Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
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The Prisoners Dilemma
Player 1
Player 2
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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

• Accepts the basic assumptions of realism
• States main actors
• States unitary, rational actors
• Goals states follow their interests
• -but have multiple interests in addition to
  security and power
• -power not always fungible
• System anarchical, no central authority

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Central Question

• What Facilitates Cooperation in an Anarchical
  System?

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Iteration

• Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation
  (1984)
• If you play the PD repeatedly the
  winning/dominant strategy is TIT FOR TAT, not
  DEFECT
• Implications
• Cooperation can get started even in a world of
  unconditional defection
• Iteration, long term horizons important
• Strategy of reciprocity can thrive where many
  other strategies of cooperation fail
• Once established cooperation based on reciprocity
  can protect itself from invasion of other
  strategies

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Conditions for Cooperation

• Hegemonic Interest (Realism and Institutionalism)
• Repeated interaction
• Repeated PD dominant strategy is Tit-for-Tat
  NOT Defect
• No immediate threat to state survival
• Smaller number of actors
• Type of cooperation dilemma

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Cooperation dilemmas

• PD problems of cheating, credible commitment

• Battle of the Sexes coordination problems

Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 33 41
Defect 14 22
Game Opera
Game 12 00
Opera 00 21
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International Regimes

• implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
  and decision making procedures around which
  actors expectations converge in a given area of
  international relations.
• Stephen Krasner (1983) International Regimes,
  p.2.
• Example GATT/WTO

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Institutions Facilitate Cooperation

• Institutionalize iteration
• Provide information
• Credible commitments
• Issue linkage
• Reduce transaction costs
• make agreements and monitoring less costly to
  administer
• Resolve distribution conflicts

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Growth in the Number of International
RegimesEnvironmental Treaties 1968-1998
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Realist Critique

• Institutions reflect the distribution of power
  and interests and therefore are irrelevant
• Neo-liberal have ignored the problem of relative
  gains that would inhibit or shape cooperation
• Little empirical evidence that institutions
  matter

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Impact of Ozone Regime
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Impact of Whaling Regime?