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Trading Agent Competition (TAC)

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Title: Trading Agent Competition (TAC)


1
Trading Agent Competition(TAC)
  • Jon Lerner, Silas Xu, Wilfred Yeung
  • CS286r, 3 March 2004

2
TAC Overview
  • International Competition
  • Intended to spur research into trading agent
    design
  • First held in July 2000
  • TAC Classic and TAC SCM Scenarios

3
TAC Classic
  • Each team in charge of virtual travel agent
  • Agents try to find travel packages for virtual
    clients
  • All clients wish to travel over same five day
    period
  • Clients not all equal, each has different
    preferences for certain types of travel packages

4
Travel Packages
  • Each contains flight info, hotel type, and
    entertainment tickets
  • To gain positive utility from client, agents must
    construct feasible packages. Feasible means
  • Arrival date strictly less than departure date
  • Same hotel reserved during all intermediate
    nights
  • At most one entertainment event per night
  • At most one of each type of entertainment ticket

5
Flights
  • Clients have preferences for ideal
    arrival/departure dates
  • Infinite supply of flights sold through
    continuously clearing auctions
  • Prices set by a random walk
  • Prices later set to drift upwards to discourage
    waiting
  • No resale or exchange of flights permitted

6
Hotels
  • Two hotels high quality and low quality, 16
    rooms per hotel per night
  • Sold through ascending, multi-unit,
    sixteenth-price auctions one auction for all
    rooms for single hotel on single night
  • Periodically a random auction closes to encourage
    agents to bid
  • Clients have different values for high and low
    quality hotels

7
Entertainment
  • Three types of entertainment available
  • Clients have value for each type
  • Each agent has initial endowment of tickets
  • Buy and sell tickets through continuous double
    auction

8
Agent Themes
  • Agents have to address
  • When to Bid
  • What to Bid On
  • How Much to Bid
  • Combinatorial preferences, but not combinatorial
    auctions

9
Strategies
  • What strategies come to mind?
  • What AI techniques might be useful?
  • Simple vs. Complicated Strategies
  • How quickly should you adapt as game progresses?
  • Use of historical data vs. Focus on current game
    only
  • Play the game vs. Play the players

10
living agents (Living Systems AG)Winner TAC 2001
  • Makes two assumptions
  • 1. Steadily increasing flight prices favor early
    decisions for flight tickets.
  • 2. Especially the good performing teams are
    following a strategy to maximize their own
    utility. They are not trying to take the risk to
    reduce other teams utility.
  • Simple strategy
  • Makes substantial use of historical data.
  • Barely any monitoring/adapting to changing
    conditions
  • Benefits from other agents complicated
    algorithms to control price Open-loop, Play the
    Players

11
living agents Determining Hotel and Flight Bids
  • Assume hotel auction will clear at historical
    levels
  • Using these as hotel prices, initial flight
    prices, and client preferences, determine optimal
    client trips
  • Immediately place bids based on this optimum
  • Purchase corresponding flights immediately
  • Place offers for required hotels at prices high
    enough to ensure successful acquisition

12
Entertainment Auction
  • Immediately makes fixed decision as to which
    entertainment to attempt to buy/sell assuming the
    historical clearing price of about 80.
  • Opportunistically buy and sell around this point
  • Put in final reservation prices at seven minute
    mark.

13
How good is living agents?
  • Risky
  • If hotel bids are not high enough, fails to
    complete trips, resulting in huge loss of points.
  • If hotel clears at living agents bid,
    potentially pays much more than necessary
  • After placing initial bid, does not monitor hotel
    or flight auctions at all
  • Clearly not all agents could use this strategy
    (Hotel auctions)
  • Simple
  • Buys flights immediately, avoiding cost of
    waiting
  • Relies on historical data
  • Contains information from many games
  • But how sensitive is evolution of game to changes
    in client preferences, or changes in opponents
    strategy?

14
Applicability
  • Use of historical data for predictive information
  • Feasibility of simple strategies that ignore
    feedback
  • Play against the players (not prices), under the
    assumption that other agents keep things
    relatively efficient.

