EMPIRICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO PARADOXICAL PATTERNS OF INTUITION

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EMPIRICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO
PARADOXICAL PATTERNS OF INTUITION

• Jennifer Nagel, University of Toronto

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• Epistemic intuitions have mystique.

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• Epistemic intuitions have mystique.
• I am going to try to destroy a little bit of
  that, empirically, for one class of intuitions.

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• Epistemic intuitions have mystique.
• I am going to try to destroy a little bit of
  that, empirically, for one class of intuitions.
• But my ultimate aim will be to highlight an issue
  that is not empirical.

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OUTLINE

• The Harman-Vogel pattern of intuitions
• The closure principle
• Overview of dual-process psychology
• Dual-process psychology and the Harman-Vogel
  pattern
• Distinguishing empirical and non-empirical
  concerns

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SECTION 1 THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN OF INTUITIONS
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THE LOTTERY PARADOX, KNOWLEDGE VERSION

• You hold a ticket in a fair one-in-a-million
  lottery.
• The drawing has just been held, but the winner
  has not been announced.
• Do you know that your ticket is not the winner?

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Bill knows that he is meeting his friend Mary for
  lunch tomorrow.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Bill knows that he is meeting his friend Mary for
  lunch tomorrow.

• Bill knows that Marys ticket in tomorrows fair
  one-in-a-million lottery will not win.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Bill knows that he is meeting his friend Mary for
  lunch tomorrow.
• EASY to accept.

• Bill knows that Marys ticket in tomorrows fair
  one-in-a-million lottery will not win.
• HARD to accept.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN
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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Smith knows that his car is on Avenue A, where he
  parked it an hour ago.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Smith knows that his car is on Avenue A, where he
  parked it an hour ago.

• Smith knows that his car is not one of the
  hundreds of cars that are stolen every day across
  the country.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Smith knows that his car is on Avenue A, where he
  parked it an hour ago.
• EASY to accept.

• Smith knows that his car is not one of the
  hundreds of cars that are stolen every day across
  the country.
• HARD to accept.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN
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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Looking at the striped animal in the zoo, Fred
  knows that it is a zebra.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Looking at the striped animal in the zoo, Fred
  knows that it is a zebra.

• Looking at the striped animal in the zoo, Fred
  knows that it is not a cleverly disguised mule.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Looking at the striped animal in the zoo, Fred
  knows that it is a zebra.
• EASY to accept.

• Looking at the striped animal in the zoo, Fred
  knows that it is not a cleverly disguised mule.
• HARD to accept.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• LAX

• STRINGENT

• The proposition that is initially psychologically
  EASY to accept.

• The proposition that is initially psychologically
  HARD to accept.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Problem the LAX proposition is known to entail
  the STRINGENT one.
• Why does the lower-probability proposition seem
  easier to know than the higher-probability
  proposition it is known to entail?

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• Although LAX is initially easier to accept than
  STRINGENT, accepting LAX while rejecting
  STRINGENT is incoherent.

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THE HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN

• On reflection we can either give up outright
  belief in LAX or find a way to accept STRINGENT,
  restoring coherence.

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SECTION 2 CLOSURE
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SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS

• If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P,
  thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining
  ones knowledge that P, one comes to know that Q.
  (Hawthorne 2005)

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SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS

• Keith DeRose denying closure yields intuitively
  bizarre results (1995)
• Duncan Pritchard Denying closure is not an easy
  thing to do since the principle is so
  incredibly compelling. (2009)
• Timothy Williamson (who actually names a
  somewhat stronger principle intuitive closure)
  urges that we should be very reluctant to reject
  intuitive closure, for it is intuitive. (2000)

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SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS

• If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P,
  thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining
  ones knowledge that P, one comes to know that Q.
  (Hawthorne 2005)
• Notice that if what matters is just our
  performance under reflection, we do not violate
  closure.

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SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS

• If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P,
  thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining
  ones knowledge that P, one comes to know that Q.
  (Hawthorne 2005)
• Notice that if what matters is just our
  performance under reflection, we do not violate
  closure although we might seem to court
  skepticism.
• And if our initial performance matters too, we
  might seem to court contextualism.

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SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS

• Hawthorne on STRINGENT claims like I am not a
  BIV
• I have an immediate and strong inclination to say
  that I do not know such things in a way that I do
  not, for example, have any such immediate
  inclination to say that I do not know that I am
  working on a computer right now. Of course, I
  might derivatively generate some inclination to
  say that I do not know the latter via reflection
  on the former. But in the case of the former,
  doubts are natural and immediate, whereas in the
  case of the latter, doubts tend to be derivative.
  We should all at least agree that the relevant
  contrast is a salient fact about human psychology
  and that it is one of the bases of epistemic
  puzzlement. (2005, 33)

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SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS

