Title: Growth Framework: macroeconomic environment and investment climate
1Growth Framework macroeconomic environment and
investment climate
- CEM for Republic of Belarus
2Main Message
- Recent performance was strong and based on a
certain set of competitive advantages - The effect of these advantages has been eroded
- Earlier growth drivers weakened, while no
replacement has emerged - We expect a slowdown in growth if there is no
policy reform - Moreover, the economy is highly vulnerable to
external shocks
3GDP Growth and Poverty Outcomes are impressive
4Broad based growth
- Growth benefits are broadly shared among
different population groups - Income/wage policy a high share of GDP growth
was channeled to finance wage increases - High growth in labor intensive sectors
- Low cross-sectoral differentiation in wages
- 40 reduction in employment in agriculture
5Average Annual GDP Growth,
6Two growth phasesPhase I 1996-2000
- The expansionist monetary policy that helped to
keep the real value of the Belarusian rubel low - The policy of multiple exchange rates that was
used as an instrument of hidden targeted support
for some exporters and as a tool of taxation for
others - The strict policy of wage and price controls that
helped to keep production costs low and support
cost advantages of traditional exports - The encouragement of barter transactions with
Russia, which in combination with multiple
exchange rates generated a considerable resource
transfer to Belarusian exporters - The active political re-integration with Russia,
which resulted in improved market access, ensured
preservation of preferable gas import prices, as
well as tolerance of energy arrears it also
helped to improve capacity utilization in oil
refineries and secure a debt write-off in 1996
7Cost advantage against Russia
8Two growth phasesPhase II 2001 - onwards
- Improved macro policies unified exchange rate,
stricter monetary policy, considerable fiscal and
quasi-fiscal adjustment, and lower inflation - Energy and utility policy that aimed at attaining
full cost recovery in tariffs and strict payment
discipline - New wage and income policies that stimulated
domestic demand - Phasing out barter, which inter alia helped
somewhat accelerate export diversification out of
the Russian market - Maintaining its political and administrative
effort aimed at the preservation of the
Belarusian traditional niche at the Russian
market - Improved external environment (oil prices,
Russian growth, etc.)
9Cost Recovery in Housing
10Significant Fiscal Adjustment
11Reduced Inflation Tax
12External Debt to GDP Ratio,
13Inflation remains high
14Incidence of State Support, of GDP
15Weaknesses of the Macro Framework
- High level of re-distribution a heavy tax burden
and excessive government interventions - Government spending is concentrated on social
spending and housing , while less funding is
available for public investments in
infrastructure - Subsidization remains high, especially in
agriculture - High share of intermediary product
under-developed service sector, as well as a
relatively low level of value added in industry - Profit/wage ratio is low hampers both savings
and investments in the real sector - The financial sector remains under-developed even
relative to the modest saving level.
16Major Macroeconomic Risks
- Low international reserves
- High dependence on a single and unstable export
market (Russia) - High concentration of the economy
- Large size of the government
- Vulnerabilities in the banking sector
- The pension system is unsustainable
- Costs of adjustment to future higher prices of
Russian energy
17Index of Economic Freedom
18Incidence of Price Control
19Restrictive Employment Policies
20Business Registration is too Slow (days)
21Trade Restricting Logic of Economic Policymaking
- Pressures to meet output targets
- Regional support for local enterprises
- Restrictions for imports and inter-regional
competition - Monopolization of regional markets
- Threat of Import Substitution
22Perception of Corruption, 2002
23Market Socialism Re-discovered?
- Similarities with market socialism in Yugoslavia
and Hungary in the 70s, not real transition as we
see it in the CEE - Excessive state ownership and government control
- This model proved to have fundamental weaknesses
soft budget constraint, over-borrowing,
inflation, weak export performance, and external
debt problems
24Economic Policiesnot conductive to growth in
competitiveness
- High cost economy taxes, interest rates, price
controls, costs of administrative interventions - Business environment is difficult for new entry
marginal growth from the new private sector,
depressed FDI diminished opportunities for
productivity growth and export expansion - Expensive subsidization undermines competition
- Trade regime high incidence of NTBs discourages
trade and will be a major barrier for global and
regional integration
25Recommendations
- Strengthening market discipline for traditional
enterprises - - downsize and restructure existing system of
state support - - advance trade liberalization to expand
international competition - - accelerate exit of non-viable firms
- - harden budget constrains (esp. in the
agro-food sector) - - ensure financial sustainability and efficiency
of the energy sector - Encourage growth by reducing operating costs
- - reduce tax burden and reform tax structure
- - liberalize employment and wage policies
- - advance price liberalization
- - reduction regulatory costs of doing business
- - limit discretionary administrative
interference - - accelerate reform of standards system
- - consolidate recent progress towards a stable
macroeconomic environment
26Urgent steps to improve investment image
- FDI level integral measure of reform progress
- Measure of progress towards export
diversification, enterprise restructuring - New Policy Initiatives
- - Expansion of FEZs (Chinese experience)
- - Several visable privatizations (e.g. banks)
- - a targeted effort to attract FDI into ffod
processing - - Setting up an investment promotion agency
- - De-regulation trade restrictions, golden
share, registration procedures
27In the longer-term
- The comprehensive reform to sustain growth will
be needed sooner or later - Advance liberalization, privatization and
de-politization of the economy - Political will be required
- Currently, it is a great time to initiate such
reforms
28Window of opportunity
- Favorable conditions for acceleration of reforms
- growing economy
- positive trends in perceptions of both enterprise
and households - favorable global developments
- low debt
- strong administrative capacity of the state
- Belarus is well equipped to mitigate potential
costs of reforms