HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, Moscow

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HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, Moscow CORRUPTION
PERCEPTION vs. EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA Professor
RICHARD ROSE FBA Director, Centre for the
Study of Public Policy U. of Strathclyde,
Glasgow email prof_r_rose_at_yahoo.co.uk
Tuesday, 15 November 2011 6pm
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IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS ?DEPARTURES FROM FORMAL
NORMS. E..g. breaking bureaucratic rules
(favouritism to friends) or illegal behaviour,
e.g. embezzlement, bribery. A broad definition
of corruption is that it involves bribery, the
exchange of money to secure a personal benefit
through illegal or unbureaucratic activity.
?BRIBERY can be payment for WHOLESALE benefits
(e.g. the right to exploit mineral resources, a
contract for building a major highway) or RETAIL
benefits (an individual getting a hospital
operation or police ignoring a speeding
violation). ?MEASURES.
Perception of Corruption Index (www.transparency.o
rg) 'What would you do if..'
scenarios are also used.
Experience of corruption increasingly seen as
important e.g. Transparency International

Global Corruption Barometer.
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GETTING THINGS DONE BY THE BOOK, BY HOOK OR BY CROOK GETTING THINGS DONE BY THE BOOK, BY HOOK OR BY CROOK GETTING THINGS DONE BY THE BOOK, BY HOOK OR BY CROOK GETTING THINGS DONE BY THE BOOK, BY HOOK OR BY CROOK
Q. What should you do to get prompt admission to a hospital a government- subsidized flat you were not entitled to a permit or official document? Q. What should you do to get prompt admission to a hospital a government- subsidized flat you were not entitled to a permit or official document? Q. What should you do to get prompt admission to a hospital a government- subsidized flat you were not entitled to a permit or official document? Q. What should you do to get prompt admission to a hospital a government- subsidized flat you were not entitled to a permit or official document?
Hospital Housing Permit
(endorsing more than one answer allowed) (endorsing more than one answer allowed) (endorsing more than one answer allowed) (endorsing more than one answer allowed)
Use connections 44 24 38
Offer a "tip" 24 25 32
Beg, tell a story, write letter 22 5 27
Buy in the market 20 30 7
Wait, nothing can be done 17 25 20
Percent saying do what you want without a permit Percent saying do what you want without a permit Percent saying do what you want without a permit Percent saying do what you want without a permit
Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer VII, 6 March - 13 April 1998. Number of respondents 2,002. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer VII, 6 March - 13 April 1998. Number of respondents 2,002. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer VII, 6 March - 13 April 1998. Number of respondents 2,002. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer VII, 6 March - 13 April 1998. Number of respondents 2,002.
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NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
Transparency International Corruption Index
Old EU members
New EU members
10 Highest integrity
Denmark, Finland 9.4 Sweden 9.3 Netherlands
9.0 Luxembourg, United Kingdom 8.4 Austria
8.1 Germany 7.8 OLD EU 15 MEAN 7.6 Ireland
7.5 France 7.3 Belgium 7.1 Spain 6.7 Portugal
6.5 Italy 3.9 Greece 3.5
6.6 Slovenia 6.5 Estonia 5.8 Malta 5.3 Hungary,
Cyprus 5.2 Czech Republic 5.0 NEW EU MEAN 4.9
Slovakia 4.8 Latvia, Lithuania 4.2 Poland 3.7
Romania 3.6 Bulgaria 2.1 RUSSIA
1 Most corrupt
Source Transparency International, TI Corruption
Perceptions Index 2007, www.transparency.org.
Accessed 20 May 2008. Ratings 2010 for Russia,
Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Romania other
countries Transparency International Perception
of Corruption Index 2007.
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PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION GREATER THAN EXPERIENCE
OF BRIBERY
Q. To what extent do you see the following
institutions as affected by corruption? Q. In
dealing with any of these institutions in the
past two years, was it necessary for you or
anyone in your household to give a bribe?
Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy,
New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number
of respondents 1,606
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HYPOTHESES ABOUT WHY RUSSIANS PAY
BRIBES SERVICES DIFFER. Bribery varies with
characteristics of the services that public
officials provide. CAPACITY OR VULNERABILITY.
Paying bribes differs with individual income or
vulnerability to exploitation. CONTACT.
Bribe-paying varies with individual contact with
public services. EVERYBODY IS DOING IT. The
more corruption is perceived as normal, the more
likely individuals are to pay bribes.
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INFLUENCES ON PAYING BRIBES
Dependent variable Number of bribes paid 0-7 Dependent variable Number of bribes paid 0-7 Dependent variable Number of bribes paid 0-7 Dependent variable Number of bribes paid 0-7 Dependent variable Number of bribes paid 0-7
Variance accounted for 1.6 14.3 18.7 21.3
Beta Beta Beta Beta
Capacity to pay
Age -.11 -.07 -.04 -.04
Education .03 .01 .00 -.01
Social status -.02 -.02 .01 -.01
Income quartile .04 .05 .03 .02