• Hawthorne on STRINGENT claims like I am not a
  BIV
• I have an immediate and strong inclination to say
  that I do not know such things in a way that I do
  not, for example, have any such immediate
  inclination to say that I do not know that I am
  working on a computer right now. Of course, I
  might derivatively generate some inclination to
  say that I do not know the latter via reflection
  on the former. But in the case of the former,
  doubts are natural and immediate, whereas in the
  case of the latter, doubts tend to be derivative.
  We should all at least agree that the relevant
  contrast is a salient fact about human psychology
  and that it is one of the bases of epistemic
  puzzlement. (2005, 33)

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SECTION 3 AN OVERVIEW OF DUAL PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY
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DUAL PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY
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DUAL PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY
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DUAL PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY
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DUAL PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY
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DUAL PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY
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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• Contemporary dual process theory has two main
  roots (1) the heuristic-analytic theory of
  reasoning of Wason and Evans and (2) the
  heuristics and biases program of Kahneman and
  Tversky
• One of Kahneman and Tverskys best-known
  experiments concerns a pattern of judgment in
  which lower-probability events are more easily
  accepted than higher-probability events, even by
  subjects who are capable of explicitly
  recognizing the disparity and direction of
  disparity in the probabilities involved.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• Linda a single, outspoken, and very bright
  31-year-old who had majored in philosophy, and
  had been deeply concerned with issues of
  discrimination and social justice as a student,
  and active in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• Linda is a teacher in an elementary school.
• Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga
  classes.
• (a) Linda is active in the feminist movement.
• Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
• Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
• (b) Linda is a bank teller.
• Linda is an insurance salesperson.
• (c) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
  feminist movement.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• (a) Linda is active in the feminist movement.
• (b) Linda is a bank teller.
• (c) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
  feminist movement.
• Amid decoys, about 90 of naïve undergraduates
  and about 85 of graduate students trained in
  statistics rank (c) more likely than (b),
  violating the conjunction rule.
• When decoys are stripped away, about 85 of naïve
  and 36 of sophisticated subjects still rank (c)
  more likely than (b).

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• (a) Linda is active in the feminist movement.
• (b) Linda is a bank teller.
• (c) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
  feminist movement.
• Both naïve and statistically sophisticated
  subjects acknowledge the validity of the
  conjunction rule when their attention is directed
  to it, and can readily see that it applies here.
• On reflection, subjects correct their judgments,
  bringing them into coherence.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• The representativeness heuristic
• Instead of calculating the probabilities of
  particular outcomes as a function of the various
  elementary probabilities on which they depend, we
  intuitively assess the similarity of an outcome
  to an existing mental stereotype or model.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• Subjects who get the Linda problem right take
  longer to answer than those who get it wrong (De
  Neys 2006).
• Performance on this task suffers under cognitive
  load (De Neys 2006).
• There is evidence that those who get it right
  still generate the (c) over (b) ranking
  initially, and then suppress it when they
  recognize that this ranking violates the rules of
  probability.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• In the Linda problem, System 1 generates a
  response, and System 2 may inhibit that response.
• Some problems (e.g. what is 7567 13?) do not
  generate an initial System 1 response System 2
  tackles these problems directly with sequential
  reasoning.

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DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY

• Our default mode of judgment is System 1.
• Individuals with higher working memory span do
  have a stronger tendency to shift up to System 2
  when cued or motivated to do so, but are not in
  general more likely to engage in System 2
  reasoning in the absence of any cue or motivation
  (Stanovich and West 2008).

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SECTION 4 DUAL-PROCESS PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
HARMAN-VOGEL PATTERN
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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• FACT Negating a hypothetical possibility is an
  operation that can be performed only in System 2.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• FACT Negating a hypothetical possibility is an
  operation that can be performed only in System 2.
• CLAIM All the entries in the STRINGENT column
  involve the negation of a hypothetical
  possibility. (PS many of them also have other
  System 2 triggers.)

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL
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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• FACT we process affirmative and routine
  judgments in System 1, unless there is special
  motivation to do otherwise.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• FACT we process affirmative and routine
  judgments in System 1, unless there is special
  motivation to do otherwise.
• CLAIM all of the judgments in the LAX column are
  routine, all but one of them are affirmative.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Um, what about that judgment in the LAX column
  that has a negation in it?

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Q Can System 1 handle this assessment?
• many normal people of modest means will be
  willing, under normal circumstances, to judge
  that they know that they will not have enough
  money to go on an African safari in the near
  future.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Negation can be seen as a prototype of an
  abstract, rule-based reasoning process.
  Particularly, explicit negations require a
  propositional representation, in which the
  meaning of the negated construct (e.g., This is
  not a friend) is activated and maintained in
  working memory while the meaning of the negated
  proposition (e.g., This is an enemy) is
  construed.
• Deutsch, Gawronski and Strack, 2006 At the
  Boundaries of Automaticity Negation as
  Reflective Operation

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• The processing of negations has been shown to
  put substantial stress on the cognitive system
  (Lea Mulligan, 2002 see also Gilbert, 1991).
  For instance, logical reasoning becomes slower
  and more prone to error if negations are part of
  premises or conclusions (e.g., Evans, Newstead,
  Byrne, 1993 Wason, 1959).
• Deutsch, Gawronski and Strack, 2006 At the
  Boundaries of Automaticity Negation as
  Reflective Operation

