Denying Armageddon: Preventing Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons

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Denying ArmageddonPreventing Terrorist Use of
Nuclear Weapons
Michael V. Hynes, John E. Peters, and Joel
KvitkyRAND Santa Monica
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Terrorist Groups Seeking Nuclear Weapons Are a
Relatively New Phenomenon

• Red terrorists of the sixties and seventies
  would never have pursued nuclear terrorism
• Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo see nuclear terrorism
  as part of their apocalyptic goals
• Osama bin Laden has stated that he wants nuclear
  weapons
• Aum Shinrikyo sought weapons at Kurchitov
  Institute in Moscow and tried to mine uranium in
  Australia

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Todays Terrorists Could Potentially Succeed

• Nuclear technologies and skilled personnel are
  more widespread than ever
• Unconventional designs and alternative isotopes
  make nuclear weapons easier to build than many
  appreciate
• Recent revelations raise concern about transfers
  of weapons or weapons-grade materials

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Nuclear Weapons Are the True Weapons of Mass
Destruction

• RANDs calculations show that a low-order yield
  from an improvised nuclear device could be
  devastating
• Biological and chemical weapons also pose serious
  threats, but they are orders of magnitude less
  lethal than nuclear weapons

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Research Questions

• How can the United States dissuade adversaries
  from pursuing nuclear weapons?
• How can the U.S. national security community
  discover and respond to those who seek nuclear
  weapons?
• What special technical capabilities are needed
  for the counternuclear mission?
• How should the United States focus its attention
  and resources to counter this threat?

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Research Questions

• How can the United States dissuade adversaries
  from pursuing nuclear weapons?
• How can the U.S. national security community
  discover and respond to those who seek nuclear
  weapons?
• What special technical capabilities are needed
  for the counternuclear mission?
• How should the United States focus its attention
  and resources to counter this threat?

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Nuclear Technologies, Material, and Personnel
Are Internationally Available

• Nuclear reactors exist around the world
• Reactors and associated technologies create a
  cadre of individuals skilled in the nuclear area
• Control regimes for the nuclear supplier group
  are ineffective

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The Illegitimate Nuclear MarketIs Segmented into
Two Elements
Opportunistic market
Low-ranking employees, amateurs
Participants
Typical materials
Mostly radioactive junk
Brokering mechanisms
Spontaneous, unstable networks
Subnational groups, middlemen, syndicates
Customers
Impact on terrorism
Low to moderate
Management technique
Market forces
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The Illegitimate Nuclear MarketIs Segmented into
Two Elements
Opportunistic market
Official market
Low-ranking employees, amateurs
Mid-level and senior government officials
Participants
Some weapon-grade isotopes and weapon know-how
Typical materials
Mostly radioactive junk
Criminal syndicates, government officials,
visiting scientists
Brokering mechanisms
Spontaneous, unstable networks
Nuclear-threshold states, undeclared nuclear
states, subnational groups
Subnational groups, middlemen, syndicates
Customers
Impact on terrorism
Low to moderate
Moderate to high
Management technique
Market forces
Incentives
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The United States Has the Means to Disrupt the
Opportunistic Market

• Myths about nuclear technologies abound
• The United States can
• perpetuate and manipulate these myths to drive
  actors from the market and/or lead them to bad
  technical choices
• increase transaction costs by exploiting the poor
  assessment capabilities of opportunistic market
  actors

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The United States Can Exert Tremendous Influence
on Incentives in the Official Market
Convince both buyers and sellers that

• nuclear forensics can reveal the source of
  nuclear materials
• transferring nuclear weapons and components will
  have grave consequences for them
• transfers will not
• provide real advantage over adversaries
• improve their position in the international
  system
• take them closer to their ultimate policy
  objectives

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Research Questions

• How can the United States dissuade adversaries
  from pursuing nuclear weapons?
• How can the U.S. national security community
  discover and respond to those who seek nuclear
  weapons?
• What special technical capabilities are needed
  for the counternuclear mission?
• How should the United States focus its attention
  and resources to counter this threat?

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Groups Seeking a Weapon Will Be Forced to Pursue
a Structured Acquisition Process
NO
Want a nuclear weapon?
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Groups Seeking a Weapon Will Be Forced to Pursue
a Structured Acquisition Process
NO
Want a nuclear weapon?
YES
Weaponization
Acquisition
Deployment
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Groups Seeking a Weapon Will Be Forced to Pursue
a Structured Acquisition Process
NO
Want a nuclear weapon?
YES
Weaponization
Acquisition
Deployment
Acquisition
Deployment
Weaponization
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Groups Seeking a Weapon Will Be Forced to Pursue
a Structured Acquisition Process
NO
Want a nuclear weapon?
YES
Weaponization
Acquisition
Deployment
Weaponization
Acquisition
Deployment
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PAF Identified Observables for Each Part of the
Process

• Work breakdown (excerpt)
• Critical assembly manufacture
• Casting of basic shapes
• Machining of final shapes

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PAF Identified Observables for Each Part of the
Process

• Work breakdown (excerpt)
• Critical assembly manufacture
• Casting of basic shapes
• Machining of final shapes

