Unnatural Disaster: How Politics Destroyed Canada

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Unnatural Disaster How Politics Destroyed
Canadas Atlantic Groundfisheries

• by
• Elizabeth Brubaker

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Collapse

• In 1992, Canadas fisheries minister, John
  Crosbie, banned fishing for cod off the
  northeastern coast of Newfoundland and off the
  southern half of Labrador.
• The northern cod stock, once one of the richest
  in the world had collapsed.
• More bans came in the next few years in more
  fisheries and on more species of fish.

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Collapse, contd

• Despite the fishing bans, many stocks continued
  to decline.
• Cod populations dropped to one one-hundredth of
  their former sizes.
• In 1997, fishing on 22 stocks remained
  prohibited.
• Scientists worried that the worst-hit stocks
  might never fully recover.

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Economic Disaster

• Collapse of the Atlantic groundfish was more than
  an ecological disasterit was an economic
  disaster.
• Fishery closures, which threw 40,000 fishermen
  and fish processors out of work, created social
  and economic chaos throughout Atlantic Canada,
  where half of the 1,300 fishing communities
  depended entirely on the fisheries for their
  existence.
• The moratoriums hit Newfoundland especially hard,
  because fishing has been its major industry.

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Destruction Could Have Been Avoided

• The destruction of this critically important
  resource was caused by politicians, pursuing
  their short-term interest in getting re-elected
• Politicians subsidized the expansion of the
  fisheries and set catch levels exceeding those
  recommended by government scientists.

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Once Boundless Stocks

• Cod were so plentiful that in the 17th century a
  writer reported that we heardlie have been able
  to row a boate through them.
• An 1883 report asserted that The cod
  fisheryis inexhaustible.
• In 1885, the Canadian Minister of Agriculture
  predicted, Unless the order of nature is
  overthrown, for centuries to come our fisheries
  will continue to be fertile.

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Nature Overthrown

• Cod catches grew from an annual average of
  500,000 tonnes in the first half of the 20th
  century to 1.5 million tonnes in 1968.
• By 1978, catches had declined to 400,000 tonnes.
• After extending to 200 miles the exclusion zone
  for foreign boats, the catch recovered to 500,000
  tonnes in 1982.
• But it declined to 183,000 tonnes in 1992, and in
  1996four years after the moratoriumfishermen
  caught only 13,000 tonnes of cod.

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Laying Blame

• Canadas fisheries managers blamed the collapse
  on forces beyond their control.
• Scientists now widely agree that it was
  politicians and bureaucrats running Canadas
  Atlantic fisheries, who permittedand even
  encouragedoverfishing.
• The government not only ignored the evidence of
  overfishing, but attempted to conceal it.
• The DFO routinely suppressed politically
  inconvenient research into the causes of the cod
  decline.

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Suppressing the Truth

• Top-level bureaucrats at the DFO did their best
  to silence Ransom Myerss research.
• Myers stated We reject the hypotheses that
  attribute the collapse of the northern cod to
  environmental change. We conclude that the
  collapse of the northern cod can be attributed
  solely to overexploitation.

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Bureaucratic Intimidation

• That senior bureaucrats would try to prevent
  staff scientists from reporting research that
  blamed government policies for the collapse of
  the fisheries, is hardly surprising.
• Tragically, successive governments abused their
  virtually complete power over fisheries, managing
  them not for long-term biological or economic
  sustainability, but for short-term political
  gain. P.171

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How Many Jobs?

• Putting to work as many fishermen and fish
  processors as possible has long been the goal of
  Canadas fisheries managers.
• Canadas fisheries would be managed not to
  maximize sustainable yields, but to increase
  employment.
• In other words, up until now fishing has been
  regulated in the interest of the fish. In the
  future it is to be regulated in the interest of
  the people who depend on the fishing industry.

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Catch Limits

• The DFO confirmed in 1981 that Canada based catch
  limits not only on what it thought the fishery
  could bear but also on the economic needs of
  coastal fishing communities.
• When the two objectives were in conflict, the
  economic needs (short-term jobs)and the votes
  they bringalways came first.

