COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice

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and eBay as a trusted third party. Mail-bid sales, disincentives to value revelation ... Continuing theory: E[revenue] First-price auction: what price does the ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice


1
COS 444 Internet AuctionsTheory and Practice
Spring 2009 Ken Steiglitz
ken_at_cs.princeton.edu
2
Evolution of eBay
  • Cassady on executing the (English) bid
  • - signals
  • Book bids (anticipating eBay)
  • - ticks or increments
  • - reserves
  • - the integrity of the auctioneer
  • and eBay as a trusted third party
  • Mail-bid sales, disincentives to value revelation
  • - bid-taker cheating future use
  • Buy-or-Bid sales (cf Buy-It-Now on eBay)

3
Terms of sale
  • Estimates often given
  • Prices realized often available
  • Reserves often 60
  • Mail-bid increment policies often vague
  • English Buyers fee often 10

4
What to post in a second-price online auction?
  • Suppose you post highest bid so far,
  • and winner pays second price
  • bidder 1 bids 1
  • bidder 2 bids 100
  • There is no further incentive to bid above 1,
  • and bidder 2 steals the item at 1

5
Evolution of eBay (Summary)
  • English ?
  • book bids ?
  • mail-bid sales pay second price ?
  • online pay and post second price deadline

6
Online variations
  • Auctions with extendable closing rules Amazon,
    Yahoo (auctions now gone), others?
  • Taobao, the Chinese online auction site
  • (California auction is an abstraction of
    eBay)

7
Expected revenue
  • Vickrey auction what price does the seller
    expect? (values uniform, iid on 0,1)
  • Erevenue E2nd highest of 2 draws

8
Expected revenue
  • Vickrey auction what price does the seller
    expect? (values uniform, iid on 0,1)
  • Erevenue E2nd highest of 2 draws
  • 1/3 (to be proven soon)

9
Continuing theory Erevenue
  • First-price auction what price does the seller
    expect? (values uniform, iid on 0,1)
  • In equilibrium (nota bene)
  • Erevenue from 1
  • Average over all v1 , multiply by 2 ? 1/3
  • SAME AS VICKREY!

10
Probability setting
  • pdf
  • cdf
  • Expectation

atomless
11
Probability setting
  • Almost universal assumption range normalized to
    0,1
  • Common assumption for examples, etc., v s
    uniformly distributed on 0,1 , which means
  • f (x ) 1 , F (x ) x
  • and iid independently and identically
    distributed
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