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Collaborative Context Based Reasoning CCxBR

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Title: Collaborative Context Based Reasoning CCxBR


1
Collaborative Context Based Reasoning (CCxBR)
  • Gil Barrett
  • Avelino Gonzalez
  • Intelligent Systems Laboratory
  • University of Central Florida

2
  • Outline
  • Context Based Reasoning (CxBR) Overview
  • Belief Desire Intentions (BDI)
  • Joint Intentions Theory (JIT)
  • Context Based Reasoning (CxBR) Formalisms
  • Collaborative Context Based Reasoning (CCxBR)
  • Team Models

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
3
  • Purpose
  • The motivation for the research described here
    is to formally describe teamwork for a contextual
    reasoning paradigm, specifically teamwork is
    defined for Context Based Reasoning based on
    Joint Intentions Theory.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
4
  • SimpleCxBRModel


CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
5
  • SimpleCxBRModel

A CxBR agent has an associated knowledge base to
store believed facts about the environment. This
knowledge base is implementation dependent and
not strictly specified by the CxBR paradigm.
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
6
  • SimpleCxBRModel

A CxBR Mission includes the agents goal.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
7
  • SimpleCxBRModel

CxBR Missions have an associated set of Contexts.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
8
  • SimpleCxBRModel

CxBR Contexts each include context specific
sub-goals.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
9
  • SimpleCxBRModel

A Context is considered Active when transition
requirements and possibly transition criteria are
met.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
10
  • SimpleCxBRModel

The Active Context determines a CxBR agents
high-level behaviors.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
11
  • Belief Desire Intention
  • Perhaps the most common paradigm for modeling
    intelligent agents is the belief-desire-intention
    model 1. Georgeff loosely defines BDI as
    follows
  • Beliefs - represent knowledge the agent possesses
    of the world.
  • Desires - correspond to goals of the agent.
  • Intentions - are plans to which an agent is
    committed.
  • These definitions are critical in defining terms
    related to collaboration and teamwork.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
12
  • Joint Intention Theory
  • Joint Intention Theory (JIT)2 is a set of
    definitions and corresponding theorems which
    define teamwork.
  • JIT itself does not provide an implementation of
    these theorems, but has been implemented by many
    researches since 1991.
  • However, very little has been done to incorporate
    JIT with contextual reasoning paradigms.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
13
  • Joint Intentions Theory
  • Definition 1 An agent has a persistent goal
    relative to q to achieve p iff
  • The agent believes that p is currently false
  • The agent wants p to be true eventually
  • It is true (and the agent knows it) that (2)
    will continue to hold until the agent comes to
    believe either that p is true, or that it will
    never be true, or that q is false.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
14
  • Joint Intentions Theory
  • Definition 2 An agent intends relative to some
    condition to do an action just in case the agent
    has a persistent goal (relative to that
    condition) of having done the action and,
    moreover, having done it, believing throughout
    that the agent is doing it.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
15
  • Joint Intentions Theory
  • Definition 3 An agent has a weak achievement
    goal relative to q and with respect to a team to
    bring about p if either of these conditions
    holds
  • The agent has a normal achievement goal to bring
    about p, that is, the agent does not yet believe
    that p is true and has p eventually being true as
    a goal.
  • The agent believes that p is true, will never be
    true, or is irrelevant (thus q is false), but has
    a goal that the status of p be mutually believed
    by all the team members.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
16
  • Joint Intentions Theory
  • Definition 4 A team of agents have a joint
    persistent goal relative to q to achieve p just
    in case
  • They mutually believe that p is currently false
  • They mutually know they all want p to eventually
    be true
  • It is true (and mutually known) that until they
    come to mutually believe either that p is true,
    that p will never be true, or that q is false,
    they will continue to mutually believe that they
    each have p as a weak achievement goal relative
    to q and with respect to the team.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
17
  • Joint Intentions Theory
  • Definition 5 A team of agents jointly intends,
    relative to some escape condition, to do an
    action iff the members have a joint persistent
    goal relative to that condition of their having
    done the action and, moreover, having done it,
    mutually believing throughout that they were
    doing it.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
18
  • CxBR Formalisms
  • Corollary 1 High level desires and goals are
    captured in CxBR Missions. Lower relative
    sub-goals and desires are captured in the
    Missions associated Contexts and Sub-Contexts.
  • Corollary 2 Given fact q is a transition
    requirement of Context c, if c is the Active
    Context then q is believed true.
  • Corollary 3 Given Context c is part of the
    context set associated with Mission m and m
    contains goal g, if c is the Active Context for
    an agent with Mission m, then the agent has
    Mission goal g and any goals (Mission sub-goals)
    of c.
  • Corollary 4 The sequence of Active Contexts for
    a CxBR agent is the agents plan.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
19
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms
  • Theorem 1 A CxBR agent has a persistent goal
    (individual commitment) relative to q to achieve
    p iff The Active Context c has transition
    requirement q and goal p or if the Active Context
    c has transition requirement q and the Mission m
    has goal p.
  • This is justified from the JIT Definition 1 of a
    persistent goal and CxBR corollaries 2 and 3.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
20
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms
  • Theorem 2 A CxBR agent intends relative to some
    condition, consisting at a minimum of some
    transition criterion, to do an action determined
    by the agents Active Context for the sake of a
    persistent goal.
  • This theorem is adapted from the JIT Definition 2
    for intentions and the fact that actions in CxBR
    are determined by the agents Active Context.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
21
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms
  • Theorem 3 A CxBR agent has a weak achievement
    goal relative to q and with respect to a team to
    bring about p if The agents Active Context is
    part of Mission ms related Contexts intended to
    accomplish p, or the agent has a goal that the
    status of p be mutually believed by all other
    teammates, regardless of the current state of p
    (true, false, or irrelevant).
  • This is justified by the JIT definition for weak
    achievement goal and the fact that the sequence
    of Contexts forms a plan that allows the
    accomplishment of the Mission goal.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
22
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms
  • Theorem 4 A team of CxBR agents has a joint
    persistent goal relative to q to achieve p if
    each agent shares the same team Mission with goal
    p.
  • This is justified by the JIT Definition 4 for
    joint persistent goal and Corollary 1.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
23
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms
  • Theorem 5 A team of CxBR agents jointly intends
    to do some action iff they share the same team
    Mission and believe they are accomplishing their
    Mission by following a plan of Mission related
    Contexts.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
24
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms
  • Theorem 6 Theorem 4 and theorem 5 could both be
    extended to include Context rather than Mission
    as a matter of scale.
  • This is justified since Mission is essentially a
    special form of Context. When considering a
    Context hierarchy including multiple Missions,
    the Missions themselves become the Context-set of
    some higher Mission.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
25
  • Collaborative CxBR Formalisms Summarized
  • Commitment to a mutual goal can be ascertained
    between CxBR agents by communicating/identifying
    the agents Mission and Active Context.
  • This requires a minimum familiarity of each
    agents Contexts by all team-members. Given
    this, agents can be aware of team-members
    intentions and beliefs based on the team-members
    Active Context and the perceiving agents
    understanding of those Contexts.

