BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PENSION ECONOMICS

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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PENSION ECONOMICS

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survivors benefits. Life expectancy will grow rapidly in China. ... Either he gets no benefit in last 5 years, or system has large unfunded liability ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PENSION ECONOMICS


1
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PENSION ECONOMICS
  • by
  • Estelle James
  • World Bank Institute

2
Key choice Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) v. Funding (FF)
  • We will discuss basic principles of pay-as-you-go
    (PAYG) and funded social security schemes,
  • how they evolve through time
  • and how to make them sustainable and better for
    the economy
  • lays the groundwork for discussion of pension
    modeling

3
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and defined benefit (DB)
systems
  • Most industrialized countries have PAYG DB
    systems Pension contributions are not saved.
    Instead, workers contribution today is used to
    pay pensioners today, according to Defined
    Benefit formula. In return, worker gets a promise
    that he will receive a pension tomorrow, paid for
    by workers tomorrow.
  • What is required contribution rate to balance the
    fiscal books of the social security system? How
    does this contribution rate change over time?

4
How to balance revenues and expenditures under
PAYG
  • Total expenditures BP, total revenues CW
  • Books are balanced (BP CW) when
    C (B)/(W/P) and CR BR/(W/P) where
  • C average contribution
  • CR contribution rate C/average wage
  • B average benefit
  • BR benefit rate replacement rate B/average
    wage
  • W/P workers/pensioners support ratio
    1/dependency ratio
  • So contribution rate required to cover
    expenditures depends on benefit rate, workers,
    pensioners

5
Example of required contribution rate
  • Assume
  • promised benefit (BR) 60 wage
  • System is new populations young, W/P 8.
  • So each point of CR yields 8 points BR.
  • Then required CR 60/8 7.5 (China past)
  • But
  • As population and system age, W/P 2
  • So each point of CR yields 2 points BR.
  • Then required CR 60/2 30 (China future)
  • Required CR higher if unemployment, evasion.
  • If 15 unemployment 35 evasion arrears,
    required CR 60 (collection a problem in
    China)

6
Required contribution Rate depends on Benefit
Rate and Support RatioBut what determines BR and
W/P?
  • BR and W, and P depend on demographic, economic
    and policy variables.
  • We will spend next 3 days discussing these 3
    types of variables, how they are chosen or
    estimated, and what is their impact.

7
Benefit rate (BR) depends on key policy choices
  • BR depends on policy choices about
  • target replacement rate and
  • indexation method
  • Important not to make target BR too high because
    it will cost workers too much CR--40-50 is good
    target replacement rate.
  • Young workers with families are often neediest
    group--cant afford high payroll tax
  • Difficult to change BR for pensioners, but can
    change promises for young workers

8
W ( workers) depends on economic, demographic
and policy variables
  • Demographic--fertility rate over past 20-50 years
    determines size of population in active age range
    (1-child policy in China reduces this)
  • Economic
  • school-leaving age (date of entry to labor force)
  • labor force participation rates
  • unemployment rate
  • Policy choices in social security system
  • Retirement age
  • coverage rate
  • evasion and arrears rate
  • Important to choose policies that keep W high

9
P ( pensioners) depends on
  • Demography mortality rate, life expectancy after
    retirement
  • Policy choices
  • retirement age
  • survivors benefits
  • Life expectancy will grow rapidly in China.
    Important to raise retirement age or pensioners
    and system cost will increase
  • Later presentations discuss demographic, economic
    and policy variables in detail

10
Sustainability of PAYG System
  • PAYG requires low contribution rate in early
    years. Easy to pay first generation of pensioners
    because many workers, few retirees, system runs
    surplus
  • But PAYG is nonsustainable as system matures and
    population ages
  • Lower fertility, higher life expectancy fewer
    workers, more pensioners, W/P falls
  • Higher CR and retirement age needed
  • PAYG is in trouble in almost every country

11
Implicit pension debt in PAYG system
  • As workers contribute, they are promised future
    pension, so implicit pension debt accumulates,
    but no funds accumulate to pay debt system has
    liabilities but no assets
  • IPD is present value of future benefits owed to
    pensioners and workers for past contributions
  • B1 (1r) B2/(1r)2 ... BT/(1r)T
  • where r discount rate that shows future has
    lower value than present
  • Usually not legally binding or backed by bonds,
    but difficult to renege

12
Implicit Public Pension Debt, 1990
Explicit debt
Canada
Implicit public pension debt
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United States
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Percentage of GDP
13
Implicit pension debt in industrial countries
  • gt 100 GDP in most industrial countries
  • gt 200 GDP in some countries
  • gt explicit debt (bonds) in all countries
  • Future generations will have to pay this debt
    requires high tax rate and makes shift to funded
    pension system more difficult
  • China has relatively low pension debt--60-70
    GDP--because of low coverage rate
  • China is in better position to shift to funded
    system and avoid high pension debt.

14
Parametric reforms (change in policy variables)
can improve PAYG finances
  • Reduce BR by cutting replacement rate, switching
    from wage to price indexation
  • Raise W/P by increasing retirement age and
    reducing early retirement--this is key policy
    change but politically difficult everywhere
  • Try to reduce evasion and arrears
  • Raise contribution rate
  • but this may decrease formal sector employment,
    wages
  • future burden may be shifted to governments
    budget, less resources for other services
  • risk for workers if future pensions are not
    affordable

15
Example of how retirement age affects W/P and CR
under PAYG
  • Suppose there are ten million people in every age
    group from age 20-80. Target replacement rate
    40
  • If retirement age W/P required CR
  • 65 3/1 13.3
  • 60 2/1 20.0
  • 50 1/1 40
  • Evasion and arrears make matters worse

