GPS Vulnerability Assessment

1
GPS Vulnerability Assessment

• CGSIC
• International Sub-Committee Meeting
• Melbourne, Australia
• February 10, 20032
• s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
• CAPT Curt Dubay
• U.S. Coast Guard

2
Overview

• Background
• Action Plan
• Radionavigation Systems Task Force
• The Way Ahead

3
Background

• PDD-63 tasked DOT to assess vulnerability of
  transportation infrastructure relying on GPS
• Analyze civil aviation, maritime, and surface use
  to assess the ways each is impacted by GPS outage
• Steps to minimize impacts of GPS outages
• Safety, operational, environmental, and economic
• Overall Finding
• GPS key element of nations transportation
• infrastructure
• GPS is vulnerable to interference/disruption
• Independent backup systems/procedures needed
• in critical applications

Study released the day before Sep 11th
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Background (contd)

• 16 specific recommendations to mitigate the
  impact on transportation systems
• Continue GPS modernization to include GPS III
• More civil signals/higher broadcast power
• Implement appropriate mitigation strategies
• For each individual mode, maintain appropriate
  backup systems or procedures
• Reflect impact of interference in application
  designs
• Monitor/report/locate sources of interference
• Applicability of military anti-jam technology
• DOT develop Navigation Infrastructure Roadmap
• for the future

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Background (contd)

• Dec 01 - DOT Pos/Nav Exec Committee
• Operating Administrations concurred with
• report recommendations
• Endorsed proposed mitigation action plan
• March 02 - Secretary approved plan
• Department currently implementing
• DOT Positioning and Navigation Executive
  Committee overseeing implementation
• Task Force conducting Radionavigation
  Capabilities Assessment

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Overview

• Background
• Action Plan
• Radionavigation Systems Task Force
• The Way Ahead

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Action Plan Goals

• Ensure that GPS fulfills its potential as a key
  element of the nations transportation
  infrastructure
• Ensure that the vulnerabilities identified in the
  report do not affect the safety and security of
  our transportation system
• Contains 12 elements

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Action Plan Elements

• GPS Receiver Enhancement
• Facilitate transfer of DoD AJ technology
• Certify safety-critical GPS receivers
• Develop GPS receiver standards
• Future Direction
• Intermodal radionavigation capabilities
  assessment
• Make decision on the future of LORAN-C by end of
  CY02
• Develop Roadmap for 2003 Federal Radionavigation
  Plan

• Vulnerability Mitigation
• Ensure adequate backup systems/procedures
• Continue GPS modernization
• Continue spectrum protection
• Enhance interference location capabilities
• Risk Awareness
• Emphasize education programs
• Conduct periodic public outreach
• Send letters to industry, state/local DOTs
• Work with GPS Industry Council

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Overview

• Background
• Action Plan
• Radionavigation Systems Task Force
• The Way Ahead

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Radionavigation Systems Task Force

• Chartered to conduct a multi-modal capability
  assessment of radionavigation systems
• Complete assessment of the future mix of systems
  to meet all requirements of the U.S.
  Transportation infrastructure
• From both a capability and cost perspective
• Consider requirements of non-transportation users
  of Federal Radionavigation Systems
• Forward recommendation to Secretary to
• support a decision in early 2003

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Technical Approach

• Identify requirements of transportation modes
• Define capabilities of different systems
• Conduct technical assessment of systems
• Capabilities vs. Requirements
• Develop alternatives of system mixes
• Reduce to 4-6 alternatives
• Criteria for evaluation of remaining alternatives
  
• Cost, performance, backup
• Political, impact to others
• Provide recommendation on best alternative
• To satisfy national need for positioning and
  timing services for at least the next 10 years

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Assumptions

• 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP)
• Baseline for radionavigation systems
• Include GPS capabilities only through GPS
  modernized Block IIF (i.e., 2 new civil signals)
• GPS III will be evaluated once system is defined
• Augmentations to GPS are not backup
  radionavigation systems for GPS
• WAAS, LAAS, and NDGPS (includes MDGPS)
• All depend on receiving basic GPS position
• If GPS position lost, value of augmentation lost

