Title: RFID Privacy Issues and the ORCA System
1RFID Privacy Issues and the ORCA System
- Steve Shafer (stevensh_at_microsoft.com)
- Microsoft Research
- May 2007
2Steve Shafer, Microsoft Research
- Working in ubiquitous computing a long time
- Working with RFID at Microsoft
- Microsoft RFID whitepaper on RFID Privacy
- Was member of the CDT RFID Privacy Working Group
- Vice Chair of the Privacy Advisory Council of the
NFC Forum - Presented at UW in November 2006
3Today
- RFID privacy vocabulary guidelines
- Privacy Survey How ORCA measures up
- Note there are both RFID and non-RFID privacy
issues in ORCA - I am only qualified to address RFID issues
4Vocabulary Personal Data
- Personal Data consists of Personal ID and
Activity Records - Personal ID is data that describes or gives
access to a unique individual Subject - An Activity Record associates a Pseudonym with
data about activities, transactions, locations,
things, or other people - A Pseudonym is any unique data associated with a
unique individual Subject - Unique datum, or unique combination of non-unique
data - Unique value, or value drawn from a unique set of
values
5Vocabulary Privacy Violations
- Privacy Violations include Privacy Breaches and
Tracking - A Privacy Breach is a disclosure of Personal ID
to an unauthorized party - Tracking is a disclosure of Activity Records to
an unauthorized party
6Vocabulary - Authorization
- In a Mandatory system, authorization is
stipulated by the system operator - In a Voluntary system, the User provides
authorization through Informed Consent - The User is the individual who presents a tag to
the system - Informed Consent includes Notice and Consent (as
decribed in the guidelines)
7Vocabulary - Recap
- Personal Data
- Personal ID
- Privacy Breach
- Pseudonym Activity Record
- Tracking
- Subject User
- Authorized v. Unauthorized
- Mandatory
- Voluntary
- Informed Consent
8Guidelines I Principles
- The broadest relevant definition of Personal ID
should be applied. - How about index data? Non-actionable data?
- Personal ID should be Directional.
- Pseudonyms should be Directional
- but frequently theyre not.
9Guidelines II Informed Consent
- Informed Consent should be obtained before a User
enrolls in the system. - Notice should include the Personal Data, its
purposes, retention other policies, User
actions. - What about limitations on the purposes?
- Consent requires knowing, affirmative indication.
- Informed Consent should be obtained before any
transaction or activity. - Notice may be simply a logo.
- Consent may be simply the presentation of the tag.
10Guidelines III Security
- Personal Data should be made Directional both in
storage and communication. - Design security Minimize Personal Data.
- Physical security Keep the tag quiet
electronically. - Information security Make the software smart.
11Guidelines IV Data Handling
- Personal Data should be handled nicely.
- Only use it for agreed-upon purposes.
- Have a policy for data expiration.
- Ensure integrity and quality of data.
- Provide Users with access to data about them.
- Provide Users with a complaint mechanism.
- Take responsibility when data is sent to third
parties (details on next slide). - Review policies and practices regularly.
12Guidelines IVa Onward Transfer
- 7f. Sending Personal Data to a third party
- Tell the recipient what the data is authorized
for. - Take some steps to ensure the recipient uses the
data only for authorized purposes. - Take some steps to ensure the recipient abides by
reasonable principles for data handling. - If the User appeals your handling of the data,
propagate that appeal to the recipient.
13Apply These Guidelines to ORCA
- Some noteworthy points
- Transit users can elect to pay cash or use ORCA
cards without creating an account - Accounts are for replenishment or for
institutions - Institutional use may be Mandatory
- Personal ID is not on the card but many
Pseudonyms are there - Should U-Pass itself considered Personal ID?
- In fact, Personal Data is on the card, in the
form of an Activity Record (ride history of
your last 10 trips for each agency)
14Apply These Guidelines to ORCA
- Some more noteworthy points
- In theory, 14443 tags can be operated up to 10cm.
But they can be skimmed at 20-50cm, eavesdropped
at 10m, and detected at 20m. - In ORCA, the Contract Administrator can authorize
additional uses for the data!!! - Cohabiting applications may access ORCA data if
authorized by the Contract Admin.!! - ORCA data is to be encrypted by a key. But where
will the key live? - One key per tag? Agency? User?
15Apply These Guidelines to ORCA
- Some more noteworthy points
- ORCA requires card serial numbers. It also
requires that they be linkable to Personal ID. - (non-RFID) ORCA mandates Personal ID at central
database - Is this really required for the stated purposes,
i.e. replenishment linkage? - (non-RFID) ORCA mandates history of at least the
last 20 fare payments transfers in database - Is this really required for the stated purposes?
16(No Transcript)
17Stuff I Presented in November 2006 to the UW Law
School
- by Steve Shafer, Microsoft Corp.
