Airport Security

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Airport Security
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Airport Security Outline

• Major consideration in Terminal planning and
  design
• Who? What?
• History Why?
• How?
• Airport Security Program
• Failure of Imagination

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Terminal Design Objectives

• Walking distances
• Aesthetic design
• Services
• Security
• Cost effectiveness

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Flight Interface

• Arriving passenger areas
• Security
• Departure lounges
• Corridors
• Departure Gates
• All are important for different reasons, mostly
  to be more efficient, make more money
• But Security is only to protect
  life/property!

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Introduction

• Safety vs. Security
• Safety-freedom from unintentional danger, etc.
• Security-freedom from intentional acts of
  violence, danger, risk of injury, loss, etc.
• Who is/are the problem?
• Terrorists
• Hijackers
• Suicide bombers
• Criminals Inside/Outside job
• Disruptive Passengers intentional and not

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Introduction

• What is the problem?
• Individual attacks to
• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
• Nuclear
• Full nuclear detonation to dirty bomb
• Biological
• Chemical
• Conventional weapons large explosives
• Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)
• Mass attacks with military weapons
• Unconventional weapons large A/C flown into
  targets

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Introduction

• Why airports?
• Vital to a stable economy
• Important to community operation
• High density of people targets
• Very visible, high profile facilities

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History of Airport Security

• FAA/TSA regs are written in blood
• Crash/incident?New regulations
• First hijacking - 1930 Lima, Peru
• Revolutionaries dropping leaflets
• 1930s to 55 - Several hijackings
• Eastern Europeans seeking asylum
• 1st Fatal 47 Romanians killed a crew
• 1955 First Major Criminal Act
• Jack Graham blew up A/C, 33 dead
• Killed his mother for insurance money

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Airport Security Hist. (Contd)

• 1960 First Suicide Bomber
• Again, for a heavy life insurance payout
• Political/public demand for baggage inspection
• Flying down to Cuba- 1959 to 80s
• First hijackings to escape Cuba, then
• Hijacking to Cuba for money or politics
• Political/public demand for Pax screening and
  hijacker profiling
• 1972 Southern Airways Flight 49
• DC-9 diverted LEX, hot refueled, next - Havana
• December- LEX Pax/carryon screening begins

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Airport Security Hist. (Contd)

• 1972-Part 107 Fed Aviation Regulations
• Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage
• All airports must
• Identify their Air Operations Area (AOA)
• ID those areas with little/no protection against
  unauthorized access due to poor infrastructure
• Create their Airport Security Plan to upgrade
  their facilities to comply with current and
  future regulations with a timetable and budget
  estimate
• Successfully reduced security incidents

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Airport Security Hist. (Contd)

• 1980s International Incidents ?USA
• 1985 TWA in Lebanon Pax murdered
• 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie Scotland-all dead
• Threats to US personnel - gaining access through
  foreign security
• New US Regulations applied to foreign facilities
• Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage
• Reconcile pax/bags or no go
• 1990s - FAA sponsored more research
• New Equipment to detect bombs/weapons
• Upgrade facilities/proceduresthen

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History of Airport Security

• September 11, 2001
• Airport Security world changed
• Failure of Imagination routine security
• ALL A/C ordered to Land immediately
• _at_0945 over 4500 A/C IFR 1000s VFR
• LEX tasked to create plan for 30-50 A/C
• 1215 nothing but Mil A/C - unprecedented
• All regs REairport secty/air ops?TSA
  responsibility
• Airports begin improvised security checklist
• LEX begins flight ops 1250 September 13
• KyANG airmen/soldiers stand guard

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History of Airport Security

• 9/11/2001

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History of Airport Security

• Aviation Transportation Security Act
• Transportation Security Admin (TSA) created
• Develop/enforce new guidelines
• Title 49 CFR Transportation
• All regs REairport secty/air ops?TSA
  responsibility
• 2003 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS)
• TSA/USCG/Customs/INS combined

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Airport Security Program

• TSA is responsible for Airport Security
• Main source for planning/design guidelines
• Air Operations Area (AOA)
• Secure Area
• Sterile area
• Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)
• Exclusive Area
• Risk Management/Assessment

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Airport Security Program

• Security Identification Display Area(SIDA)

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Pier/Finger Terminal
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Security _at_Commercial Airports

• Passenger Screening
• Baggage Screening
• Employee Identification
• Perimeter Security

