What does

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What does community mean for farmer adoption of
conservation practices? Some logic and evidence

Graham Marshall Institute for Rural Futures,
Uni. of New England
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(No Transcript)
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• We are trying to encourage a process of
  self-help Some day the local community has to
  pick up all this.
• - Commonwealth Dept Primary Industries
  Energy, 1989.

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• A strong feeling of ownership over the NRM
  planning process will increase motivation and
  likelihood that the outcomes identified in the
  regional integrated NRM plans are achieved.
• - National NRM Capacity Building Framework,
  2002

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Key points

• The raison detre of community-based NRM lies in
  helping people to help themselves
• We need to acknowledge, understand, and learn how
  to address the Samaritans Dilemma that faces
  us in helping farmers self-help
• Targets, program logic, and M E need, at all
  levels, to change as we learn.

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Origins and evolution of rural CBNRM in Australia

• Prior approaches to helping farmers conserve
  natural resources fostered dependency
• NRM programs seek to help people manage their
  resource problems
• Community-based NRM programs seek to help people
  to help themselves

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• CBNRM soon became understood mainly through the
  lens of extension thinking
• Rural extension was the dominant
  social-scientific tradition for agricultural
  issues
• Governments concerned that farmers lacked
  awareness, knowledge, skills and attitudes needed
  to address NRM issues
• Political reasons for CBNRM focusing community
  programs on extension

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• Politicians/officials attracted by lure of CBNRM
  stretching funds further by kick starting local
  voluntarism
• Ongoing financial support comes to be accepted,
  but emphasis on self-help persists

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The Samaritans Dilemma
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• The paradox of supplying help to self-help is
  the fundamental conundrum of all helping
  relationships. Most external help actually
  overrides or undercuts the budding capacity for
  self-help and thus ends up being unhelpful.
• - David Ellerman, 2007.

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• 1978 James Buchanan developed a game-theory
  model of this paradox called the Samaritans
  Dilemma
• Self-interest of helper propels unconditional
  help, thus weakening self-help
• compulsion to see problems solved
• empire-building, turf protection, getting money
  out the door
• scepticism about recipient capacities for
  self-help
• The helper needs strategic courage
• but Buchanan felt increasing wealth had made
  soft options too hard to resist

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• 1979 The neo-liberal revolution begins (with
  Thatcherism)
• Strong on strategic courage, but weak on theory
• Committed to smaller government and reciprocity
• Focus on market (and market-like) solutions
• Purchaser-provider arrangements embraced
• Reciprocity to be enforced by rigorous
  accountability measures

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Helping self-help under regional NRM delivery
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• Regional delivery model a neo-liberal exercise in
  new public management
• Stringent financial accountability measures
  follow frustrations with cost shifting
• But coercing reciprocity is costly
• Limited resources to monitor compliance with
  conditions attached to help
• Difficult to establish the without help
  scenario

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• Most farmer lapses in reciprocating help may be
  motivated unconsciously by reduced pressure to
  help themselves, eg. by
• reducing land-use intensity
• keeping up with RD
• experimenting with solutions on-farm
• sending kids to university
• cooperating with neighbours
• Help is unlikely to strengthen farmer self-help
  substantially unless most of their reciprocity is
  voluntary

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CBNRM, farmers, and reciprocity
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• Robert Axelrod identified two ways of promoting
  reciprocity
• Change the payoffs (to make reciprocity
  consistent with actors goals) and/or
• Make the future more important relative to the
  present (enlarge the shadow of the future)

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How might CBNRM change the payoffs?

• Greater community ownership of decisions by
  farmers?
• Greater ownership of funds by administrators
  increases their strategic courage?
• Or community body less able to deny help when
  reciprocity requires?
• advantages of government acting as bad cop

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How might CBNRM enlarge the shadow of the
future?

• Easier mutual monitoring by helpers and
  recipients?
• More durable interactions between helpers and
  recipients?
• More frequent interactions between helpers and
  recipients?

