Towards a

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Towards a clash of civilizations?

• Paul Bacon
• SILS, Waseda University

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The clash of civilizations

• In this lecture I will summarize the main points
  of Huntingtons clash of civilizations thesis.
• Huntingtons main argument is that culture and
  cultural identities are shaping the patterns of
  cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the
  post-Cold war world.
• Cultural identity, at the broadest level, is
  civilizational identity.
• Your cultural identity is ultimately formed by
  the civilization of which you are a member.
• Huntington makes five further arguments, and
  devotes a section of the book to explaining each
  argument in more detail.

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Argument 1

• 1. For the first time in history global politics
  is both multipolar and multicivilizational.
• Modernization and Westernization are not the same
  thing.
• It is possible to modernize without becoming a
  Western society.
• Modernization is not producing a universal
  civilization.
• Non-Western societies are not becoming Western.

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Argument 2

• 2. The balance of power amongst civilizations is
  shifting.
• There are four elements to this claim
• A. The West is declining in relative influence.
• B. Asian civilizations are expanding their
  economic, military and political strength.
• C. Islam is exploding demographically, which will
  cause problems for Muslim countries and their
  neighbors.
• D. Non-Western civilizations are re-affirming the
  values of their own cultures.

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Argument 3

• 3. A civilization-based world order is emerging.
• A. Societies which share cultural affinities are
  cooperating with each other.
• B. Some countries have attempted to move from one
  civilization to another, but these attempts have
  been unsuccessful (Mexico, Turkey, Australia).
• C. Countries are grouping themselves around the
  leading or core states of their civilization.

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Argument 4

• 4. The Wests attempts to impose universalism are
  increasingly bringing it into conflict with other
  civilizations.
• A. At the level of global politics, the most
  serious problems are those between the West, on
  one hand, and Islamic countries and China on the
  other.
• B. At the local level, fault-line wars between
  states from different civilizations provoke
  kin-country rallying.
• This increases the likelihood that core
  civilizational states will become involved.
• This increases the possibility that conflicts
  will escalate.
• Huntington argues that fault-line wars are
  largely fought between Muslims and non-Muslims.

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Argument 5

• 5. The West is unique not universal.
• The survival of the West depends on
• A. Americans re-affirming their Western identity,
  and
• B. Westerners uniting to renew and preserve their
  civilization from the influence of non-Western
  societies.
• World leaders should acknowledge the reality that
  the world is multi-civilizational, and cooperate
  accordingly.

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Western Civilization and empire

• For most of human history, contacts between
  civilizations were either limited or
  non-existent. With the beginning of the modern
  era, from roughly 1500 onwards, the politics of
  civilizations had two aspects.
• 1. Firstly, for roughly four hundred years, there
  was a multipolar international system within
  Western civilization. The nation-states of the
  West - most importantly Britain, France, Spain,
  Austria, Prussia, Germany and the United States
  interacted, competed and fought with each other.
• 2. Secondly, during this period, the major
  Western nations created substantial empires. In
  the process, they expanded their influence across
  the world, and conquered and colonized countries
  from all other civilizations.

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The Cold War

• During the Cold War global politics became
  bipolar, and the world was divided into three
  camps.
• The first camp contained a group of mostly
  wealthy and liberal-democratic capitalist
  societies led by the United States.
• The second camp contained a group of somewhat
  poorer communist countries led by the Soviet
  Union.
• The third camp contained mostly Third World
  countries, which were often poor, lacked
  political stability, were recently independent,
  and claimed that they were non-aligned in the
  Cold war conflict.
• The communist and liberal-democratic camps were
  engaged in ideological, political, economic and
  occasionally military competition with each
  other.
• Much of this competition and conflict actually
  took place in the Third World outside these two
  camps.

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The end of the Cold War

• In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed.
• The Cold War ended, and the division of the
  international system into competing communist and
  capitalist camps also ended.
• People define their identities by referring to
  the things that are the most important to them.
• During the Cold War, people and states defined
  their identity in terms of ideology, politics and
  economics.
• In the post-Cold War world, Huntington argues
  that people and nations will define their
  identities in terms of culture.