18(No Transcript)
19Worthwhile Web Links
- http//www.cephas-library.com/nwo/nwo_the_year_of_
rfid_legislation.html - http//www.retail-leaders.org/new/resources/RFID_B
ill_Summaries_2005_08-31-05.pdf - http//info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_0651-
0700/sb_682_bill_20050815_amended_asm.html - http//info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_0651-
0700/sb_682_bill_20060807_amended_asm.html - http//info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_0751-
0800/sb_768_bill_20050902_amended_asm.html - http//www.cr80news.com/news/2006/10/02/governor-s
chwarzenegger-vetoes-controversial-antirfid-legisl
ation/ - http//www.retail-leaders.org/new/rlGovAffairs.asp
x?sectionGOVEISid5cid16 - http//www.cdt.org/privacy/20060501rfid-best-pract
ices.php
20Issues to Consider
- What is Privacy?
- What is RFID?
- What are the key initiatives of public interest?
- What are the privacy risks from RFID?
- What is happening with RFID privacy policy today?
- What are key issues for policymakers?
21What is Privacy?
- One definition Giving consumers control over
the collection and use of personal data
22The Privacy Community
Advocates Sociologists What makes people feel
uneasy?
CPOs Regulators What are the rules for
handling data?
Surveys Behavior Studies
Fair Information Practices Legislation
Regulation
Engineers How do I give control over
information?
Security Mechanisms Control UX
23Key RFID Technology Variations
32 Kbytes, UI, Sensors, Location, Security,
Active Tags
NFC / 14443 / SmartCards
dozens of variations
Tag Capability
256 Bytes
EPCglobal
ID Only
4 inches
10 feet
300 feet
Read/Write Range
24Key Privacy-Sensitive Forms of RFID
- EPCglobal ID number, 20-foot range
- For supply chain (pallets and cases)
- What if individual goods are labeled?
- RealID (state drivers licences) is similar to
this - NFC Lots of data, security, 2-inch range
- Payment cards, cell phones
- Personal data can be involved
- e-Passport uses NFC, also credit card companies
- Active RFID Idiosyncratic, 300-foot range
- Person-tracking by employers
- License plate tracking in UK
25What is Personal Data?
- Personal Identification
- Details about an individual person
- Primarily in ID documents / badges / cards
- Privacy violation is Breach
- Activity Records
- Accumulated based on pseudonym
- Primarily in consumer goods
- Privacy violation is Tracking
26PII Personally Identifiable Information
- Primary category of data protected by privacy
in US practice - Many different definitions, heres one
- any piece of information which can potentially
be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate
a single person - Wikipedia says it includes name (if not common),
govt. ID , phone , street address, email
address, vehicle plate , face / biometric, IP
address (sometimes) - Fairly loose and squishy definition
- Different sources have different definitions
- EU Personal Identification includes more
27RFID Privacy Breaches
- Leak of information through radio
- Collecting information not authorized
- Retaining information not authorized
- Using information in ways not authorized
- Sending information to third parties who are not
authorized - These apply to all IT systems, not just RFID
28RFID Radio Security
- Security is to protect data from access by
unauthorized parties - Types of attack
- Not all systems have adequate security designed in
Authorized Reader
Tag
Eavesdropper
Spoofer
Tamperer
Skimmer
29Tracking
- Activity Records based on pseudonym
- Non-PII Data About Individual
- New technologies e.g. RFID, cell phone produce
data about things in the world - You may leave a trail of breadcrumbs
- Based on pseudonym, not personal ID
- But the object is yours!
- Actually trail ? mountains
- These data mountains are not considered PII
30Helen Wears a Hat
- Helen buys a hat at store A.
- The hat contains an RFID tag with a unique ID
number. - (Even if encrypted it is unique.)
- (The store might record purchase information
about Helen, but we will assume they keep it
private.) - Helen keeps the RFID tag in the hat because she
has a smart closet.
Hat 1
Hat 1
Store A
Hat 1
Helen
31Helen Wears a Hat Chapter 2
- Helen visits store B wearing her hat. Store B
detects it at the door. - Helen visits stores C, D, and E, and has lunch
with her friend Suzie who has a new sweater.
Hat 1
Store B
Hat 1
Hat 1
Store C
Hat 1
Store E
Hat 1
Store D
Sweater 9
32Helen Wears a Hat Chapter 3
- These stores all sell their data to marketer X,
who assembles it and looks for patterns. This
information is available to businesses, and is
discoverable in legal proceedings. - Helens name and personal data do not appear in
the records. - The usual privacy policies and regulations do
not apply to this data!
33Privacy Breach Tracking
- Privacy Breach and Tracking have interactions
- Breach makes it possible to track
- Tracking physical presence can lead to a breach
- More tracking makes it easier to mine to create a
breach - Tracking makes the consequences of a breach more
serious
34Protecting Personal Data
- Who does what with your personal data?
- Sanctioned
- Users Understanding
- Authorized Use
- Authorization Creep
- Third-Party Freedom
- Miscreants
- Opportunistic
- Professional
- Conspiratorial ( Organized)
- That Which Must Not Be Named
Privacy Policy
Privacy Security
35Best Practice Guidelines
- Most experts agree that the primary basis for
RFID Privacy policy should be Fair Information
Practices - Many variants e.g. Safe Harbor
- Notice, Choice, Consent, Security,
- This addresses authorized users
- Not always honored by government
- Identity documents, license plates, etc.