15
ATTac (ATT Research)Winner TAC 2002
  • Uses sophisticated machine-learning techniques to
    predict future hotel prices based on the current
    situation
  • Buys flights based on cost-benefit analysis of
    committing versus waiting
  • Minute-by-minute reoptimization of bids based on
    holdings and predictions

16
The heart of ATTac
  • Assumption Because of many unknowns, exactly
    predicting the price of a hotel room is hopeless.
  • Instead, regard the closing price as a random
    variable that needs to be estimated, conditional
    on our current state of knowledge
  • Number of minutes remaining in game
  • Ask price of each hotel
  • Flight prices
  • Historical Date
  • Construct a model of the probability distribution
    over clearing prices (based on a boosting
    algorithm), stochastically sample prices, and
    compute expected profit

17
The high-level algorithm
  • Denote the most profitable allocation of goods at
    any time by G
  • When first flight quotes are posted
  • Compute G with current holdings and expected
    prices
  • Buy the flights in G for which the expected cost
    of postponing commitment exceeds the expected
    benefit of postponing commitment
  • Starting 1 minute before each hotel close
  • Compute G with current holdings and expected
    prices
  • Buy the flights in G for which expected cost of
    postponing commitment exceeds expected benefit of
    postponing commitment
  • Bid hotel room expected marginal values given
    holdings, new flights, and expected hotel
    purchases
  • Last minute Buy remaining flights as needed by
    G
  • In parallel (continuously) Buy/sell
    entertainment tickets base on their expected
    values

18
The boosting algorithm solving conditional
density estimation problems
  • Start with ordered pairs (x,y), with x being a
    vector that describes auction-specific features,
    y being the difference between closing price and
    current price
  • Aim of boosting is, given current x, to estimate
    the conditional distribution of y
  • Construct conditional distribution function that
    minimize the sum of negative log likelihood of y
    given x, for all training samples.
  • Use this condition distribution function to map x
    to y

19
living agents vs. ATTac
  • Two very different approaches
  • Statistically insignificant difference in scores
    in TAC2001

20
Open and Closed Loop Processes
  • Closed-loop system feeds information back into
    itself. Examines the world in an effort to
    validate the world model.
  • appropriate for real-world environments in which
    feedback is necessary to validate agent actions.
  • Open-loop no feedback from the environment to
    the agent. Output from processes are considered
    complete upon execution.
  • appropriate for simulated rather than real
    environments (tasks not performed perfectly by
    agent generally.)
  • generally more efficient for the same reason.

21
Walverine (Closed-loop)
  • Model Based Flight and Hotel
  • Predicts hotel prices by Walrasian equilibrium
  • Derives expected demand from 64 clients
    preferences and initial flight prices, which
    influence clients choice of travel days, and
  • Construct bids that max expected value of bid
  • Model Free Entertainment
  • Q-Learning from thousands of auction instances
    (aside on model vs model-free learning)
  • No empirically tuned parameters

22
SouthamptonTAC (Closed-loop)
  • Adaptive agent, varies strategy to mkt cond.
  • 3 classifications for environments
  • Non-competitive (agent gets hotel at low prices)
  • Semi-competitive (medium prices)
  • Competitive (prices of hotels high)
  • Based on curr game and outcomes of recent games
  • Non-competitive
  • Buys all flights at beginning of game
  • Never change itinerary of clients

23
SouthamptonTAC (Closed-loop)
  • Competitive
  • Rapidly rising prices buy at beginning
  • Stagnant prices buy near the end
  • Fuzzy reasoning to predict hotel clearing prices
  • 3 rule bases
  • Factors inc price of hotel, counterpart, price
    change in prev minute, price change in
    counterpart hotel in prev minute
  • Continuously assesses game type

24
ROXY-BOT (Open-loop)
  • Two phase bidding policy
  • Solve completion problem
  • Optimization based on a tree structure using beam
    search that only partially expands the tree.
    Greenwald
  • Valuate goods in that set
  • Marginal utility calculator MU(x) V(N) V(Nx)
  • Computing Prices (historical data)
  • Point estimates (00)
  • Estimated price distributions (01)
  • Averaging MU across many samples of estimated
    price dist
  • Monte-Carlo simulation to evaluate bidding policy
    (02)

25
Whitebear (Winner in 02, Open-loop)
  • Flights
  • A buy everything
  • B buy only what is absolutely necessary
  • Combination buy everything except dangerous
    tickets
  • Hotels (predictions simply historical averages)
  • A bid small increment greater than current
    prices
  • B bid marginal utility
  • Combination Use A, unless MU is high, use B
  • Domain specific, extensive experimentation
  • No necessarily optimal set of goods, no learning

26
Summary Open vs Closed
  • All else equal open-strategy better
  • Simple
  • Avoids waiting costs (higher prices)
  • Predictability of price is determining factor
  • Perfectly predictable open-loop
  • Large price variance closed-loop
  • Open-loop picks the good at the start and may pay
    a lot
  • Small price variance optimal closed loop
  • But complexity for potentially small benefit
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