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Some evidence
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Method

• Survey a sample of farmers
• Measure their (a) trust in their community-based
  agency, and (b) intentions to adopt practices it
  promotes to them.
• Test statistically whether the relationship
  between trust and intentions is positive
  (indicating reciprocity).
• Control for influence of other relevant factors.

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• Two projects
• Land and Water Management Planning (LWMP) in
  NSWs Murray Irrigation Districts - surveyed
  1999.
• Regional NRM delivery in 3 NRM regions surveyed
  2006
• Fitzroy Basin (Qld)
• Mallee (Vic)
• South West Catchments (WA).

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Murray LWMP project

• 7,490 km2 25,000 people 1,610 farms.
• Historic antagonism between irrigators and NSW
  Government
• 1991 Start developing community-based plans
  focused on irrigation salinity
• 1996 Murray Irrigation Ltd, co-owned by
  irrigators, made responsible for ensuring farmers
  help implement the LWMPs by complying with their
  cost-sharing commitments .

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• A significant positive relationship was found
  between farmers intentions to comply and their
  trust in their community-based corporation
• Indicates that farmers were interacting with
  CBNRM arrangements on the basis of reciprocity

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Regional delivery project

• Fitzroy Basin Region
• 156,000 km2 200,000 people.
• CBNRM body is Fitzroy Basin Association (FBA)
• Central Highlands sub-region
• 45,000 km2 20,000 people.
• CBNRM body is Central Highlands Resources Use
  Planning Cooperative (CHRRUP)

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• Mallee Region
• 39,000 km2 65,000 people.
• focused on dryland area of region.
• CBNRM body is Mallee Catchment Management
  Authority.
• NRM delivery not devolved to sub-regional level

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• South West Catchments Region
• 51,657 km2 193,000 people 5,000 farms.
• CBNRM body is South West Catchments Council.
• Blackwood Basin sub-region
• 23,500 km2 37,000 people 2,000 farms.
• CBNRM body is Blackwood Basin Group (BBG).

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• Given the
• (a) greater scales of the regional-delivery
  cases, compared with the LWMP case, and
• (b) logic that increased scale lessens farmer
  incentives to practise reciprocity,
• Farmer reciprocity was expected to be weaker
  in the regional-delivery cases
• Although less weakened when delivery was
  devolved to the sub-regional level.

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• Models were estimated for each of the 22 key
  conservation practices promoted across the three
  regions (7 by CHRRUP, 7 by Mallee CMA, 8 by BBG)
• Only one model (4.5) indicated farmers were
  practising reciprocity with their regional CBNRM
  body
• This model was for the Mallee Region, where
  farmer interaction with the regional body was not
  reduced by presence of a sub-regional body
• In the two regions with sub-regional bodies, 9 of
  the 15 models (60) indicated farmers were
  practising reciprocity with their subregional
  body

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• Devolving NRM helping to CBNRM arrangements can
  be effective in strengthening farmer capacities
  for self-help, although this benefit declines
  with increasing scale of CBNRM
• Caveat Conclusions based on a limited set of
  cases hypotheses only.

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Conclusions
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• The raison detre of community-based NRM lies in
  helping people to help themselves
• It is about making community members more likely
  to reciprocate the help given them under CBNRM
• Help from CBNRM may include leadership,
  networking, RD, financial incentives, social
  incentives, regulation, extension, etc.
• Extension is important but only part of the
  picture

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• We need to acknowledge, understand, and learn
  systematically how to solve the Samaritans
  Dilemma
• A business approach to CBNRM requires us at
  all levels - to devise targets, milestones,
  program logics and ME strategies accordingly.

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Key points

• The raison detre of community-based NRM lies in
  helping people to help themselves
• We need to acknowledge, understand, and learn how
  to address the Samaritans Dilemma that faces
  us in helping farmers self-help
• Targets, program logic, and M E need, at all
  levels, to change as we learn.

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