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Passenger Screening

• Major changes/overhaul since 9/11
• Since 2003 managed/operated by TSA
• Prior by Airlines under FAA regulation
• Significant impacts on planning/design
• Continuously reviewed and evolving
• Facilities/Equipment include
• Automatic process magnetometer, explosive trace
  detection, body scanning, biometrics, etc
• Manual search procedures/areas
• Each airport is unique

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Passenger Screening

• Typical Passenger Screening Layout

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Baggage Screening

• Since 2003, every bag screened
• 100 EDS rule, Explosive Detection System
• Like a CT scan
• Magnetometer
• Greatly complicates baggage handling
• Usual solution Automation (LEX)
• 1st in Lobbies, then moved behind counters
• Search areas blast resistant

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Baggage Screening

• Initial Standalone Screening in lobbies-exposed

• Inline Screening

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Employee Identification

• All personnel in the Security Identification
  Display Area (SIDA)
• Must have criminal background check/OK
• Trained in facilities and security issues
• Prominently display SIDA badge at all times
• SIDA Facilities/Equipment needs
• Secure defined perimeter
• Automatic electronic controls
• Electronically controlled gates, card readers
• CCTV, card reader monitoring, personnel

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Perimeter Security

• Airport Security Plan must have a defined
  perimeter
• Perimeter fencing
• AC 107 Aviation Security--Airports
• Controlled access gates
• Kept to a minimum
• Security lighting
• PSO patrols
• NOT routine

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Vulnerability Assessment

• Important for planning and design
• ID where security enhancements are needed
• Intro security issues early in design
• Wide range of threats/vulnerabilities
• Threat-anything that may cause harm
• Vulnerability-anything the bad guys can take
  advantage of to carry out a threat
• Cannot completely eliminate
• Play out scenarios
• Implement protective measures/procedures

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Vulnerability Assessment

• Flow diagram

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Special Design Issues

• TSA controls most Security Design
• TSA used to post links on website for design
• Mark Day Must have need to know get OK
• Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation
• Glazing and screens
• Structure harden columns, blast walls, etc.
• Mimimize progressive collapse
• Blast Analysis Plan (BAP)
• Public Facilities
• Limit concealment points, entry control points
• Harden emergency systems

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Special Design Issues

• Security Facilities
• Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, TSA areas, road
  barriers, vehicle inspection areas, etc
• Joint Military Facilities
• Coordinating force protection with TSA
• Avoid Security Theater
• Countermeasures to provide the feeling of
  securitybut do little or nothing to achieve it
• Sometimes perception is beneficial but
• Actual benefits very debatable

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Special Construction Issues

• All personnel get criminal background checks
  before access approval
• Security during construction
• Workers cant go sightseeing! Areas off-limits!
• Security of classified equipment
• Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, etc.
• TSA screening areas
• Only cleared workers handle the installation

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Special Security Issues

• Presidential/US VIP visit
• Secure Ramp/buildings/
• Detailed access to your info
• Shut down airspace/terminal/roads/comm
• Foreign VIP visit
• Queen of England
• Emir of UAE and family
• Con Air
• Federal/International prisoner exchange

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Security at GA Airports

• TSA has not required the same level of security
  effort at GA airportsbut
• Encourage GA airports to develop their own
  security initiatives
• Like Commercial Airports
• Awareness programs
• Reporting methods
• Develop security plans similar to commercial

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Future Security

• Changing/Increasing security?Norm
• Keep up with TSA/FAA regulation changes
• Airport/perimeter security technology changes
• Cannot completely eliminate threats
• Continuous vulnerability assessment
• Watch the news
• Criminals/terrorists are copycats AND innovators
• Scare du jour (disease, terrorism)
• Europe warning - five A/C bombings for Xmas
• Failure of Imagination

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Airport Security

• Questions?

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Airport Security

• References, Links
• http//www.bluegrassairport.com/
• http//www.faa.gov/
• http//www.boeing.com/boeing/
• http//www.aaae.org/
• R. Horonjeff, F. McKelvey. Planning Design of
  Airports. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2010
• TSA. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport
  Planning, Design and Construction. 2006
• R. Souleyrette. CE 633 Lectures
• John Cassel, majordadjohn_at_msn.com
• Mark Day, MDay_at_bluegrassairport.com
• - http//www.kentucky.com/2014/12/16/3596907/tsa
  -chief-travelers-from-some.html?sp/99/101/