Balance of Capabilities and War

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Balance of Capabilities and War

• or Working without a Net

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• Now it is my turn to present what I did on this
  assignment. First, Ill talk about what several
  different models predict about the relationship
  between the dyadic balance of capabilities and
  conflict. Then I will describe the data set I
  constructed for my test. I conclude with my
  statistical analysis and results.

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• Why do IR theorists care about this question?
• Most stories about this balance concern how the
  probability of winning a war influence state
  decisions to go to war.
• Confusion about balance of power
• What about third parties?

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Previous Research

• The Siverson and Sullivan piece reviews early
  literature on this relationship, which is a mess.
  Lousy tests with inconsistent results.
• Power transition theorists claim to have results
  showing that equality of power is dangerous.
• Limited sample typical to such studies
• How equal is equal?

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Story 1 Bargaining

• The probability of victory is a key element in
  determining a states reservation level.
• But inability to reach a bargain is the
  explanation of war according to this argument.
• A smaller zone of agreement may make war more
  likely, but this should not be related to the
  dyadic balance.

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• Initiation decisions hinge on the difference
  between the status quo and expectation of a
  successful outcome to the crisis.
• In the Simple Ultimatum model earlier this week,
  p(war) ½(1 - cA/C). Probability of victory
  plays no role here.
• Similar result in Powells model
• However, neither of these models clearly
  separates escalation to war from initiation.

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• Hypothesis 1 There is no relationship between
  the dyadic distribution of capabilities and the
  likelihood of war, whether at the level of the
  initiation of disputes or escalation to war.
• In terms of signaling model, this hypothesis
  follows if the status quo moves closely with the
  balance of power.

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Story 2 Commitment

• In the commitment model,
• B fights if
• 1 - p - cB ? min(1 - R,1 - ?)
• If we set R 1, meaning A has the ability to
  take everything by reneging, then B does not
  fight when
• p gt 1 cB
• B does not fight when A is overwhelmingly
  stronger.

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• In the version of the commitment game where A
  chooses between the status quo worth q and making
  an offer, A keeps the status quo when
• p lt q cA
• Again, there is no relationship here if p and q
  move together generally.

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• ? Hypothesis 2 There is a nonlinear relationship
  between the dyadic distribution and war it rises
  at first and then falls.

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Story 3 Multiple Equilibria

• In the BdM, Morrow, and Zorick paper, there are
  multiple equilibria with the following
  properties
• For extreme values of the observable balance, the
  weaker side always avoids war by either not
  making a demand or submitting to one.
• For moderate values, the parties always fight if
  neither side gives in.
• Negotiated settlements, as opposed to unilateral
  concessions, only possible when the sides are
  relatively equal.

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• ? Hypothesis 3 The probability of a demand rises
  as the observable balance becomes more favorable
  to the initiator.
• ? Hypothesis 4 The probability of the demand
  being granted rises as the observable balance
  becomes more favorable to the initiator.
• ? Hypothesis 5 The likelihood of mutual violence
  given a crisisa demand made and resistedgoes
  down and then up as the observable balance
  becomes more favorable to the initiator. The
  lowest chance of war should be near equality.

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• Big caveat The model published in the paper is
  incorrect, but I believe these properties will
  occur in a more general and correctly solved
  model.

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The Competing Hypotheses
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A Test of these Hypotheses

• Data set Directed dyads of CoW disputes only
  the initiator vs. original target with the
  following dropped
• Cases that ended with released or unclear outcome
• Added roughly equal number of non-events
• Variables Composite capabilities for both sides
  initiation, reciprocation, and escalation to
  mutual violence

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Initiation Probabilities
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Escalation Probabilities