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Title: National Series Lecture 1 Introduction Jordan


1
National SeriesLecture 1IntroductionJordan
  • Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of
    Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

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2
Outline
  • Where we are in the early 21st century
  • Outline of the following lectures
  • What we should know (learning outcome)
  • What we can do (policy contribution)

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3
What is Life Science?
  • Any field of science that is leading to or has
    the potential to lead to an enhanced
    understanding of living organisms, especially
    human life.
  • E.g. Biology, proteomics, genetic engineering,
    nanotechnology, aerosol technology, chemistry and
    mathematics
  • (National Research Council, 2006 27)
  • Applied in
  • Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy,
    Environment and National security studies

4
Biotechnology An integral part of national
strategy in the 21st Century
A growing market in Biotechnology the
pharmaceutical market (National Research
Council, 2006 85)
Region Annual Worth Share
North America 204 Billion 51
Europe 102 Billion 25
Japan 47 Billion 12
Asia, Africa, Australia 32 Billion 8
Latin America 17 Billion 4
  • Similar results in number of researchers and
    the amount of private investment for RD in the
    life sciences
  • Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle
    East
  • (ErnstYoung 2011, FrostSullivan 2010)

5
Jordan Royal Scientific Society (RSS)
  • The Royal Scientific Society (RSS) of Jordan was
    established in 1970 by a Royal Decree as a
    national, not-for-profit, non-governmental,
    applied research institution designed to support
    the continuous socio-economic development of
    Jordan.
  • The RSS is mainly an applied research
    institution, though it has an academic extension.
    Young scientists are appointed as per the
    regulations women represent around 30 of the
    staff which totals around 584. The Society is
    active in the Natural Sciences, as well as in
    Health and Engineering.
  • (IAP 2012)

6
Jordan Science Outlook
  • Higher Council of Science and Technology
  • Science, technology innovation profile of
    Jordan
  • (Elshuraydeh, 2006)
  • Science and Technology sector in Jordan can be
    best described by some synthetic indicators. A
    study conducted by the Higher Council for Science
    and Technology, during the period 2002-2003
    Science and Technology Requirements Survey
    revealed that there were 835 national
    institutions dealing with ST activities in 2003
    to be compared with 524 in 2006.
  • The total number of employees working on ST
    activities in 2003 was 42,151. The number of
    Engineers Scientists in RD amounted to 1,464
    FTE (Full Time Equivalent), equivalent to 2.7
    percent of 10,000 populations.

7
Jordan Life science outlook
  • The Testing Sector of the RSS aims to maintain
    and expand upon set standards for food safety,
    health, and environment and raise these standards
    and specifications for both imported and locally
    produced products, including chemical and
    biosafety.
  • On biosecurity, annual Biosafety and Biosecurity
    International Conference (BBIC) has been
    organized since 2009.
  • (RSS 2012)

8
Princess Haya Biotechnology Center
  • The center is located in King Abdullah University
    Hospital building. It comprises a total of
    sixteen research laboratories and occupies
    approximately 1,500 square meters.
  •  
  • The center provides faculty members, graduate
    students, and regional organizations with a
    robust and excellent scientific infrastructure to
    support important experimental research in
    biotechnology, particularly in the fields of
    genomics and proteomics.
  • One of the major objectives of Princess Haya
    Biotechnology Center (PHBC) is to establish a
    multidisciplinary research foundation and a
    fundamental training center in the areas of
    genomics and proteomics. Currently, the center is
    seeking a high-throughput DNA sequencer and
    MALDI-TOF machines for high throughput genomics
    research and protein sequencing.

9
King Hussein Institute for Biotechnology and
Cancer
  • King Hussein Institute for Biotechnology and
    Cancer (KHIBC) is a not-for-profit
    nongovernmental organization established in
    concordance with His Majesty King Abdullah II's
    vision of transforming Jordan into a regional and
    international center for healthcare and research
    Furthermore, the Institute aims to advance life
    sciences and biotechnology and their contribution
    to medicine in the world through innovative
    research and scientific discoveries.
  • The Center for Health Policy under the Office of
    Science, Health and Research Policy at King
    Hussein Institute for Biotechnology and Cancer
    assesses Jordan's governance on research and
    development in the field of biosciences and
    biotechnology. It is also currently working with
    key stakeholders and international organizations
    on developing the National Medical Biotechnology
    Strategy for Jordan. 