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• memory-based automaticity can be expected if
  practice creates associations between the
  representation of the stimuli and the correct
  solution in memory. For instance, the compound
  term no way is a frequently used expression in
  everyday English. As such, the meaning of this
  term may be activated in memory without applying
  the operation of negation. That is, the compound
  term may have acquired independent meaning in
  associative memory, which does not require
  controlled construal processes upon the
  perception of the two words.
• Deutsch, Gawronski and Strack, 2006 At the
  Boundaries of Automaticity Negation as
  Reflective Operation

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Upshot evaluating negated expressions can be
  driven by memory retrieval instead of the
  application of the procedure to negate.
• Deutsch, Gawronski and Strack, 2006 At the
  Boundaries of Automaticity Negation as
  Reflective Operation

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• One tentative suggestion If the expression man
  of modest means already incorporates a negative
  component (in its upper bound), and if in saying
  that the man of modest means will not be able to
  afford a lavish vacation we are just unpacking
  this restriction, then we can form the
  problematic LAX judgment associatively, or from
  memory, rather than by representing the
  hypothetical scenario and negating it.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• How do you think about this passage?
• many normal people of modest means will be
  willing, under normal circumstances, to judge
  that they know that they will not have enough
  money to go on an African safari in the near
  future.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• LAX judgments System 1
• STRINGENT judgments System 2
• Q1 Why are we initially inclined to grant
  knowledge of the LAX claims?
• Q2 Why are we initially inclined to deny
  knowledge of the STRINGENT claims?
• Q3 What happens on reflection?

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Lucy knows that the current US President is
  Barack Obama.
• The System 1 response to this cue would evaluate
  it on the basis of prior belief, say by computing
  the acceptability of this predication of
  knowledge on the basis of its similarity to some
  prototypical representation of knowing.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Lucy knows that no one has assassinated Barack
  Obama in the last hour.
• System 2 is cued by the need to negate a
  hypothetical possibility. Systematic assessment
  of the predication of knowledge would typically
  involve representing Lucys evidential position,
  and checking whether she could reason her way to
  the STRINGENT judgment without bias.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• Considered on reflection, now with the
  assassination worry in mind Lucy knows that the
  current US President is Barack Obama.
• Now that we are in System 2, when we go back to
  this LAX claim, we will naturally judge Lucys
  claim systematically, starting from the
  representation of Lucys evidence, and typically
  finding that the most she should say is that it
  is highly likely that Obama is President.
• It may be a mistake to evaluate Lucy as though
  she were reasoning in System 2 ( epistemic
  egocentrism).

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• LAX Looking at the striped animal in the zoo,
  Fred knows that it is a zebra.
• STRINGENT Looking at the striped animal in the
  zoo, Fred knows that it is not a cleverly
  disguised mule.
• System 2 is cued by the need to negate a
  hypothetical possibility. Systematic assessment
  of the predication of knowledge would typically
  involve representing Freds evidential position,
  and checking whether he could reason his way to
  the STRINGENT judgment without bias.
• Because attention is drawn to Freds visual
  information here, it initially seems he could
  not. But taking the time to ponder his probable
  evidential base further, we may come to decide
  that he could. His larger evidential base also
  supports LAX unproblematically. Coherence is
  restored.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• FACT We are not in general aware of the fact
  that we have switched from System 1 to System 2
  in handling a given problem (Cary and Reder
  2002).
• SUGGESTION It feels odd to revise a belief when
  ones evidence has not changed, but what matters
  for knowledge is not only ones evidence, but
  also ones available paths for handling this
  evidence (Weisberg).

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• What about closure?

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• What about closure?
• Explicit deduction is invariably a System 2
  process, so the fact that the judgments in the
  Harman-Vogel pattern are individually intuitive
  over a switch in modes does not show that someone
  could satisfy the antecedent of the closure
  principle without satisfying the consequent.

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• What about skepticism?

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DUAL PROCESS MEETS HARMAN-VOGEL

• What about skepticism?
• Notice that we judged LAX twice positively when
  in System 1 and then negatively when in System 2.
  
• Given the truth-relevant differences between the
  systems, perhaps we dont have to choose between
  these responses. Perhaps we got it right both
  times (for first-person judgments) perhaps we
  were guilty of epistemic egocentrism (for
  third-person judgments).
• (P.S. this doesnt entail contextualism).

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SECTION 5 DISTINGUISHING EMPIRICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS
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THE EMPIRICAL AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL

• If we have an answer to the question why do
  these knowledge ascriptions feel natural?, this
  is not to say that we have an answer to the
  question which of these knowledge ascriptions
  are right?

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THE EMPIRICAL AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL

• To figure out what we ought to say about
  knowledge, it will not be enough to check many
  intuitions about particular cases.
• In adjudicating the balance of respect to be
  given to System 1 and System 2 in our ascriptions
  of knowledge, we will need to weigh the value of
  two competing desiderata the pursuit of truth
  and the avoidance of error.
• Figuring out the extent to which we ought to
  pursue each of those goals is not an empirical
  task.

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• the end