The Zapatista Rebellion

1
The Zapatista Rebellion

• A Political Process Account of Movement Emergence

2
The Political Process Paradigm

• The dominant paradigm of social movement
  studies since 1996 (Koopmans, 2001)
• Interdisciplinary combines political science and
  sociological approaches to SMs (McAdam et al,
  1996)
• Provides several hypotheses and tools
  specifically designed for the explanation and
  analysis of social movement emergence (and
  development)
• However, PP was designed to explain western SMs
  in advanced industrial settings. Therefore, a
  real need to test PP in less developed countries
  (Meyer, 1999)
• Moreover, since 1999 a younger generation of
  sympathetic critics has been reworking
  classical PP hypotheses and tools, requiring us
  to undertake further empirical testing and
  refinement.

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Aims and Structure

• Aims
• To demonstrate strengths weaknesses of
  classical PP in explaining movement emergence
• To test the value of more recent theoretical
  contributions and revisions of PP concepts
• Structure
• Theory
• Classical Political Process Theory history,
  concepts, hypotheses
• Revised Political Process Theory rethinking
  culture and agency within the paradigm
• Application
• Political Process and the EZLNs rise, 1983-94
• A Revised Appraisal of the EZLNs rise, 1983-94
• Conclusions

4
Movement Emergencethe central importance of
Political Opportunities

• The political process model stresses the crucial
  importance of expanding political opportunities
  as the
• ultimate spur to collective action
• (McAdam et al, 1996 7)

5
Classical PP Political Opportunity and
Movement Emergence

• Political Opportunities political opportunities
  structure activists behaviour and channel
  activism down certain avenues
• The structure of political opportunities NOT
  grievances (strain), resources, networks or
  culture are the main determinant of the timing
  and form of a social movements emergence
  (McAdam, 1982 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996
  Tarrow, 1998).
• There are 4 points to the structure of political
  opportunities
• i. The relative openness/closure of the
  political system
• ii. The stability/instability of elite
  alignments that undergird the polity
• iii. The presence/absence of elite allies
• iv. The states capacity for repression
  (McAdam, 1996)
• So

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• movement emergence is more likely in a
  transitional political system that is opening up
  to challengers.
• Opening systems that grant more formal political
  access to challengers are apt to set in motion
  the narrowest and most institutionalised of
  reform movements.
• movements are most likely to emerge in systems
  where once stable elite alliances are now under
  threat or are disintegrating.
• the instability of elite alignments can lead to
  both radical reform movements and violent
  revolutionary movements, as the development of
  cleavages among previously stable political
  elites provides challengers with significant
  leverage and opportunities in both
  institutionalised and noninstitutionalised
  settings.
• the appearance of new elite allies within a
  previously unresponsive political system is
  likely to lead to institutionalised reform
  movements rather than violent revolutionary ones,
  as challengers avoid alienating new allies
  through controversial methods.
• a significant decrease in either the will or
  ability of the state to repress tends to be
  related to the rise of noninstitutionalised and
  radical social movements.

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The Rise of the EZLN and the Structure of
Political Opportunities 1983-1994

• Increasing Openness of Polity Greater
  associational autonomy (1970-1982) yet closure
  of traditional channels of political redress
  constitutional reform
• Unstable elite alignments 1988 PRI schism
  Democratic Tendency/Cardenismo
• Elite Allies None until 1994, when civil society
  demanded negotiations an end to the violence
• Diminishing capacity for repression (Amnesty Int.
  Reports personal accounts) NAFTA and OECD
  mship Salinass need to liberalise
• NB. The structure of political opportunities
  supports classical PP theory

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• movement emergence is more likely in a
  transitional political system that is opening up
  to challengers.
• Opening systems that grant more formal political
  access to challengers are apt to set in motion
  the narrowest and most institutionalised of
  reform movements.
• movements are most likely to emerge in systems
  where once stable elite alliances are now under
  threat or are disintegrating.
• the instability of elite alignments can lead to
  both radical reform movements and violent
  revolutionary movements, as the development of
  cleavages among previously stable political
  elites provides challengers with significant
  leverage and opportunities in both
  institutionalised and noninstitutionalised
  settings.
• the appearance of new elite allies within a
  previously unresponsive political system is
  likely to lead to institutionalised reform
  movements rather than violent revolutionary ones,
  as challengers avoid alienating new allies
  through controversial methods.
• a significant decrease in either the will or
  ability of the state to repress tends to be
  related to the rise of noninstitutionalised and
  radical social movements.