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
26
Diagonal-Combination-play-Context
Box-Combination-play-Context
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
27
SimplifiedMidfielderModel
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
28
SimpleModel
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
29
Modeling Team Hierarchies
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
30
Modeling Team Hierarchies
Abstract Class from which teams and team members
both inherit.
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
31
Used to model single-entities, such as
team-members.
Modeling Team Hierarchies
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
32
Modeling Team Hierarchies
Used to model group-entities, such as teams.
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
33
Team Model
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
34
Embedded Contexts
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
35
Co-Contexts
CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
36
Collaborative Context Based Reasoning
(CCxBR)??? Questions ???
  • Gil Barrett
  • Avelino Gonzalez
  • Intelligent Systems Laboratory
  • University of Central Florida

CxBR BDI JIT
CCxBR Team Models
37
  • References
  • 1 Georgeff, M. Pell B., Pollack M., Tambe M.,
    and Wooldridge M. The belief-desire-intention
    model of agency. In Proceedings of Agents,
    Theories, Architectures and Languages (ATAL),
    1999.
  • 2 Cohen, P. R., Levesque, H. J., 1991
    Teamwork. Nous, 35 1991
  • 3 Grosz, B. and Kraus, S. 1999. The evolution
    of SharedPlans. In Rao, A. and Woolridge, M.,
    editors, Foundations and Theories of Rational
    Agency, pages 227--262. Kluwer.
  • 4 Tambe, M., 1997, Towards Flexible Teamwork.
    Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 7,
    pp. 83-124.
  • 5 Jennings, N. R., 1993, Specification and
    Implementation of a Belief-Desire-Joint-Intention
    Architecture for Collaborative Problem Solving.
    International Journal of Intelligent and
    Cooperative Information Systems, 1993
  • 6 Jennings, N. R., 1995, Controlling
    Cooperative Problem Solving in Industrial
    Multi-Agent Systems using Joint Intentions.
    Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 74(2), 1995.
  • 7 Stensrud, B., Barrett, G., Trinh, V., and
    Gonzalez, A., Context Based Reasoning A Revised
    Specification. In the proceedings of Florida
    Artificial Intelligence Research Society 2004.
  • 8 Searle, J. R., 1990. Collective Intentions
    and Actions. In Intentions in Communications,
    chapter 19. The MIT Press. The evolution of
    SharedPlans. In Rao, A. and Woolridge, M.,
    editors, Foundations and Theories of Rational
    Agency, pages 227--262. Kluwer.
  • 9 Grosz, B. and Sidner, C., 1990, Plans for
    Discourse. In Cohen, P.lt Morganlt Press,
    Cambridge, MA. In Grosz, B. and Kraus, S.
    (1999). The evolution of SharedPlans. In Rao, A.
    and Woolridge, M., editors, Foundations and
    Theories of Rational Agency, pages 227--262.
    Kluwer.
  • 10 Bratman, M. E., 1992, Shared Cooperative
    Activity. The Philosophical Review,
    101(2)327-341. In Grosz, B. and Kraus, S.
    (1999). The evolution of SharedPlans. In Rao, A.
    and Woolridge, M., editors, Foundations and
    Theories of Rational Agency, pages 227--262.
    Kluwer.
  • 11 Grosz, B. and Kraus, S. 1996 Collaborative
    plans for complex group action. Artificial
    Intelligence, 86(2)269357 In Grosz, B. and
    Kraus, S. (1999). The evolution of SharedPlans.
    In Rao, A. and Woolridge, M., editors,
    Foundations and Theories of Rational Agency,
    pages 227--262. Kluwer.
  • 12 Grosz, B., 1996, Collaborative Systems
    1994 AAAI Presidential Address. AI Magazine,
    2(17)67-85. In Grosz, B. and Kraus, S. (1999).
    The evolution of SharedPlans. In Rao, A. and
    Woolridge, M., editors, Foundations and Theories
    of Rational Agency, pages 227--262. Kluwer.
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