PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

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PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

• Norihito KUBOTA
• Visiting Scholar, University of Toronto
• National Defense Academy Japan

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Current situation of troop contribution for
  international peacekeeping
• Purpose of study
• Analytical framework who persuade who
• Application(Fiji, Canada, and Japan)
• Conclusion
• The views or analyses shown in this presentation
  will represent neither those of Japanese
  government nor the organization which the
  presenter belongs to.

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MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS
(Source CIC NYU, 2009)
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TOP TWENTY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UN MANDATED
OPERATIONS 31 OCTOBER 2008
Source CIC NYU, 2009.
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PURPOSE OF STUDY

• To establish general but meaningful framework of
  analysis of states participation in
  international peacekeeping
• Previous research of supply-side of peacekeeping
• Country specific explanation
• -gtLack of generality, unable to expand to other
  cases
• Theoretical/Large-N statistic analysis
• -gtLack of meaningful implication
• Research Strategy
• Comparative analysis of countries (limited
  numbers)
• Using previous country specific analyses
• (Canada, Ireland, Fiji, India,)

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DEFINITION OF PEACEKEEPING

• in-country operations that are authorized by a
  multilateral body, that are multinational in
  their composition, that have a substantial
  military component, and that are deployed
  principally in support of a peace process or
  conflict management objective(CIC NYU Annual
  Review of Global Peace Operations)
• Including both UN-led and non-UN-led
  operations(i.e. UNFICYP, ISAF)
• Excluding war fighting (i.e. OEF, OIF), small
  political mission, unilateral intervention.
• Although the roles of civilian and civilian
  police in operation are getting more important
  due to the evolution of complex operations makes,
  this study mainly focuses on military.

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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK THREE ACTORS MODEL WHO
PERSUADE/ENFORCE WHO?

• Second-level analysis, Foreign policy model
• Government (Prime Minister/Foreign Office, etc)
• Military Institution(Army, SDF,)
• Public (Public Opinion)

Preference
Relation
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PREFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT (1/2) MOTIVATION IN
DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

• A Condition to be a member of certain diplomatic
  group or status
• Permanent Membership in SC of UN, member of
  NATO/EU
• Competition with rivaling country over regional
  hegemony
• Linkage of other issue (in relation with the US)
• BMD for Canada in Afghanistan
• North Korean issue for Japan in Iraq
• Helping allies in trouble
• Geostrategic interest (influence over the area in
  conflict)
• Reimbursement from the UN is good source of
  foreign currency in developing country (troop)

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PREFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT (2/2)MOTIVATIONS IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS

• A tool for Rally round flag effect (national
  unity) and diversionary effect
• A method in which government can export unpopular
  militaries during transition from military regime
  to democracy (Argentina)
• Measure against unemployment (Youths were sent as
  reserves)

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PREFERENCE OF MILITARY

• A good rational for size of military in peace
  time
• A good rational for maintaining/increasing
  defence budget(remodel of weapon system)
• Occasion for multilateral military exercise
• Ameliorating image of military which was damaged
  in previous history
• Source of foreign currency (MO in UN operations)
• Generally reluctant, because it is not the main
  job of national defence
• Distance matters (logistics, communications)

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PREFERENCE OF PUBLIC

• Being do-gooders in international community
• Sense of independence from super powers (support
  for middle power diplomacy)
• Compassion for the people under conflict (we
  have to do something)
• Can be casualty sensitive
• Distance matters (cultural and ethnic similarity
  influences on their preference)

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EFFECT OF PUBLIC OPINION

• Strong effect on Government
• Anti-militarism in Japan during the Cold War
• Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping even if
  PM and military didnt want it
• But it is effective only when it is activated
• The public tend to have only vague idea of
  peacekeeping
• (see, Carrière et al., 2003)
• CNN Effects are valid conditionally, when
  opinion among government is split(Robinson,
  2002).
• The more complex the situation and mandates come
  to be, the more susceptible to persuasion by
  government the public comes to be.

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APPLICATION FIJIAN CASE, PROBLEMS

• Reimbursement matters?
• Two problems
• In 1979, payment of reimbursement was uncertain
• Fiji has sent military not only as Troop
  (reimbursement is paid through government), but
  also as Military Observers (salary and allowance
  are paid to individual).
• -gtMO is not beneficial to government who is
  motivated by receiving foreign currencies

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APPLICATION FIJIAN CASE, EXPLANATION

• Before the Coup 1989
• After the Coup

Government ()
Government (-)
Public (-)
Military (-)
Public (-)
Military ()
60 were regular force Participated as MO and
Troops
60 were reserves Participated only as Troops
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APPLICATION CANADIAN CASE (1/2)

• During the Cold War and early 90s

Government (-)
Military (-)
Public ()
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APPLICATION CANADIAN CASE(2/2)

• Late 90s thereafter
• UN Peacekeeping
• Non UN operations

Government (-)
Government (-)
Public (-)
Military (-)
Public (-)
Military ()
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APPLICATION JAPANESE CASE(1/2)

• During the Cold War
• After the Cold War

Government (-)
Government ()
Public (-)
Military (-)
Public (-)
Military (-)
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APPLICATION JAPANESE CASE(2/2)

• Late 90s thereafter
• UN Peacekeeping
• Non-UN operations

Government (-)
Government ()
Public (-)
Military (-)
Public (-)
Military ()
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CONCLUSION

• The three-actor model can be valid to explain
  behaviour of various types of countries
  (empirical verification required)
• If we need to keep up with demand for
  peacekeeping, we have to encourage countries to
  participate in operations with paying attention
  to whose and what kind of benefit should be
  presented to them
• In this framework, the present patterns of
  persuasion is similar between Canada and Japan