Title: Presentation for Kyiv Economics Institute
1Poland three years in EU Lessons learned
Marcin Swiecicki
- Presentation for Kyiv Economics Institute
- Economic Education and Research Consortium
- 23 May 2007
2Some chronology
- Sept 1989 Agreement on economic and trade
cooperation - Dec 1991 Association (European) Agreement.
Preamble dichotomy - 1993 In Copenhagen EU defines accession criteria
- 1994 Application supplied
- 1998 Negotiations open
- 2002 Negotiations concluded
- 1 May 2004 accession of 10 countries
3Preamble to Europe Agreement on Association
- In 1991 EU not ready to issue joint statement on
future accession, but only supportive - Recognizing the fact that the final objective
of Poland is to become a member of the Community
and that this association, in view of the
Parties, will help to achieve this objective,
4EU defines criteria in Copenhagen in 1993
- Stable democracy with the rule of law able to
respect human and minority rights - Competitive market economy able to interact
within the market forces within the Union - Ability to fully implement Community laws
5Pre-accession anticipations
- Europe Agreement increased trustworthiness of the
country, e.g. FDI growth from 1.7 bln in 1993 to
10 bln USD in 2000 - Full liberalization of non-agricultural trade in
1989-1999 - Pre-accession funds PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA as
kindergarten for membership
6Unfinished agenda
- Transition Periods
- For Poland
- 10 Environmental directives, sale of land to EU
nationals, road standards, food processing
standards, financial contributions, rates of
exise taxes.... - For EU
- Protecting labor market for up to 7 years
- Providing EU level of agricultural subsidies only
in 2013 - Schengen agreement on lifting border controls
-2008? - Euro
7Pre-accession fears
- Rampant growth of prices
- Collapse of industry not ready to compete
- Fall of Polish agriculture
- Negative balance of budgetary flows
- Buy out of land by foreigners
- New barriers with East neighbors
- Deprivation of economic sovereignty
- Massive emigration
8Macro results
- GDP growth. Many models but results always
positive for both sides new and old members.
Extra 0,1-0,2 percentage points for EU15
countries and 0,4-1,7 for Poland - Tremendous growth in trade, in particular
agricultural one, where trade restrictions lifted
only after accession - Anticipated and post accession investment influx
9GDP growthin percent to previous year
10GDP growth other newmembers 2005-2006, even
better than PL
11Export , import, balances
- High rates of export continued
- No import hikes
- Trade balance lower deficit
- Agricultural export boosts
- Net capital inflow increased
- Currency reserves increased
12Export from Pl to EU-15 agriculture, mil euro
- Several trade barriers kept until accession
- Sale at areas close to borders increased
- Sale to third countries increased and decline
after Russian embargo - Producer prices increased
- Farmers revenue increased
13Foreign direct investment
- 1998 6.4 bln US
- 1999 7.3
- 2000 9.3
- 2001 5.7
- 2002 4.1
- 2003 4.9
- 2004 12.4
- 2005 7.7
- But Estonia, Hungary, Czech Republic attracted
2-4 time more in per capita terms
14Unemployment rate
- Low activity rate 52, whereas 64 in EU15 and
70 recommended by Lisbon Strategy - Old jobs disappeared quickly, new jobs built
slowly - Emigration increased, but legal, workers right
protected
15Inflation, 12 months
- February 04 to February 03 1.6
- Highest growth 4.8 May 2004 to May 2003, then
down - May 2005 to May 2004 only 2.5
- On average additional growth about 2 per cent
points, much less than forecasted by pessimists
16Political and economic anchor
- Political freedoms and democratic institutions
strengthened (freedom of press, demonstrations,
political organization, etc.) - Stability and Growth Pact ensuring
macroeconomic convergence through controlling
public finance debt and deficit, and inflation - Free flow of capital protected, including access
to land for EU nationals - European standards enforced, whenever national
standards left then equal for all - Public aid for ailing enterprises restrained
17New political leverage
- Eastern policy
- Energy security
- Trade disputes, e.g. with Russia
18Some other consequences
- Poland launches EU antidumping procedure, e.g.