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Cultural identity

• People will define themselves in terms of
  ancestry, religion, language, history, values,
  customs and institutions.
• In the post-Cold war world, people will identify
  with cultural groups.
• These cultural include tribes, ethnic groups,
  religious communities, nations, and, at the
  broadest level, civilizations.
• During the Cold War, the question was whose side
  are you on?
• In the post-Cold War world, the question is who
  are you?

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The continuing significance of states

• Importantly, Huntington argues clearly that
  nation-states will remain the principal actors in
  global politics.
• The behavior of states is always shaped to some
  extent by the pursuit of power and wealth.
• However, in the post-Cold War world, state
  behavior will also increasingly be shaped by
  cultural preferences, commonalities, and
  differences.
• The most important groupings of states during the
  Cold War were the blocs of communist, capitalist
  and non-aligned states.
• In the post-Cold War world the most important
  factor guiding the alignment of states will be
  their civilizational identity.

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Huntingtons nine civilizations

• Sinic
• Japanese
• Hindu
• Islamic
• Western

• African
• Buddhist
• Latin American
• Orthodox

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A civilization-based future world order

• Henry Kissinger has argued that in the 21st
  century the international system will contain six
  major powers. These six are the United States,
  Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India.
  
• Kissingers six major powers belong to five
  different civilizations.
• There are also many important medium-sized
  Islamic states which have large populations,
  significant oil resources, and strategic
  locations.
• These Islamic countries will also feature
  importantly in the international politics of the
  21st century, in particular Iran, Iraq and Saudi
  Arabia.
• Huntington argues that Cold War superpower
  rivalry has been replaced by a clash of
  civilizations.
• In this new world, local politics is the politics
  of cultural identity, and global politics is the
  politics of civilizations.

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Kin-country rallying

• In the post-Cold war world the most important and
  dangerous conflicts will be between people who
  belong to different cultural groups.
• Tribal conflicts and ethnic wars will, of course,
  still occur within civilizations.
• But the key point that Huntington is making is
  that violence between states and groups from
  different civilizations carries a more dangerous
  potential for escalation.
• Huntington believes that states and cultural
  groups which come from the same civilizations
  will support their kin countries kin country
  rallying.

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Kin-country rallying

• Huntington cites Yugoslavia, the Caucusus,
  Kashmir and Central Asia as areas where local
  clashes between rival groups could escalate into
  wars involving core or leading states from rival
  civilizations.
• Kin states do not become involved in such
  conflicts because of ideology, power politics or
  economic interests.
• They become involved because of shared cultural
  kinship.
• As a result of this, the most dangerous cultural
  conflicts are those which occur along the fault
  lines between civilizations (see the map for an
  explanation of fault-lines).

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Culture can be a unifying force

• 1. During the Cold War the two Germanys, the two
  Koreas and the many Chinas were divided by
  ideology but united by culture. In the post-Cold
  War world, Huntington argues that countries and
  groups with such cultural ties will increasingly
  come together.
• 2. Countries with cultural affinities cooperate
  politically and economically.
• 3. International organizations which are based on
  states which share a common culture are more
  successful than those which are not. Huntington
  cites the European Union as an example of this.

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Culture can be a divisive force

• 1. Some societies are formed due to shared
  ideology or historical circumstance and contain
  groups from different civilizations.
• Huntington argues that such states will either
  come apart or be subject to great strain in the
  post-Cold war world.
• The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia came apart, and
  both were federations which contained ethnic
  groups from different civilizations. Ukraine,
  Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan and India are all
  currently under great strain.
• 2. Philosophies, values, social relations,
  customs and overall outlooks on life differ
  greatly amongst civilizations. Religion has been
  revitalized in many countries, and this has
  reinforced cultural differences.

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Culture can be a divisive force

• 3. It is true that cultures can change, and that
  the impact of culture on economics and politics
  can vary over time within the same civilization.
• But Huntington believes that the major
  differences in political and economic development
  between different civilizations are clearly
  rooted in their cultural differences.
• He provides the following examples
• East Asian economic success has its roots in East
  Asian culture.
• The difficulties that East Asian societies have
  had in achieving stable democratic political
  systems have their source in East Asian culture.
• Islamic culture explains in large part the
  failure of democracy to emerge in the Muslim
  world.