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Fishing for Subsidies

• Successive governments showered fishing
  communities with subsidies.
• After 1977 subsidies skyrocketed.
• Loans at low interest rates to buy bigger boats
  and sophisticated gear.
• Cash grants to fishermen and fish processors.
• Tax exemptions for fuel and equipment.
• Generous unemployment benefits.

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Unemployment Insurance

• In the Early 1980s, UI was widely taken for
  granted as a natural part of fishermens income.
• For many years workers had to work only 10 weeks
  to receive 42 weeks of benefits.
• By 1990, Newfoundlands fishermen were receiving
  1.60 in benefits for every dollar they earned in
  the fishery.

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Unemployment Insurance to Ensure Unemployment

• The perverse effects of UI became tragically
  clear in the 1990s
• Unemployment insurance encouraged people to
  remain in communities that lacked any promise of
  a viable future.
• UI prompted young people to quit school, as they
  could earn more in the UI-supplemented fishery
  than they could working in many year-round jobs.

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UI contd

• Of Newfoundlands fishermen, 83 percent have not
  graduated from high school, and 37 percent
  havent attended high school.
• UI contributed to overcapacity in the fishing
  industry.
• The UI program lured workers into an industry
  that could not support them.
• Following the UI changes in 1972, the number of
  fishermen doubled.

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A Vicious Circle

• As the number of workers in the fishing industry
  increased, so did the capacity of their boats and
  plants.
• The artificially inflated workforce and its
  artificially inflated investmentsboats and
  plantspressured politicians to maintain
  artificially inflated catch limits.
• Loans had to be repaid and workers needed to
  qualify for UI so the politicians
  compliedperpetuating a vicious circle that only
  the collapse of the fishery could break.

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Early Warnings Ignored

• As early as 1970, a federal cabinet memorandum
  described the fishing industry as
  overcapitalized.
• Fishermen, processors and provincial governments
  all pressured the federal government for
  expansion.
• Between 1974 and 1981, the number of licensed
  fishermen in Atlantic Canada increased 45, while
  the number of processing facilities expanded 35.

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Continued Warnings Ignored

• In the 1980s more reports warned of overfishing,
  but they continued to be ignored.
• By 1993, it was too late. The groundfish stocks
  had collapsed.
• Decades of subsidieshad created a false economy
  based on a resource that no longer existed.
  Governments had paid people to destroy the
  fishery. p. 180

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Fruits of Canadian Citizenship

• The bulk of federal spending in the 1990s has
  gone to the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS)
  in an attempt to shrink the industry.
• The program created perverse incentives.
• When TAGS benefits run out, recipients can return
  to UI.
• The benefits are so generous that continued
  attachment to the fishery is profitable.

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The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS)

• In its Recent Account of Canadas Atlantic Cod
  Fishery, the DFO reports
• TAGS had two main components income adjustment
  measures and measures to achieve a 50 per cent
  capacity reduction and industry renewal.
  Emphasizing labor adjustment measures, TAGS was
  also designed to help individuals to access new
  career training and job opportunities outside the
  fishery.
• The income assistance has been too generous
  people have incentives to remain tied to their
  fishing communities to remain on the dole.

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No Fish and Only a 35 Reduction

• Between 1992 and 2001, the Government of Canada
  spent 3.9 billion on income support, industry
  adjustment measures, and economic development
  assistance programs for the Atlantic fishing
  industry. A total of 1,769 fishers opted for
  early retirement during this time, and 3,686
  licenses were retired through the four economic
  assistance programs which began in the 1990s.
• There were 17,200 Atlantic groundfish license
  holders in 1992 and 10,372 in 2002, representing
  a decline of roughly 35 per cent. In fact, of the
  6,380 groundfish license holders entitled to fish
  2J3KL, 3Pn4RS, and 4TVn cod in 2000, only 3,882
  actually fished for cod mostly in small
  quantities and almost half relied on cod for
  less than 10 per cent of their total fishing
  income.

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Why Leave the Fishery?

