Dr. Kenneth Alibek

1
Biological Weapons

• Presented by
• Dr. Kenneth Alibek
• to the USAF Air War College
• November 1, 1999

HADRON, INC.
2
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chemical
Biological
Nuclear
STRATEGIC
TACTICAL
3
Factors in BW Effectiveness

• Choice of agent
• Deployment method
• Formulation
• Manufacturing process
• Meteorological and terrain conditions

4
Types of BW Threat

• Bacterial weapons
• Viral weapons
• Rickettsial weapons
• Fungal weapons
• Toxin weapons
• Peptide weapons (a variant of toxin weapons)

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Partial Listing of Known Biological Weapons Agents
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BW Deployment Methods

• Vector

• Contamination of food and water sources

• Aerosol (the most effective deployment method)

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Soviet Biological Weapons Developed and Approved
for Use
Tularemia Glanders VEE
Smallpox Plague
Anthrax Q Fever (lt1990) Marburg (gt1990)
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
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Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late
80s/Early 90s
NATURAL STRAINS

• Ebola
• Bolivian hemorrhagic fever
• Argentinian hemorrhagic fever

• Melioidosis
• Lassa fever
• Japanese encephalitis
• Russian spring-summer encephalitis

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Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late
80s/Early 90s
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED STRAINS

• Antibiotic-resistant (AR) plague
• AR tularemia
• AR anthrax
• Antibiotic- and sulfonamide-resistant glanders

• Immune system-overcoming (IO) plague
• IO tularemia
• IO anthrax
• Smallpox with VEE genes inserted

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Types of Biological Weapons

• DRY
• Tularemia
• Anthrax
• Brucellosis
• Marburg

• LIQUID
• Smallpox
• Plague
• Anthrax
• VEE

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BW Manufacturing CapacitiesMinistry of Defense

• Sverdlovsk facility--anthrax
• 100 tons stockpiled
• Production capacity gt 1000 tons annually
• Kirov facility--plague
• 20 tons stockpiled
• Production capacity 200 tons annually
• Zagorsk facility--smallpox
• 20 tons stockpiled
• Production capacity 100 tons annually
• Strizhi (new facility)

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BW Manufacturing CapacitiesBiopreparat

• Berdsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders
• Production capacity gt 1000 tons annually
• Stepnogorsk facility--anthrax, tularemia,
  glanders
• Production capacity gt 1000 tons annually
• Omutninsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders
• Production capacity gt 1000 tons annually

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BW Manufacturing CapacitiesBiopreparat (cont.)

• Kurgan facility--anthrax
• Production capacity gt 1000 tons annually
• Penza facility--anthrax
• Production capacity gt 1000 tons annually
• Koltsovo facility--Marburg, smallpox
• Exact production capacity unknown dozens of tons
  annually

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BW Manufacturing CapacitiesMinistry of
Agriculture

• Pokrov facility--smallpox, VEE
• Production capacity gt 200 tons annually

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Munitions, Submunitions, Delivery Means

• Aviation bombs with biological bomblets for
  strategic and medium bombers
• Spray tanks installed on medium bombers

• Multiwarhead ballistic missiles with bomblet
  warheads
• Cruise missiles with special disseminating
  devices (under development)

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Epidemiological Pattern of Smallpox Weapon
New foci of secondary infection
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial explosion
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Epidemiological Pattern of Tularemia Weapon
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial explosion
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Epidemiological Pattern of Plague Weapon
New foci of secondary infection
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial explosion
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Epidemiological Pattern of Anthrax Weapon
Contaminated zone
Zone of initial explosion
Infected zone
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Modes of Infection
PRIMARY AEROSOL

• Caused by aerosols that form immediately after
  dissemination
• Affect target objects before sedimentation

SECONDARY AEROSOL

• Caused by aerosols which have already sedimented,
  but have aerosolized again due to wind or
  activity (building ventilation, vehicular
  activity, street cleaning, maintenance, etc.)

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Modes of Infection (cont.)
SECONDARY DROPLET

• Caused by droplet aerosols secreted by people who
  were infected by primary or secondary aerosols
• Seen only with agents contagious by respiratory
  droplet infection

SECONDARY NON-AEROSOL

• Transmitted by infected animals (rodents, insect
  parasites) directly or via objects, food or
  water, OR
• Transmitted by contaminated objects (without
  involving aerosolization)

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Effectiveness of the USSRs BW

• Specific expenditure value (Q50) amount of BW
  required to affect 50 of the population evenly
  distributed over one square kilometer (open area)
• Smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, plague, VEE,
  glanders Q50 3-5 kg/km2
• Marburg, dry form (and theoretically dry Ebola)
  Q50 1 kg/km2

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Current Defenses AgainstBiological Weapons

• Physical
• Early Detection
• Limited Capability
• Protective Gear
• Inadequate
• Unrealistic

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Current Defenses AgainstBiological Weapons

• Medical
• Vaccines
• Available for lt 10 of known agents
• Genetic engineering can render ineffective
• Weeks / months to become effective
• Supplies inadequate
• Not cost effective
• Pre-treatment
• Depends on luck
• Treatment
• Marginal success

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Medical Research Targets

• Treating and preventing a broad spectrum of
  infections by modulating the immune system
• Treating and preventing specific infections
  caused by biological weapons

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Dr. Kenneth Alibek
7611 Little River Turnpike Suite 404W Annandale,
VA 22003 [phone] kalibek_at_hadron.com