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A State-Centered Approach to the Politics of Trade

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Title: A State-Centered Approach to the Politics of Trade


1
A State-Centered Approach to the Politics of Trade
  • READING ASSIGNMENT
  • Oatley Chapter 5

2
Plan
  • What does the state want?
  • Survival
  • Why would the state intervene?
  • Infant Industries

3
What does the state want?
  • Improve overall welfare
  • Increase its relative power

4
What does the state want?
  • SURVIVAL!
  • Political Institutions shape the incentives of
    political leaders
  • Under democracy, leaders survive by winning votes
  • Under dictatorship, leaders survive by satisfying
    elite constituents
  • military, big business, foreign interests

5
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6
Democracy vs. Dictatorship
7
Hazard Rate over Time for Democracies (Solid
Line) Dictatorships (Dotted Line) Time in
years
8
Time in office
  • Does not improve a democratic leaders chances
    in office
  • What then helps democratic leaders survive?
  • PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
  • In the United States
  • Economic Growth

9
Time in office
  • Does improve an autocratic leaders chances in
    office
  • Why?
  • PROVISION OF PRIVATE GOODS
  • Pay off a small, loyal group of supporters
  • Military elites
  • Business elites

10
Changing focus toA more specific institution
Legislative Representation
  • Proportional?
  • Or Malapportioned?

11
Who needs the most gasoline per capita?Urban v
Rural
12
Policy outcome?
  • Weve got Interests Incentives
  • Now, to get the policy outcome,
  • We interact interests/incentives with a domestic
    political institution
  • Malapportionment!

13
Malapportionment tends to weigh RURAL preferences
more than URBAN
  • (i.e., Proportional representation tends to weigh
    URBAN preferences more than RURAL)
  • Does this have an effect on NATIONAL policy?

14
Test
  • Does malapportionment affect
  • Gasoline prices

15
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16
How can the state get what it wants?
  • Industrial Policy
  • Tariffs
  • Subsidies
  • Investment

17
Why does the state protect?
  • One answer Infant industries

18
Infant-industry case
  • Long-run welfare gains created by a new industry
    will be greater than the short-run losses of
    social welfare
  • infant industries like children who need the
    protection of their parents until they grow
    strong
  • Comparative advantages are DYNAMIC

19
  • Both states are better off with tradeBUT
  • Would you rather live in Brazil with trade?
  • Or the United States with autarky?

20
Infant Industry Argument 1Fixed costs
Economies of scale
  • Economies of scale refers to the decreased
    per-unit-cost as output increases.
  • The initial investment of capital is diffused
    (spread) over an increasing number of units of
    output
  • ? The marginal cost of producing a good or
    service decreases as production increases

21
Example
  • Suppose an industry requires an initial
    investment (fixed cost) of 1000
  • With 100 customers, the Average Fixed Cost is 10
  • With 200 customers, the Average Fixed Cost
    becomes 5
  • This results in a lower average total cost

22
  • No economies of scale
  • If costs increase proportionately to the quantity
    of all input factors
  • Diseconomies of scale
  • If costs increase by a greater amount than the
    quantity of all input factors
  • Economies of scale
  • If costs decrease by a greater amount than the
    quantity of all input factors

23
A different way to approach returns to scale
  • Where all inputs increase by a factor of 2, new
    values for output should be
  • Twice the previous output ?
  • a constant return to scale
  • More than twice the previous output ?
  • an increased return to scale
  • Less than twice the previous output ?
  • a decreased return to scale

24
Formal notation
  • Y is output, K is capital, L is labor, F is the
    production function
  • YF(K,L)
  • Suppose we double our inputs
  • 2K, 2L
  • F(2K,2L) ???
  • How much does Y increase?
  • If F(2K,2L) 2F(K,L) ? We have _______ returns
    to scale
  • CONSTANT
  • F(2K,2L) gt 2F(K,L) ? We have _______ returns to
    scale
  • INCREASING
  • If F(2K,2L) lt 2F(K,L) ? We have _______ returns
    to scale
  • DECREASING

25
Slightly more abstract notation
  • Y is output, K is capital, L is labor, F is the
    production function, a is the increase in inputs
  • YF(K,L)
  • If F(aK,aL)aF(K,L) ? Constant returns to scale
  • If F(aK,aL)gtaF(K,L) ? Increasing returns to scale
  • F(aK,aL)ltaF(K,L) ? Decreasing returns to scale
  • For fun Apply this to the Cobb-Douglas
    production function! Yippee!

26
Bringing the two sets of concepts together?
  • YF(K,L) start up costs

You can have increasing returns to scale if
And/or if investments in inputs generate
disproportionately high increases in outputs
Start-up costs are high
27
Infant Industry Argument 2Economies of
experience
  • Efficient production requires specific skills
    that can only be acquired through production in
    the industry
  • Experienced management
  • Skilled workers
  • Network of suppliers

28
Why cant markets efficiently educate / train
the workforce?
  • Trained people may leave the firm, taking their
    skills elsewhere
  • Missing market
  • Futures market for labor
  • Externalities from education?

29
Economies of scale /or experience can lead to
  • Oligopoly, market power
  • Barriers to entry
  • First mover advantages

30
Suppose an industry where market-demand supports
only one firm (high tech e.g., aircraft)
European firm
PRODUCE NOT PRODUCE
PRODUCE 5, 5 100, 0
NOT PRODUCE 0, 100 0, 0
US firm
What are the two EQUILIBRIA? (R,C)
31
Equilibrium
  • An outcome where no player has an incentive to
    deviate from his or her chosen strategy given the
    strategies of the other players.

32
Whoever moves first wins!
  • http//www.youtube.com/watch?vK4GAQtGtd_0feature
    related

33
Now suppose the US moved first, but Europe offers
a subsidy (R,C)
European firm
PRODUCE NOT PRODUCE
PRODUCE 5, 5 100, 0
NOT PRODUCE 0, 110 0, 0
US firm
34
Take-aways
  • What do governments want? Survival
  • Democracy v. Autocracy
  • Malapportionment
  • Why does the state intervene?
  • Infant Industries
  • Economies of Scale
  • Increasing returns to scale
  • Economies of experience
  • First mover advantages
  • Equilibria

35
Thank youWE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!
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