An investigation into some aspects of Braess Paradox Keith Bloy Vela VKE Consulting Engineers Contents Classical example Other paradoxes Literature survey ...
Braess's Paradox, Fibonacci Numbers, and Exponential Inapproximability. Henry Lin ... New lower and upper bounds on Braess's Paradox in multicommodity networks ...
Note the above measure is the average network performance over time of ... The network efficiency measure captures user behavior, flows and costs on networks ...
Title: Algorithmic Mechanism Design Author: Y. Narahari Last modified by: Guido Created Date: 10/16/2002 4:53:42 AM Document presentation format: Presentazione su ...
Rail 26,339 0.56% Other 1,627 0.04% Passenger miles by mode ... Urban rail networks. Falls between highway and air networks. Flows in a Highway Network ...
S. Mandayam/ ANN/ECE Dept./Rowan University. Shreekanth Mandayam. ECE Department. Rowan University ... Theorem 1: Every compact set is an existence set (Cheney) ...
Algorithmic Issues in Strategic Distributed Systems * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * For each e E, the amount of flow absorbed by e is: fe= P:e P fP ...
Protecting against national-scale power blackouts. Daniel Bienstock, Columbia University ... The leading cause of the blackout was. Inadequate System Understanding ...
Selection of training and test data - cross-validation. Pre-processing: Feature Extraction ... Theorem 1: Every compact set is an existence set (Cheney) ...
Title: Algorithmic Mechanism Design Author: Y. Narahari Last modified by: Guido Created Date: 10/16/2002 4:53:42 AM Document presentation format: Presentazione su ...
How Bad is Selfish Routing. A survey on existing models for selfish routing ... Overlay routing: Detour or RON routing via peer nodes in the overlay network ...
Computational Issues in Game Theory Lecture 3: Other topics. Edith Elkind ... Corollary: for any C 0, the cost of anarchy is C. What can we do now? ...
Based on Slides by Amir Epstein and by Svetlana Olonetsky ... The social optimum. k! / ( k-i)! Gi. k-i. k! 1. k. k. k-1. k(k-1) k-2. G0. G1. G2. 2. v=2k-i. v=1 ...
a rate (amount) ri of traffic from si to ti. for each edge e, a cost function ce ... Nash flow can cost arbitrarily more than the optimal (min-cost) flow ...
Game defined by matrix with a row for each of R's options and a column for each of C's options. ... alg to do nearly as well as best fixed row in hindsight. ...
Bad news: inefficiency of selfish routing grows as cost functions ... Good news: inefficiency does not grow with network size or # of source-destination pairs. ...
How Bad is Selfish Routing. A survey on existing models for selfish routing ... These routing metrics of the above protocols are generally based on hop counts. ...
... longitudinal responses. Fetene B. Tekle, Frans E. S. Tan and Martijn P. F. Berger ... The optimality criteria for non linear models depend on unknown ...
NBC is taking the premiere of 'Celebrity Apprentice' out of the cross-hairs of ... in modern humans is essentially an evolutionary oops, albeit a beneficial one. ...
Potential Functions and the Inefficiency of Equilibria. Tim Roughgarden. Stanford University ... example: POA 4/3 if G has affine cost fns. 36. Proof of General Thm ...
A Play of the Restaurant Game. The play. Row player chooses Dusty's. ... For each possible combination of actions by the players, what's the outcome of the game. ...
the worst price of anarchy is always on two edge network. s. t. x. 1. s. t. x. 1. 1. 0. 1- Corollary: price of anarchy for degree d polynomials is O(d/log d) ...
fe = ri The rate - the amount of flow from si to ti. f is feasible if for all i ... And le*(fe) is 2aefe be. ... function e is of the form le(fe) = aex. ...
Suppose user 1 hacks his TCP/IP back-off implementation: Converges to ... Fortunately, TCP/IP hacks have a cost to adopt and hackers have a disincentive ...
Users with a multitude of diverse economic interests sharing a Network (Internet) ... true for cars, packets?: users do not choose paths on the Internet: routers do! ...
Algorithmic Mechanism Design: computational mechanisms to handle Private ... Agents are in a game, reach Nash equilibrium. The Principal's. design parameter: ...
Any multilevel method where geometry is not used (and may not be available) to ... given, that are important, or novel, or historical, or downright weird: ...
Having a global view might lead to sub-optimal results ... Goal of learning is to find an optimal policy for selecting actions. The Q value. R: Reward ...