16
Parametric reforms are necessary but politically
difficult
  • Later we show simulations that calculate long run
    impact of parametric reforms
  • These reforms are important for PAYG and also for
    partially funded system

17
Shift to funding
  • Funded system is less sensitive to demography,
    more sustainable, better for the economy than
    PAYG
  • China is planning to make this shift. But must
    figure out how to cover implicit pension debt if
    part of CR goes into individual
    accounts--transition costs
  • Good to do now before implicit pension debt
    becomes larger as coverage expands

18
Fully funded (FF) defined contribution (DC)
systems
  • Assets are accumulated to match liabilities, and
    earn interest, so no implicit debt or
    unaffordable promises.
  • Large stock of assets (wealth) buildsgt100 GDP
  • Can be used to increase sustainability, economic
    growth so many countries moving toward funding
  • In Defined Contribution (DC) funded system, part
    of contribution is put into individuals account.
    Pension depends on accumulated contributions
    investment earnings. Doesnt depend on W/P.
  • But depends on rate of return--so fund
    management and investment choice are crucial

19
Rate of return important under FF DC
  • If funds earn 5 interest, replacement rate of
    60 requires CR 10 under FF DC
  • under PAYG if W/P 2, would require CR gt 30
  • Rate of return is crucial Suppose worker works
    40 years, retires 20 years, wage growth2, CR8
    (China)
  • Then If interest rate, r 2, RR 20 under
    FF DC,
  • 4, RR
    36
  • 5, RR
    48
  • Where RR replacement rate of workers final
    year wage
  • Each interest rate point raises RR 8-12 or cuts
    CR

20
Rate of return must be higher than rate of wage
growth
  • Interest rate determines growth rate of funds in
    account.
  • Rate of wage growth determines final year wage.
  • Crucial that r gt rate of wage growth otherwise
    funds in account grow slower than wages and FF DC
    gives low replacement rate of final years wage.
  • Will be big problem in China unless investment
    policy changes

21
Contribution rate required to pay replacement
rate 40 under PAYG and funding
Contribution rate
Assumptions rate of wage growth 2 worker works
40 years, retires for 20 years r net rate of
return for funded plan horizontal lines show FF
DC for top line r 2 and for bottom line r 5
Workers/pensioners
22
What the slide shows
  • This slide shows that required contribution rate
    in PAYG system starts very low when many workers,
    few pensioners, but system becomes expensive when
    W/P falls. Tempting at first, but pay later.
  • Funded system has level costs, independent of
    demography.
  • But contribution rate needed for target
    replacement rate depends on r, rate of return
    Important that r gt wage growth rate

23
How are accumulated contributions turned into
pension?
  • Suppose worker works for 40 years and his
    accumulated contributions interest AC
  • When worker retires, AC is turned into pension.
    Suppose system expects average worker to live 10
    years. Then, annual pension payments set so that
    AC present discounted value of all payments
    PP1/(1r) PP2/(1r)2 PP10/(1r)10 AC This
    is actuarially fair pension EPVPP AC

24
How life expectancy and retirement age determine
size of pension under FF DC
  • Now suppose average worker lives 15 years. But
    system expected him to live 10 years. Either he
    gets no benefit in last 5 years, or system has
    large unfunded liability
  • Crucial to take actual life expectancy into
    account in determining annual pension
  • Currently China does not do this--it divides AC
    by 10 even though life expectancy gt 15 Will cost
    more than expected--burden to MOF
  • Will get worse as life expectancy rises

25
Example of how life expectancy after retirement
affects pension under actuarially fair FF DC
  • Suppose r5, wage growth2, CR8
  • Then if worker works age 20-65, retires age
    65-80, his replacement rate 58
  • if he works age 20-60, RR 48
  • if he works age 20-50, retires 50-80, RR 24
  • This provides incentive for people to work
    longer--good for economy as young workers falls

26
Important to simulate expected pension under DC
  • Under funded DC plan, system does not guarantee a
    particular benefit. But policy-makers should have
    a target replacement rate (RR) in mind and should
    model relationship between RR, contribution rate,
    investment return and retirement age needed to
    reach RR.
  • Shouldnt lead workers to expect more than they
    are likely to get. Adjust contribution rate,
    retirement age or investment policy so they are
    consistent with desired RR. Not consistent today
    in China due to low r and retirement age.

27
Evasion
  • Under FF DC if worker evades making
    contributions, his account remains small, his
    pension is small
  • This is bad for him, but it doesnt become a
    burden on others, undermine fiscal sustainability
    of system, lead to higher CR
  • Under PAYG worker who evades or whose employer is
    in arrears may still receive benefit--becomes a
    burden to the system

28
Summary
  • PAYG DB has advantage that it can give pensions
    to first generation of workers who have not
    contributed, and it can redistribute to low
    earners, if society desires this
  • But disadvantage that is is not sustainable in
    its original form. Costs start low but rise
    sharply as system matures and population ages.
    Very sensitive to demography
  • Large implicit pension debt accumulates--burden
    on future generations government. Political
    risk promised benefit wont be paid.

29
Summary (continued)
  • FF DC less sensitive to demography and evasion.
    Contribution rate is more stable.
  • Accumulates large stock of assets, not debt
  • Benefit is very sensitive to rate of
    return--crucial to invest funds well.
  • Financial market risk r and benefit may be lower
    than expected
  • Both systems require modest target replacement
    rate and rising retirement age as longevity
    increases--otherwise costs will be too high for
    workers and society

30
Important to model long run effects of both
systems
  • Important to do simulations showing current
    situation, long run effects of parametric reforms
    and impact of individual accounts--if funded and
    if unfunded (notional, PAYG)
  • Sensitivity analysis to different assumptions
    given great uncertainty about future
  • Later we discuss how to do this and give examples
    using PROST and other models
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