weight in
  gold --- as long as they have batteries. They're
  still telephones though. And still have capacity
  limits. Reconfiguration necessary in preparation
  for Rita because of density of use nearby (LA).
• Satellite data gateways may be at least as
  important.
• Dependence on cell service for public safety
  operations is dangerous. Because of their
  asynchronous, inherently packet-switched mode of
  operations, cellular text messaging services once
  again proved more resilient than voice
  operations. Queuing abilities within the devices,
  at sites, and further across the disrupted
  network. Sites coming up and down, allowing
  traffic to pass, users passing through pockets of
  coverage. Slow communications preferable to no
  communications.
• The amateur radio service is a broad, pliable
  resource that can be leveraged more than it is in
  most jurisdictions.

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Lessons Learned Vendor

• Complete devastation was a reality
• Pre-stage equipment, when possible
• Sat-Phone didn't work (acted like cell system
  overload)
• First communication (and the only for a while)
  was Amateur operated shortwave
• A deployable Broadcast transmitter, FM or AM, was
  critical for EOCs to get the information out to
  the public, existing assets where down
• Reach back, particularly PSTN became a moral
  upper for first responders since all other means
  where out
• Infrastructure re-build was more feasible that
  overlay systems, even in the short term
• State/local, Federal and National policies need
  to be in place, but without the communication and
  logistic channels even those policies can not be
  unified
• Self sustaining
• Independence