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Constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions in Poland

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Title: Constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions in Poland


1
Constitutional review of parliamentary
resolutions in Poland the Banking Investigative
Committee case
  • Piotr Chybalski
  • Chancellery of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland

2
Contents
  1. Evolution of constitutional review of
    parliamentary resolutions
  2. Analysis of the judgment of the Constitutional
    Tribunal of 22nd Sept. 2006 on the so called
    Banking Investigative Committee judgment (Ref.
    No. U 4/06)

3
Evolution of constitutional review of
parliamentary resolutions (1)
  • Before 1992/1993 parliamentary resolutions were
    considered incapable of being reviewed by the
    CT
  • Closed catalogue of sources of universally
    binding law in Poland (did not include
    resolutions),
  • the principle of parliamentary autonomy,
  • old mentality (the Sejm still considered a
    supreme State organ).

4
Evolution of constitutional review of
parliamentary resolutions (2)
  • Constitutional Tribunals judgments of 1992 and
    1993 (U 6/92, U 10/92, U 14/92)
  • Article 1 Para 2 of the CT Act of 1985 the CT
    may control normative acts issued by supreme
    and central State organs,
  • Admissibility of constitutional review of
    parliamentary resolutions, if they are
    normative, i.e. create abstract and general
    legal norms,
  • Admissibility of constitutional review of
    parliamentary rules of procedure.

5
The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (1)
  • Article 95 Para. 2 of the Constitution of 1997
  • The Sejm shall exercise control over the
    activities of the Council of Ministers within the
    scope specified by the provisions of the
    Constitution and statutes.
  • Article 111 Para. 1 of the Constitution of 1997
  • The Sejm may appoint an investigative committee
    to examine a particular matter.
  • Act of 21st January 1999 on Sejm Investigative
    Committees (Dz.U. No. 35, item 321, with
    amendments)

6
The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (2)
  • Resolution of the Sejm of 24th March 2006 on the
    appointment of the Investigative Committee to
    examine decisions concerning capital and
    ownership transformations in the banking sector,
    and the activities of banking supervision
    authorities from 4th June 1989 to 19th March
    2006,
  • Four Articles (creation of the committtee, scope
    of activity, number of members of the committee,
    entering of the resolution into force),
  • Group of Deputies to the Sejm applied to the
    CTfor a review of Articles 1 and 2.

7
The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (3)
  • Review of Article 1of the resolution
  • Creation of the investigative committee,
  • An act establishing a new organ shall be the act
    of applying, as opposed to creating, the law.
    Thus, acts appointing Sejm committees, including
    extraordinary ones cannot be the subject of
    review by the Constitutional Tribunal,
  • Discontinuation of proceedings by the CT.

8
The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (4)
  • Review of Article 2 of the resolution(scope of
    activity of the committee)
  • The article is an element of a legal norm
    (together with Article 7 Para. 1 of the Act of
    Sejm Investigative Committees),
  • The norm is general (defines the addressee by
    indicating their generic features) and abstract
    (regulates repeatable behaviours that may be
    defined in a generic manner),
  • Conclusion Article 2 is normative, so its
    constitutional review is admissible.

9
The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (5)
  • Review of Article 2 of the resolution (scope of
    activity of the committee)
  • The scope of activity was generally too broad
    and too general,
  • An investigative committee may not control the
    National Bank of Poland and the Committee for
    Banking Supervision,
  • An investigative committee may not violate the
    autonomy of private persons and entrepreneurs.

10
The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (6)
  • Conclusions
  • It is admissible for the CT to review
    parliamentary resolutions even if only some of
    their provisions are normative,
  • It is admissible for the CT to review provisions
    of parliamentary resolutions even if they do not
    constitute complete general and abstract legal
    norms, but only elements of such norms.

11
Thank You for Your attention
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