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Multicivilizational and multipolar

• Huntington has made the case that international
  politics are multicivilizational and multipolar.
  It is necessary to explain what he means by this
  in a little more detail.
• He argues that the West is and will remain for
  years to come the most powerful civilization.
• However, the long-term power of the West,
  relative to other civilizations, is in decline.
• As the most powerful civilization, the West
  continues to assert its values and protect its
  interests.
• This presents non-Western civilizations with a
  choice.

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Multicivilizational and multipolar

• Some civilizations attempt to emulate the West,
  to join the West, or to bandwagon with the West.
• Other non-Western societies, particularly
  Confucian and Islamic ones have attempted to
  develop their own economic, military and
  religious power in attempts to resist, or to
  balance against the West.
• Huntington believes that one of the most
  important features of contemporary international
  politics is the relationship between Western
  culture and power, and the culture and power of
  non-Western civilizations.

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Summary

• The contemporary world is a world of nine major
  civilizations.
• Shared culture and cultural difference shape the
  interests, alliances and antagonisms of states.
• The most important countries in the world mostly
  come from different civilizations.
• The local conflicts which are most likely to
  escalate into broader wars are those between
  groups and states from different civilizations.
• The predominant patterns of economic and
  political development differ from civilization to
  civilization, and can be explained by cultural
  difference.
• Relative power is shifting from Western
  civilization to non-Western civilizations.
• Global politics has become multipolar and
  muticivilizational.

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Realism basically correct

• Realist theory is a highly useful starting point
  for analyzing international politics.
• Realism explains much state behavior.
• States are and will remain the dominant actors in
  international politics.
• However, realist theory does have some clear and
  important limitations.
• Realism assumes that all states understand their
  own interests in the same way, and act in the
  way.
• Realists claim that the behavior of states can be
  explained by reference to their power.

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Realism culture?

• But power is only part of the explanation.
• States do define their interests in terms of
  power, but they also define their interests in
  terms of many other factors.
• Values, culture and institutions have a
  substantial influence on how states define their
  own interests.
• It is true that states prioritize their own
  security.
• But different types of states define their
  interests in different ways.
• In particular, states with similar cultures and
  institutions believe themselves to have common
  interests.

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The culturally-informed behavior of states

• Since the end of the Cold war, Huntington
  believes that states have increasingly defined
  their interests in cultural or civilizational
  terms.
• States are more likely to cooperate with states
  with a similar or common culture.
• States are more likely to form alliances with
  other states which share a similar or common
  culture.
• States are more often in conflict with countries
  with which they do not share a common culture.

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The culturally-informed behavior of states

• States in the traditional security dilemma define
  threats in terms of the intentions of other
  states.
• But those intentions and how they are perceived
  are powerfully shaped by cultural considerations.
  
• People and governments are not as likely to feel
  threatened by countries that they believe they
  can trust, because of shared language, religion,
  values, institutions and culture.
• People and governments are more likely to feel
  threatened by countries which have different
  cultures, which they find difficult to
  understand.
• As a result of this it is difficult to trust
  countries which are culturally different as
  easily.

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Culturally-informed realism?

• Huntingtons civilization-based approach is a
  kind of culturally-informed realism.
• Huntington believes that many important
  developments after the end of the Cold War can be
  understood by using his civilizational approach
  or paradigm, and could have been predicted by
  using it.
• These include
• the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
• the wars which occurred in the former territories
  of these federations
• the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout
  the world
• the identity struggles which are taking places
  within Russia, Turkey and Mexico
• economic friction between the US and Japan

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Culturally-informed realism?

• the opposition of Islamic states to Western
  foreign policy in the Middle East
• the emergence of China as a potential long-term
  threat to US hegemony
• the efforts of Islamic and Confucian states to
  acquire WMD
• the consolidation of democratic regimes in some
  countries but not in others
• and the developing arms competition in East Asia.