against importation of Chinese textiles - Polish products became Made in EU
- Polish passports became EU passports
- But visa regime reintroduced for Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and 12 other countries - Increased public support for EU after accession
from 55-60 to 75-80
19Natural or traditional monopolies broken due to
- Telecommunication
- Railroad transport
- Air transport
- Gas distribution
- Electricity distribution
- Imported know how on introducing market forces
into natural or traditional monopolies
20Support for agriculture increased as the support
of farmers for EU
- Export growth
- Prices up
- New subsidies
- direct payments per hectare prevailing
- some product subsidies kept (sugar, tobacco)
- rural development
- EU rules in full only in 2013
21Structural funds
- 16 programs for all 16 voievodships transport
(roads, railroads, bridges airports..),
environment, training, small business,. - 5 national programs infrastructure (high ways,
railroads) and environment (waste water
treatment), human capital, innovations,
22Budgetary transfers in euro
- 45 bilion euro earmarked for 2007-2013 for
structural funds - 15 bilion euro earmarked for agriculture and
rural development - Max ceiling for transfers for Poland in 2007-13
perspective 4 GDP per year - 2004 positive balance for Poland Contribution to
EU budget 1.2 billion euro Payments for Poland
2.8 billion euro
232007-2013
- Expected gross payments in 2007-13 on average
8,5 billion euro per year, as maximum ceiling
24Costs of integration-public and private
- Payments to the EU budget
- Enterprise costs, ¾ reported no major costs of
adjustment - Nevertheless estimated costs of agriculture and
food processing adjustment 6 billion in
1999-2004 - Environment total costs of adjustment 30
billion euro to be borne in 1999-2013 but
substantial part would anyhow be borne
25Social costs of integration
- Need to differentiate
- costs of collapse of the command economy
- costs of collapse of the comecon market, in
particular Soviet purchases of processed goods
machinery and consumer goods - costs of economic transformation hard realities
of market prices, competition, etc. - costs of integration with EU.
- COSTS of No-Integration would be greater
26What membership in the EU is not bringing
- Privatization shipyards, mining industry, power
supply remain state owned - Modernization of social policy pension system,
health care, social aid, education are left to
national discretion - Tax policy is only partially harmonized (VAT
general scheme, excise taxes), which is good - Public spending priorities transfers v.
development - Immigration policy
27Pitfalls of CAP
- The greatest economic absurd in the
developedworld The Economist - Large farms, British Queen, French 6 families
main beneficiaries 80 funds for 20 farms - Overproduction and quotas for domestic production
and restrictions on import - Higher prices for consumers
- Even after transition, in 2013, EU 15 farmers
will get 2-3 times more per hectare than farmers
in newEU 12
28Lisbon agenda 2000-2010
- Poland lags behind other members
- Activity rate Lisbon agenda 70 in 2010 EU15
64 in 2003 and rising, Poland 56 in 2000 then
falling to 52 in 2004, expected small growth - Spending on RD Lisbon Agenda 3 GDP in 2010
whereas in 2004 - EU15 around 2 Poland 0,64
29EU15 and enlargement
- Security gains, extended sphere of stability and
cooperation - Enlargement of markets strengthened EU economy,
trade quadrupled in the decade, trade surplus
with the new members helped maintain jobs, small
but positive impact on GDP growth - Net costs for taxpayers in EU15 10 euro (two
coffees) per inhabitant per year in 2004-2006 - Relocation of jobs marginal, border areas
30Lessons learned
- Prepare no matter whether promised membership
- Harmonization of legislation, free trade
agreement with EU, rule of law bring benefits in
themselfs - Benefits of economic integration by far exceed
costs, that are generated by collapse of command
economy