Contact with officials
Number of contacts - .36 .35 .35
Political awareness
Learn from friends - - - .11
Learn from what I see - - - .10
Learn from media - - - .06
Political interest - - - .01
Everybodys (not) doing it Everybodys (not) doing it
Bribery acceptable - - .18 .16
Perception of corruption - - .10 .05
Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .05 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .05 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .05 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .05 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .05
Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606.
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INFLUENCES ON PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
Dependent variable Perception that seven public services are corrupt Dependent variable Perception that seven public services are corrupt Dependent variable Perception that seven public services are corrupt Dependent variable Perception that seven public services are corrupt
Variance accounted for 16.4 Variance accounted for 16.4 Variance accounted for 16.4 Variance accounted for 16.4
(Range 4, almost all corrupt to 1, very few. Mean 3.2) (Range 4, almost all corrupt to 1, very few. Mean 3.2) (Range 4, almost all corrupt to 1, very few. Mean 3.2) (Range 4, almost all corrupt to 1, very few. Mean 3.2)
b s.e. Beta
Capacity to pay
Age -.00 .00 -.01
Education .00 .02 .00
Social status -.02 .01 -.04
Income quartile .02 .02 .03

Contact with officials
Number of contacts .00 .01 .00
Number of bribes paid .02 .02 .03
Political awareness
Learn from friends .10 .02 .16
Learn from what I see .09 .02 .15
Learn from media .08 .02 .11
Political interest -.02 .02 -.03
Everybodys (not) doing it
Officials act fairly -.17 .02 -.21
Bribery acceptable .02 .02 .03
Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .00 Significant at .01
Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606. Source Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, 13-24 April 2007. Number of respondents 1,606.
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CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIME SUPPORT
Dependent variable Support for political regime. Dependent variable Support for political regime. Dependent variable Support for political regime. Dependent variable Support for political regime.
Variance accounted for 39.6 Variance accounted for 39.6 Variance accounted for 39.6 Variance accounted for 39.6
(Range plus 10 to minus 10 mean 1.9) (Range plus 10 to minus 10 mean 1.9) (Range plus 10 to minus 10 mean 1.9) (Range plus 10 to minus 10 mean 1.9)
b s.e. Beta
General perception of corruption General perception of corruption
Number of contacts -06 07 -02
Number of bribes paid -17 13 -03
General perception corruption -10 14 -02
Mean perception, corrupt services 24 20 03
Bribery acceptable 00 12 00
Political performance
Evaluation current economy 51 02 54
Trust political institutions 35 10 09
Officials act fairly 59 16 09
Feel freer now 38 14 06
Regime is democratic 16 06 06
Political awareness
Learn from friends 27 13 05
Learn from what I see 13 12 03
Learn from media -15 14 -02
Political interest 24 12 05
Ability to pay
Age -00 01 -00
Education -20 12 -04
Social status 14 09 04
Income quartile -02 11 -00
Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .00 Significant at .01 Significant at .00 Significant at .01
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IMPLICATIONS ?LEVELS OF CORRUPTION DIFFER BY
CONTEXT. Post-Soviet countries perceived as more
corrupt than Ex-Communist bloc countries of
Central Eastern Europe now in EU Ex-African
colonies of Britain ?WHATEVER THE LEVEL,
CONTACT WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS MATTERS MOST Can
contacts be made more rule-bound, fairer?
?BRIBERY VARIES WITH SERVICES Bribery more
common for people as citizens than as consumers