10
PubMed search with Jordan Middle East
11
Scientific Journal in Jordan
  • Jordan Journal of Biological Sciences
  • The Jordanian Ministry of Higher Education and
    Scientific Research in corporation with the
    Hashemite University will publish a new
    high-quality journal devoted to biological
    sciences
  • Mainly welcome are contributions dealing with
    cell biology, genomics, microbiology, immunology,
    molecular biology, biochemistry, embryology,
    immunogenetics,cell and tissue culture, molecular
    ecology, genetic engineering and biological
    engineering, bioremediation and biodegradation,
    bioinformatics,biotechnology regulations, gene
    therapy, organismal biology, microbial and
    environmental biotechnology, marine sciences. 

12
Industrial Efforts
  • MONOJO
  • MONOJO was established in 2005 as a result of
    four years of efforts and hard work between
    public and private sectors, the company now
    represents the new concept of knowledge base
    economy and considers the trigger the
    biotechnology industry in Jordan.
  • MONOJO is currently a member wihin UK BioIndustry
    Association the association has enhanced
    MONOJOs visibility, network, and relationships
    with business decision-makers in the UK and
    Europe bioscience industry. We operate in two
    main countries The MONOJO in Jordan,in which
    it constitutes the main companys RD and its
    global business development and marketing
    operations department for its innovative
    bioproducts. The second main country is in the
    United States of America (USA) by MONOJOs first
    subsidiary The Columbia Biotech, this
    subsidiary is a complementary for MONOJOs RD
    department and its business development and
    marketing operations. 

13
Nanotechnology in Jordan
  • Jordan University of Science and Technology
  • Nanotechnology Center
  • The center was founded  to participate in the
    national and international efforts towards
    achieving nanotechnology based solutions to
    problems related to energy, healthcare and water
    treatment.
  • The center aims to
  • provide research and development environment for
    researchers from Jordan and the region in micro
    and nanotechnology.
  • Have a significant impact on education and
    research in the area of nanotechnology and
    promoting its advantages in finding solutions to
    real life problems that otherwise will not be
    possible.
  • Create a pool of researchers and trained experts
    in nano-applications.
  • Attract local and international researchers and
    investors from industry.
  • Put JUST and Jordan on the map of this
    cutting-edge technology.

14
Why do we care? Should this be an issue for us?
  • The dual-use nature of science and technology
  • Every major technology metallurgy, explosives,
    internal combustion, aviation, electronics,
    nuclear energy has been intensively exploited,
    not only for peaceful purposes but also for
    hostile ones.
  • Must this also happen with biotechnology,
    certain to be a dominant technology of the
    twenty-first century?
  • Matthew Meselson Professor of Molecular Biology
    at Harvard University
  • (Meselson, 2000 16)

15
Meselsons Forecast in 2000
  • Ability
  • Our ability to modify fundamental life processes
    continues its rapid advance
  • We will be able not only to devise additional
    ways to destroy life but will also become able to
    manipulate it
  • Dilemma
  • This has a Vast potential for beneficial
    application and could have inimical consequences
    for the course of civilization.

16
Meselsons Forecast in 2000
  • At present, we appear to be approaching a
    crossroads a time that will test whether
    biotechnology
  • Will come to be intensively exploited for hostile
    purposes, or
  • Our species will find the collective wisdom to
    take a different course.