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• In 1994, the Mexican economy was overheating.
  The poor were getting poorer and the rich
  although richer were dissatisfied with the
  palpable corruption of their government. The
  dominant political party, the PRI, in the saddle
  for a half-century, was divided between politicos
  and tecnicos. Internally divided, the PRI
  oligarchs no longer dared to repress their
  opponents as they had done in the past.
  Opposition parties of the left and right are
  gaining leverage in local and state politics.
  Sensing blood, they offered their support to
  insurgent challengers outside the polity.
• This was the opportunity insurgents had been
  waiting for. Taking advantage of the structural
  determinants outlined here and of the resources
  offered by indigenous anger, movement
  entrepreneurs launched a rebellion in the state
  of Chiapas.
• (Tarrow, 1999 71-2)

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The Classical Model Proven

• Or is it?

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• if one simply assumes the necessity of political
  opportunities for collective action, one will
  undoubtedly discover some such opportunities.
• (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999 110)
• for us, political opportunity carries little
  weight compared
• to political ethics.
• (Marcos, July 19th, 1999)
• We Zapatistas are very other, el Monarca once
  observed, and told me that when he ran out of
  brake fluid, he would use his urine insteadThe
  youth committee got together and organised the
  Zapatista Olympics. The master of ceremonies
  declared that the long jump competition was about
  to start, which really meant who jumps highest.
  Next was the high jump, which really meant who
  jumps the farthestPerfectly logical in the
  mountains of Southeast Mexico. I sighed.
• (Marcos, December, 1994)

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Revised PPRethinking Structure and Agency

• Recently, a younger generation of PP
  revisionists has tested and refined classical
  hypotheses, attaching greater significance to the
  complex relations between structure, culture and
  agency
• The concept of opportunity has been redefined
  to mean options for action in order to downplay
  the structural determinism implicit in the
  classical model (Koopmans, 1999 Meyer, 1999).
  This allows the mapping of available options
  prior to SM emergence without assuming the
  rational selection of the most cost-effective
  option.
• Some have argued that political structures are
  cultural constructs, requiring a sensitivity to
  the cultural dimension of the opportunities
  they create (Poletta, 1999 Goodwin Jasper,
  1999)
• Others observe culture-as-structure a lens for
  the perception, interpretation and reaction to
  political opportunity (Jasper, 1997)
• Finally, Crossley (2001) Koopmans (1999) argue
  that political opportunities tell only part of
  the tale, and look to uncover complementary
  cultural opportunities as well. Both Political
  and Cultural Opportunities are understood as
  options for action structured by political,
  social and cultural contexts (Rucht, 1996)

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The Cultural Dimension of Political Opportunity

• The relative openness or closure of the political
  system
• The stability or instability of elite alignments
• The presence or absence of elite allies
• The states capacity for repression

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Cultural Opportunities

• 1979 the institutional memory of Emiliano Zapata
• Disillusionment with institutional politics in
  the Lacandon
• Not a conventional political movement the
  pragmatism of the EZLN as a self-defence
  organisation
• Local suspicion EZLNs need to become more
  integrated in Lacandon Maya communities
• Confluence of Maya episteme and EZLNs politics
  of pragmatism Non-Mayan Other?
• 1992 Columbus Day 500 years of resistance the
  indigenisation of popular struggle

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Conclusions the present state and possible
future of PP

• A context-sensitive toolkit? (Goodwin and Jasper,
  1999)
• A paradigm for the collection of hypotheses?
  (Meyer, 1999)
• Defunct? (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001)
• The foundation for a value-added approach?
  (Crossley, 2001)