- Unclear meaning, e.g. what is consent?
- Unclear decision-making process
36Privacy Policy for PII Safe Harbor
- Notice
- Choice Consent
- Onward Transfer
- Access
- Security
- Data Integrity Quality
- Enforcement Remedy
- Good reference Privacy Best Practices for
Deployment of RFID Technology, Center for
Democracy and Technology, 2006.
http//www.cdt.org/privacy/20060501rfid-best-pract
ices.php
37Security Mechanisms
- Information Security
- Encryption, Authorization, Dynamic IDs,
- Physical Security
- On/off switches, Foil covers, Short range,
Multiple modalities, - Design Security
- Opt-in v. opt-out, Default settings, No PII on
tags,
38Resistance to Tracking
- Proposed privacy measures
- Clipping (IBM) shorten antenna after purchase
- Killing (EPC) deactivate tag on command
- Erase the Serial Number leave the SKU intact
- Blocker (RSA) device pretends to be every tag
- Dynamic ID is a new trend in the RFID literature
tag presents apparently random ID - Cryptographic techniques for generating a
sequence of ID numbers that cannot be inverted - All of the above have major shortcomings!
39Where is the Action Today?
- Guidelines Industry organizations, standards
bodies, privacy advocates - Center for Democracy and Technology
- State legislatures in the US
- CA, IL, WA, NH, AL,
- EU, Japan,
40Common Pitfalls in Proposed RFID Privacy
Regulations Laws
- Overbroad definition of RFID includes cell
phones, laptops, etc. - Example RFID means electronic devices that
broadcast identification number by radio - Regulating technology without limiting data or
its use - RFID in 2006, what will it be in 2016?
- Ban on technology (reduces innovation)
- No RFID until 2010
41Policy Recommendations
- Trustworthy Computing is Good Business
- Get good technical guidance!
- Encourage technology development
- Regulate data and its use, not technology
- Foster responsible use
- Codify best practices based on FIP
- Dont lock in current technologies
- Sensitive applications need careful planning
42Issues in RFID Privacy
- What is Privacy?
- What is RFID?
- What are the key initiatives of public interest?
- What are the privacy risks from RFID?
- What is happening with RFID privacy policy today?
- What are key issues for policymakers?
43Additional Material
44Soloves Taxonomy of Privacy
Data Holders
I. Information Collection Surveillance
Interrogation
II. Information Processing Aggregation
Identification Insecurity Secondary Use
Exclusion
III. Information Dissemination Breach of
Confidentiality Disclosure Exposure Increased
Accessibility Blackmail Appropriation Distortion
IV. Invasions Intrusion Decisional Interference
Reprinted with permission from Solove, Daniel
J., "A Taxonomy of Privacy". University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 154, Fall 2005.
http//ssrn.com/abstract667622.
Risk from PAI on previous slide
45TRUSTes definition (excerpt)
- any information (i) that identifies or can be
used to identify, contact, or locate or (ii)
from which identification or contact information
of an individual person can be derived. - Includes name, govt. ID numbers, phone FAX
numbers, street address, email address, financial
profiles, medical profile, credit card info. - Note financial / medical info is especially
sensitive information - Source Jeffrey Klimas v. Comcast Corp, US
46TRUSTe Associated Info
- to the extent unique information not PII is
associated with PII it will be considered
PII - Includes personal profile, biometric, pseudonym,
IP address - IP address becomes PII only if associated
with PII - Excludes data collected anonymously (without
identification of the individual user) - So it seems to exclude Helens hats data records
unless associated with PII - This data is pseudonymous, not really
anonymous
47Pseudonyms
- A pseudonym is any constant, unique datum
- Can be an almost-unique datum
- Can be a set of common data
- Can be an encrypted datum
- Can be a pseudo-random member of a unique set
48Privacy and Security
Security Enforcement of boundary against
unauthorized users Privacy Define / enforce
boundary policy for personal data
49Directionality in Identity Systems
- Omnidirectional accessible to everyone
- Directional only accessible to authorized
parties - Also called Unidirectional
- Enforced by security measures
- Authorization of both endpoints
- Encryption of data in storage and in communication
50Security Goals for RFID Privacy
- Personal ID should always be Directional
- Pseudonyms should always be Directional
- Personal ID this is a no-brainer
- Pseudonyms usually very difficult to implement!
51Problems With Tracking Resistance
- Proposed privacy measures
- Clipping (IBM) shorten antenna after purchase
- Doesnt change the information flow
- Killing (EPC) deactivate tag on command
- Prevents after-market use of tags
- Erase the Serial Number leave the SKU intact
- Combinations of SKUs can create a unique
identifier - Blocker (RSA) device pretends to be every tag
- Denial of Service is a security violation
- Dynamic ID is a new trend in the RFID literature
tag presents apparently random ID - Every reader has to know the secret for every tag