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Evaluation

• Produced detailed matrices of requirements
• 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan
• GPS Operational Requirements Document (Feb 2000)
• Other validated requirements
• Produced detailed matrices of systems
  capabilities
• Evaluated Capabilities vs Requirements
• Integrity, availability, coverage, accuracy, and
• continuity

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Alternatives

• Developed 12 alternatives from the baseline
• Based on assumptions and capabilities vs
  requirements assessment
• Guidance from the POS/NAV EC on several issues
• FAA Navigation and Landing Transition Strategy
• Forwarded to the DOT on Aug 21, 2002
• Results integrated into Task Force evaluation
• Reduced to 4 for further evaluation
• Pros cons for each alternative

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Issues

• Should radionavigation systems in RD be
  considered in current alternative mixes?
• LAAS Cat II/III (FAA) High Accuracy NDGPS
  (FHWA) enhanced Loran (FAA, Coast Guard) GPS
  III (DoD/AF) and Galileo (EU)
• Decision Do not include RD systems until
  completion of RD
• Performance and lifecycle costs for systems are
  unknown at this time
• Modes continue investments in RD systems
• Each RD effort should assess feasibility to meet
  other mode performance requirements

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Issues

• Can a single augmentation system (i.e. WAAS
• or DGPS) meet cross-modal transportation
• requirements?
• 1994 National Augmentation Study
• Field both the NDGPS and WAAS systems to meet
  individual mode requirements
• Coordinate all Federal augmented GPS systems
• Ensure optimal use of resources by maximizing
• commonality of system components
• Task Force validated 1994 Study
• Decision Continue both WAAS and NDGPS
• FAA/CG examine co-location of future WAAS
• and NDGPS monitor stations

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Issues

• What is decision path for Loran-C in 2002?
• Transportation requirements not met by
  Loran-C
• The POS/NAV EC examined three options
• Option 1 Terminate Loran-C
• Option 2 Complete enhanced Loran evaluation
• Option 3 Fully endorse enhanced Loran now
• Evaluation of enhanced Loran required to
• Determine performance for non precision approach
• for aviation and harbor approach for maritime
• Will take until March 2004 and 10M to complete
• Based on current spending levels
• Does not include recapitalization costs thru 2008
• Working toward decision in early 2003

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Radionavigation Alternative Mixes

• Baseline Mix
• Satisfies user requirements for primary and
• backup systems
• May be viewed as failure to reduce proliferation
  
• of systems
• Mix 1 Baseline w/Loran-C terminated
• Cost savings to Government w/termination of
• Loran-C
• Negative user and political impact
• May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report

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Radionavigation Alternative Mixes (contd)

• Mix 2 Baseline w/ optimizing future systems
• convergence, Loran-C terminated
• Some cost savings with termination of Loran-C
• Negative user and political impact
• May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report
• Mix 3 Baseline w/ optimizing future systems
• convergence to include Loran
• Meets requirements for primary and backup
• systems
• Requires completion of enhanced Loran evaluation

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Overview

• Background
• Action Plan
• Radionavigation Systems Task Force
• The Way Ahead

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The Way Ahead

• Developing Decision Memorandum for Secretary on
  Loran-C
• Coordinating with Modal Administrators
• Evaluating remaining 4 mix options pending
  decision on Loran
• Forward recommendation to Secretary in early 2003
• Establish foundation for development of 2003
  Federal Radionavigation Plan

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Summary

• Department concurs with all recommendations of
  the Volpe Study
• Critical infrastructure protection a continuing
  issue
• Department is implementing Action Plan
• Completing assessment of future radionavigation
  mix to maintain adequate backups in the future
• Working toward Loran decision in early 2003
• Safety-critical transportation applications that
  use GPS currently have adequate backups in case
  of GPS disruptions
• Ensure maintained in future

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GPS Vulnerability Assessment

• CGSIC
• International Sub-Committee Meeting
• Melbourne, Australia
• February 10, 20032
• s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
• Michael Shaw
• U.S. Department of Transportation