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Reading the clash of civilizations fairly

• Huntington acknowledges that several
  civilizations have INTRA-civilizational wars.
• The point is that such wars do not usually lead
  to escalation. They do not lead to kin-country
  rallying.
• The COC is NOT a triumphalist argument.
• Huntington argues that The West won the world
  not by the superiority of its ideas or values or
  religion but rather by its superiority in
  applying organized violence. Westerners often
  forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.
• Huntington argues that there are three basic
  responses to modernization and the West. It is
  possible to embrace both, reject both, or embrace
  the former but not the latter.

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Modernization Westernization
Rejectionism (Tokugawa Japan) No No
Kemalism (Turkey) Yes Yes
Reformism (post-Meiji Japan) Yes No
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Reading the clash of civilizations fairly

• Huntington argues that it would be childish to
  think that modernization would lead to the end of
  the rich and varied historical cultures which
  make up the worlds great civilizations.
• In the book, Huntington argues that To preserve
  Western civilization in the face of declining
  Western power, it is in the interest of the
  United States and European countries most
  importantly to recognize that Western
  intervention in the affairs of other
  civilizations is probably the single most
  dangerous source of instability and potential
  global conflict in a multicivilizational world
  (pp. 311-2).
• Huntington is on record as saying that he did not
  support the US invasion of Iraq.

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Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards

• One of the most controversial sections of the
  book is that in which Huntington suggests that
  Islam has bloody borders and bloody innards.
• Huntington argues that there are two levels of
  international politics with which we should be
  concerned.
• At the level of global politics, the most serious
  problems are those between the West, on one hand,
  and Islamic countries and China on the other.
• At the local level, fault-line wars between
  states from different civilizations provoke
  kin-country rallying.
• This increases the likelihood that core
  civilizational states will become involved.
• This increases the possibility that conflicts
  will escalate.

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Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards

• When Huntington argues that Islam has bloody
  borders, he is arguing that fault-line wars (wars
  between two actors from different civilizations)
  are largely fought between Muslims and
  non-Muslims.
• Huntington provides quite detailed evidence to
  back up his claim, from three different sources
  (see photocopy of p. 257 of Huntingtons book).
• But Huntington also argues that a significant
  proportion of intra-civilizational wars are
  fought between Muslim states.
• Again, detailed evidence is provided on the
  handout.

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Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards

• So, Islam has bloody borders because Islamic
  states are involved in a far higher proportion of
  intercivilizational conflicts.
• And Islam has bloody innards because Muslim
  states are involved in a higher proportion of
  intracivilizational wars than states from all
  other civilizations apart from African
  civilization.

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Reasons for Muslim violence

• Huntington offer six reasons for what he refers
  to as the late-20th century upsurge in fault-line
  wars, and the central role of Muslims in
  fault-line conflicts.
• 1. Militarism. It is suggested that Islam has
  from the start been a religion of the sword and
  that it glorifies military values.
• 2. Proximity. Muslim and non-Muslim expansion by
  land has resulted in Muslims and non-Muslims
  living in close physical proximity throughout the
  whole of Eurasia. There are more fault-line wars.
  It might therefore be reasonable to expect that
  there will be more fault-line wars.
• 3. Muslim culture is indigestible. Islam is an
  absolutist faith that merges religion and
  politics, and draws a sharp line between insiders
  and outsiders. People from other civilizations
  find it easier to adapt to and live with each
  other than they do in adopting to and living with
  Muslims.

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Reasons for Muslim violence

• 4. Victim status. Muslims are, according to this
  argument, victims of a widespread anti-Muslim
  prejudice. (Anti-Semitism, imperialism,
  subjection).
• 5. The absence of one or more core states in
  Islam. Islam lacks a dominant central power.
  Potential core states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran,
  Pakistan and Turkey compete with each other for
  influence. No one state has the authority to
  mediate conflict within Islamic civilization. No
  one state has the authority to represent islam in
  its dealings with the non-Muslim world.
• 6. There has been a demographic explosion in
  Muslim societies. When this happens there are
  large numbers of unemployed males between 15-30.
  this is a natural source of instability and
  violence within society.
• This discussion of Islam has attracted widespread
  criticism.