• On April 24, 2003, the Minister of Fisheries and
  Oceans announced the closure of the cod fisheries
  in 2J3KL, 3Pn4RS, and 4TVn. At the same time, the
  Minister and his colleagues from ACOA and CED-Q
  outlined a 50-million, four-part action plan to
  assist individuals and communities that would be
  most affected by the closure.
• Temporary financial assistance was also made
  available to affected fishers and plant workers
  while the short-term job creation projects were
  being implemented, through the 27-million
  Temporary Fishers Income Program (TFIP), which
  was announced by the Minister of Human Resources
  and Development on June 3, 2003.

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Messy Information

• As the fishery expanded, scientists and fishermen
  alike cautioned that fish stocks were declining.
• Inshore fishermen complained of declining
  catches, hired three biologists to review the
  governments report.
• Biologists believed that the report overestimated
  the fish biomass by 55.
• The DFOs desire for consensus and a report
  without ambiguity, meant that biologists
  concerns did not get communicated in the report.

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The Politics of Truthful Information

• The scientists understood that they derived
  their funding and authority from politicians who
  relied on their help to achieve political
  objectives. p. 186.
• Political realities prevented scientists from
  disclosing the full scientific truth.
• Warnings never made it into the task forces
  report, which overflowed with wildly optimistic
  forecasts of stock growth.
• These predictions encouraged further expansion of
  the industry, justifying unsupportable
  investments in harvesting and processing.

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Bureaucratic Rules

• Civil service rules prevented staff scientists
  from reporting to the media.
• Designated spokespersons were to speak to the
  media only on matters of fact or approved
  government policy.
• Breaking these guidelines may be grounds for
  dismissal.
• Hence, scientists could not express their
  concerns about the depleted fish stocks outside
  of the DFO.

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Total Allowable Catches

• TACs of 20 of estimated stocks may have been
  consistent with sustainable harvests.
• Between 1977 and 1985, TACs were perhaps twice as
  high as they should have been.
• CAFSAC advised in 1989 that the TAC be lowered
  from 266,000 tonnes to 125,000 tonnes.
• Those in charge lowered TAC to 235,000 tonnes88
  higher than recommended.

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Ignoring Scientists Advice

• John Crosbie in announcing the TAC for 1989
  stated, A politician has to be concerned about
  protecting both the fish stocks and the
  livelihood of fishermen. We couldnt suddenly
  cut the TAC by more than half.
• He added, If we accepted the new TACBoth
  National Sea and Fishery Products International
  would have gone bankrupt.

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TACs contd

• Setting TACs at unsustainable levels had already
  become department policy.
• The DFO had introduced what it called the 50
  rule, allowing managers to ignore their
  long-standing target of limiting catches to about
  20 of the spawning stock.
• This announcement set the policy DFO would follow
  until the cod stock disappeared.
• Failing to respond in 1989 meant destroying the
  cod stocks and the jobs it wanted to keep.

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Responding to the Voters

• John Crosbie later admitted that by keeping the
  TAC high, FPI might be able to keep its fish
  plant open at Trepassey in my constituency.
• Crosbie had his eye on votes rather than on the
  fish.
• In 1991, in response to protests by fishermen the
  government raised the TAC.

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1992

• In 1992, Crosbie realized that even a
  125,000-tonne TAC was too high.
• The political pressures on meto do
  somethinganythingabout the fishery made my job
  almost unbearable.
• By July, CAFSAC estimated that the cod stock had
  fallen to as low as 48,000 tonnes.
• Only then did Crosbie impose a moratorium on
  fishing for northern cod.

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Too Optimistic or Political Calculation?

• On July 2, 1992, the Fisheries Minister (John
  Crosbie) announced a two-year moratorium on cod
  fishing in 2J3KL to allow "the spawning biomass
  to recover quickly to its long-term average."
• A two-year Northern Cod Compensation Adjustment
  and Recovery Program (NCARP) was announced on
  July 17, 1992, comprising income replacement
  benefits, skills training, professionalization
  and certification, and options for harvesters to
  voluntarily take early retirement or to
  voluntarily retire their fishing licensces.