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Many Physical Aspects of a Nuclear Weapon
Development Program Are Detectable

• Low to moderate levels of radioactivity
• Special scattering and absorption characteristic
  of nuclear materials
• Ionized air cloud near radioactive materials
• Characteristic temperature and heat emission
• Electromagnetic interference from testse.g., of
  firing devices
• Special chemicals in the effluent from facilities
• Use of large amounts of electrical power
• Unique spectral responses to pulsed neutron
  sources and moderate-energy x-ray sources

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Many Process Aspects Are Also Detectable

• Recruitment and movement of personnel
• Development of knowledge and expertise
• Procurement and use of facilities
• Acquisition of specialized equipment
• Creation and movement of financial resources

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It Is Easier to Detect the Early Phases of a
Program Than to Locate a Finished Weapon
300
Working weapon
Build from parts
Number of associated observables
250
200
150
100
50
0
Resource management
Acquisition
Weaponization
Deployment
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Research Questions

• How can the United States dissuade adversaries
  from pursuing nuclear weapons?
• How can the U.S. national security community
  discover and respond to those who seek nuclear
  weapons?
• What special technical capabilities are needed
  for the counternuclear mission?
• How should the United States focus its attention
  and resources to counter this threat?

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There Are Many Sources of Intelligence About
Nuclear Programs
Current
Future

• Web intelligence
• Human intelligence
• Electro-optical, infrared, multispectral imaging
  sensors
• Radar sensors
• Signals interceptors in air and space
• Acoustic, seismic sensors on the ground
• Radiation detectors on conveyances, containers,
  portals

• Imaging sensors on microair vehicles and
  microbots
• Radar capable of penetrating foliage and the
  ground
• Chemical sensors (airborne, ground-based,
  microbots)
• Acoustic, seismic sensors on microbots
• Radiation detectors on microbots

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Lack of Persistent, Wide-Area Sensors Is a
Limitation for the Counternuclear Mission
?
?
Wide-area sensors gather first clues at sites of
interest

• Some wide-area possibilities
• Neutrino detection
• Hyperspectral intelligence
• Archival change detection

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Lack of Persistent, Wide-Area Sensors Is a
Limitation for the Counternuclear Mission
Cue other sensors to examine the site more
closely
?
?
Wide-area sensors gather first clues at sites of
interest

• Some wide-area possibilities
• Neutrino detection
• Hyperspectral intelligence
• Archival change detection

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Various Laser Techniques Can Examine Plumes from
Smokestacks of Interest

• Differential absorption lasers characterize the
  chemical composition of smoke plumes
• Infrared lasers work at shorter ranges to
  identify chemicals and oxides in smoke plumes

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Research Questions

• How can the United States dissuade adversaries
  from pursuing nuclear weapons?
• How can the U.S. national security community
  discover and respond to those who seek nuclear
  weapons?
• What special technical capabilities are needed
  for the counternuclear mission?
• How should the United States focus its attention
  and resources to counter this threat?

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The United States Should Increase Its Focus on
the Nuclear Weapons Marketplace

• Disrupt the opportunistic market
• Increase level of manpower and effort on traps,
  stings, and intelligence collection
• Promulgate myths to convince groups that nuclear
  weapons are too costly and risky to acquire

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The United States Should Increase Its Focus on
the Nuclear Weapons Marketplace

• Disrupt the opportunistic market
• Increase level of manpower and effort on traps,
  stings, and intelligence collection
• Promulgate myths to convince groups that nuclear
  weapons are too costly and risky to acquire
• Create and enforce incentives in the official
  market
• Strengthen international control regimes
• Control and monitor transfers of specialized
  materials, equipment, and personnel
• Institute new control regimes for alternative
  materials and technologies
• Export U.S. security systems and expertise to
  ensure foreign stockpiles are safe and secure

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It Should Also Invest More Resources in
Discovering Nuclear Weapons-Related Activities

• Increase focus of collection and analysis on the
  early phases of nuclear weapon development
  programs
• Aggressively pursue development of sensors
  specifically intended to search for nuclear
  weapon program observables
• Constantly scan existing sensor outputs and other
  intelligence sources for observables associated
  with these programs

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This Project Has Produced Several Important
Outcomes

• Focused attention on the counternuclear mission
• Demonstrated the leverage that early detection
  brings to the mission
• Led to PAFs 2004 sensor study
• Produced significant interest within government
  agencies
• Office of the Vice President
• National Security Council staff
• Department of Homeland Security
• Office of the Secretary of Defense
• U.S. Northern Command

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There is More Research to be Done

• Study of purpose built sensors and their
  platforms
• Chemical or radiological and ROCs
• Ground, airborne, or LEO
• Organizational issues for a Center for
  Counternuclear Operations - CNOP
• Two components discovery and response
• New data handling and reporting techniques for
  the discovery component (the intelligence
  community)
• New JTF in a combatant command
• Information and knowledge exchange and planning
• Integration of CNOP with new initiatives in the
  counter terrorism community.
• Policy implications of movement from
  nonproliferation to counterproliferation.

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