17
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC)1972
  • Article I
  • Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
    never in any circumstances to develop, produce,
    stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain
  • 1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins
    whatever their origin or method of production, of
    types and in quantities that have no
    justification for prophylactic, protective or
    other peaceful purposes.
  • This applies not only to states but also to
    non-state actors

18
Science and Security Dual-Use
  • The need for a broader conceptualisation of
    dual-use
  • Biological agents and toxins can be used for
    hostile purposes without weaponization and
    technology is typically diffused globally for
    peaceful purposes
  • Hostile use can take the form of criminal acts or
    terrorist acts (non-state level) in parallel to
    military application (state level),
  • The BTWC prohibits the misuse of the life
    sciences by both states and non-state actors

19
Jordan and international regimes
  • WMD
  • Jordan is not known to possess nuclear, chemical,
    or biological weapons programs, or ballistic or
    cruise missile systems. The country is a member
    in good standing of all relevant nonproliferation
    treaties and organizations, ...and Jordan is a
    strong supporter of establishing a WMD-Free Zone
    in the Middle East.
  • BTWC
  • Signature (10 April 1972) Ratification (30 May
    1975)
  • Since 2004, Jordan has launched several
    initiatives to develop its biotechnology sector,
    including establishing a National Center for
    Biotechnology to serve as a central coordinating
    institution for both domestic and international
    biotechnology activities.
  • (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)

20
Jordan and international regimes
  • CWC
  • Accession (29 October 1997)
  • Amman has consistently been found in compliance
    with its CWC commitments, and is not believed to
    have pursued a chemical warfare capability.
  • However, Jordan shares borders with several
    states suspected of chemical weapons activities,
    and as such requires robust border security and
    export controls to prevent its territory from
    being used as an illicit transshipment route.
  • Jordan has invested heavily in counter-terrorism
    efforts and has received training and other
    assistance from the United States to secure its
    borders against illicit trafficking.
  • (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)

21
National Series Lecture Outline
  • 2. Biosecurity Threats
  • 3. The Web of Prevention
  • 4. National Measures
  • 5. Responsibility of Scientists

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22
Reviewing threats (Lecture 2)
Natural outbreaks of infectious disease
Safety/accidental risks at laboratories
Manmade threats warfare, crime and terrorism
Unpredictable future of the life sciences
  • No single focal point of threats
  • Potential actors, material and information, which
    can be related to dual-use issues, exist at
    international, regional, national, local and
    individual levels.

23
The Web of Prevention (WoP) (Lecture 3)
  • To address natural outbreaks of infectious
    disease
  • Public health preparedness and response planning
  • To address safety/accidental risks
  • Laboratory regulations to safely manage
    dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an
    accidental release into the environment and
    unauthorized access
  • To address manmade threats
  • Strong international arms control agreements with
    effective national implementation
  • Internationally coordinated export controls
  • Intelligence
  • Biodefense
  • To address the unpredictable future of the life
    sciences
  • Oversight Review of security-sensitive science
    and technology developments
  • Responsible conduct in research through education

24
Natural threats
Safety risks
Manmade threats
Governance of science
25
National implementation (Lecture 4)
To National Context
26
National implementation (Lecture 4)
27
Worldwide engagement of life scientists with the
WoP will
The need for responsible conduct in
research(Lecture 5)
  • Effectively strengthen biosecurity measures by
    requiring the engagement of practicing scientists
  • Prevent unnecessary restriction of scientific
    freedoms

Engagement of informed life scientists about
biosecurity issues is key to successful security
  • Education of, and capacity building among,
    scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for
    successful security
  • Uninformed scientists no effective science
    policy inputs to the WoP

28
Biosecurity Definition issues
  • The term biosecurity has been conceptualised
    differently across various scientific and
    professional disciplines
  • Areas The term has been used in ecology,
    agriculture, food supply, arms control and public
    health contexts, with different meanings and
    conceptualisations
  • Policy processes these overlap with
    interdisciplinary areas such as biosafety,
    counter-terrorism, agricultural biosecurity and
    biodiversity
  • Linguistic In addition to these conceptual
    complications, biosecurity has also experienced
    linguistic complications
  • (Fidler and Gostin 2007, Sunshine Project 2003,
    Barletta 2002)

29
National SeriesWoP Biosecurity Education
Biosecurity Competency
30
References
  • The references cited in this lecture are viewable
    in the Notes section of this presentation.
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