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Mistakes Were Made

• In November 1993, the Task Force on Incomes and
  Adjustment in the Atlantic Fishery presented its
  final report . Entitled, Charting a New Course
  Toward the Fishery of the Future, the report
  blamed three fundamental problems for the
  predicament of the Atlantic groundfish fishery
  over-dependence, too much fishing pressure on the
  resource, and an over-capacity in harvesting and
  processing. Simply put, there were too many
  fishers and boats in the cod fishery, and not
  enough fish to catch.

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Would You Trust Him?

• The Fisheries Minister (Brian Tobin) responded
  directly to the Report on November 16, 1993, by
  pledging to rebuild the Atlantic fishing industry
  and fishing communities using four key
  strategies. He promised to create a partnership
  between the fisheries minister and the fishing
  industry and to restore reliability and
  confidence in conservation and management
  decisions. He also vowed to create a viable
  fishing industry and to restore the economic base
  of fishing communities.

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Announced Short-Term Moratoriums Keep Fishermen
in Place

• Shortly after issuing his response, the Minister
  received a bleak report from the FRCC regarding
  Atlantic groundfish stocks.
• On December 20, 1993, the Fisheries Minister
  announced that all major cod fisheries would be
  suspended and that quotas for other groundfish
  species would be sharply restricted in 1994.
• It was estimated at this time that up to 35,000
  fishers and plant workers would be out of work in
  1994, as a result of closures and restrictions
  since 1991. In keeping with his commitment to
  these Canadians, the Minister eased AGAP
  eligibility rules as a "matter of basic
  fairness." The amendments ensured that the income
  support measures were more consistent for
  individuals, regardless of their province of
  residence.

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Atlantic cod catch 1950-2002. Northeast Atlantic
(blue), northwest Atlantic (green) and total
(red)
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Surrendering Control?

• With an eye on the next election, politicians
  have chosen short-term payoffs with disastrous
  long-term consequences.
• No politicians or bureaucrats have been held
  accountable for making decisions that destroyed
  the groundfish stocks.
• Government control is simply not a sustainable
  method of fisheries management. Political and
  bureaucratic structures being what they are,
  government managers have neither the incentives
  nor the tools to make the best long-term
  decisions. p. 201

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Avoiding Tragedy

• The transfer of ownership and control of
  fisheries from central governments to fishermen,
  fishing companies, or fishing communities
  changesincentives. Exclusive, permanent
  property rights promote stewardship.
• With property rights, fishermen gain powerful
  incentives to maximize their stocks value, not
  just today, but in the future. p.202

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Conclusion

• In 1998, Ransom Myers observed, The disaster in
  the cod fishery is now worse than anyone
  expected. It may be a generation before we see a
  recovery of the cod. That a five-hundred-year-old
  industry could be destroyed in fifteen years by a
  bureaucracy is a tragedy of epic proportions.

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Updating Brubaker

• A decade ago,  cod stocks crashed in Atlantic
  Canada, an event generally agreed to have been
  the result of overfishing." Despite a ten year
  fishing moratorium, however, these stocks are
  showing no convincing signs of recovery. Most
  perplexing, perhaps, is the continued, and
  increasingly acute, absence of older, mature fish
  from these stocks. With 10 years to grow without
  fishing pressure, there should now be a
  significant stock component of larger adult fish.
  But there is notand in fact the oldest age now
  attained by cod on the Grand Bank of
  Newfoundland, is less that it was ten years ago.
  Stock assessment indicators for cod in general
  continue to fall.

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Slow Recovery, If Ever

• The northwest Atlantic cod has been regarded as
  heavily overfished throughout its range,
  resulting in a crash in the fishery in the United
  States and Canada during the early 1990s. The
  fishery has yet to recover, and may not recover
  at all because of a possibly stable change in the
  food chain.
• Atlantic cod was a top-tier predator, along with
  haddock, flounder and hake, feeding upon smaller
  prey such as herring, capelin, shrimp and snow
  crab. With the large predatory fish removed,
  their prey has had a population explosion and
  have become the top predators. Young Atlantic Cod
  have become the prey in the northwest Atlantic,
  making recovery extremely slow as they do not
  spawn until about 7 years of age.