HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM NK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

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HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM---NK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

• MSE 193/293
• 31 October, 2005
• William J. Perry

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REFERENCES

• Preventive Defense, Chapter 5
• North Korea Admits Having Secret Nuclear Arms
  Washington Post 17 Oct., 2002
• Back to the Brink Perry and Carter Washington
  Post OpEd 20 Oct., 2002
• Good Nukes Bad Nukes by Carter, Kanter, Perry,
  and Scowcroft New York Times 22 December 2003
• The Two Koreas Don Oberdorfer (Chpt. 12,13,
  14)
• Going Critical Gallucci et al.

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POLICY PAPER ON HYPOTHETICAL CRISIS

• 5-page (double space) limit
• Due on 9 November
• Paper will be graded on how well it demonstrates
  
• your knowledge of facts (lectures ref.)
• your ability to do objective analysis and
• your ability to write clearly

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HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM

• The date is 31 October, 2005
• Assumed facts prior to that date are based on
  actual history
• The scenario that develops in November is purely
  hypothetical
• The hypothetical situation is invented to test
  your ability to do objective analysis, not as a
  prediction as to what will happen

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HYPOTHETICAL 20 NOVEMBER 6-PARTY MEETING

• US offer
• Non-first strike pledge
• Will sign treaty to end Korean War
• Will open interest office, and consider
  embassy at later date
• Will agree to LWR only after dismantlement
• All of this conditional on NK rejoining NPT
  and accepting anytime-anywhere challenge
  inspections

6
6-PARTY MEETING (cont.)

• NK counteroffer
• Offers dismantlement only after LWR
• Offers to rejoin NPT inspection of Yongbyon by
  IAEA accepts one challenge inspection per year
• States that if their counteroffer is not
  accepted they would break off talks and ramp
  up production of plutonium at the rate of 10
  bombs per year and they would reserve the right
  to sell products of their nuclear program

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PROBLEM GROUND RULES

• NK crisis arises as a result of 20 Nov. 6-party
  meet
• President has called a Natl. Security meeting on
  25 November to decide what action he will direct
• Sec Def plans to recommend military action
• SecState plans to recommend further diplomacy
• You are an analyst working for SecDef
• or alternatively, SecState (you choose)
• He (she) has asked you to prepare an analysis
  with objective arguments supporting his (her)
  decision

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TWO ALTERNATIVES(you must pick A or B do not
mix provisions)

• Alternative A SecDef
• Do not bargain away dismantlement and
  inspection provisions in US offer
• Do not allow further nukes to be built
• Authorize a military strike on Yongbyon to
  destroy all facilities---can be done with high
  confidence and with no US casualties.
• Alternative B SecState
• Accept NK counteroffer with only minor
  modifications
• LWR can be attacked if NK does not fulfill
  agreement
• Our satellites (more open NK) provide adequate
  verif.

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PRESIDENTS GUIDANCE(before 25 Nov. meeting)

• I will base my decision primarily on which
  alternative makes the better case for reducing
  the likelihood of a terrorist detonating a
  nuclear bomb in one of our cities as a result of
  bombs or fissile material obtained from NK

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JOINT CHIEFS ESTIMATE(must take as given)

• Strike at Yongbyon will destroy all facilities at
  Yongbyon and all fissile material based there
  (p1). It can be done using existing cruise
  missiles with no casualties to US forces and
  minimal casualties to NKs
• NK could not get facilities operating again for
  at least 5 years, at which time we could take out
  again

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CIA ESTIMATE--- NK RESPONSE TO ATTACK(each
probability independent)

• NK has made 4 bombs Pu for 6 more p1
• All Pu is destroyed in attack
  p1
• 4 bombs survive attack
  p.8
• NK would sell bomb to terrorist
  p.4
• (p is low because NK cannot make more)
• Terrorist successful with bomb
  p.5

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CIA ESTIMATE---NK RESPONSE TO TREATY(each
probability independent)

• NK has made 4 bombs Pu for 6 more
  p1
• NK turns in all Pu
  p1
• NK cheats, doesnt turn in bombs
  p.3
• NK turns in bombs, but covertly builds more
  p.2
• NK would sell bomb to terrorist
  p.6
• Terrorist would be successful with bomb
  p.5

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GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE PROBLEM

• Numbers are not realistic (they were cooked up
  to make the problem interesting).
• The problem is oversimplified (we are overlooking
  the highly enriched uranium program) to make the
  calculations relatively easy
• You cannot argue with the CIA estimates BUT you
  should do a sensitivity analysis on them
• You cannot argue with the presidents guidance,
  but you should do a qualitative analysis of
  other factors