US, CHINA, AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGENTINA

1
US, CHINA, AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA IMPLICATIONS
FOR ARGENTINA

• Tim Beal
• Victoria University of Wellington
• New Zealand

2
OVERVIEW

• Security Council condemnation of NK
• Six Party Talks
• Background, Breakthrough, Breakdown
• Characteristics of the contestation
• Positions of the contestants
• Russia, Japan, China, ROK, DPRK,
• US

3
Security Council condemnation

• Argentina non-permanent member of UNSC
• Unanimous condemnation of DPRK missile tests 4
  July
• Portrayed as straightforward action of
  international community against rogue state
• Reality?

4
Reality

• DPRK test not wise, but
• Not illegal
• Not unusual
• UNSC resolution violation of UN charter
• Result of compromise between China/Russia/ROK and
  US/Japan

5
Legal position

• Missile tests by sovereign states not illegal
• DPRK not party to any treaty restraining missile
  development
• Had self-imposed moratorium since 1999 with US
• Only valid if US negotiating

6
Context of missile tests

• Other long-range missile tests in the period
• US 2
• Russia 1
• India 1
• NZ 0
• Argentina?

7
ROK

• To launch military communications satellite
• Has conducted 10 tests of cruise missiles in last
  3 years

8
UNSC

• Why condemn DPRK and not other countries testing
  missiles?
• Why so slow to take action over Israels invasion
  of Lebanon
• Nuclear pressure on Iran, not Israel
• Answer not law but power of US
• And limitations of that power
• Need to survey Six Party talks

9
Six Party Talks - background

• Where does it begin?
• Japanese period, Liberation and Division, Korean
  WarAgreed Framework
• Agreed Framework
• Origins, course and collapse

10
Agreed Framework

• Clinton 1994
• DPRK
• Mothball and then decommission nuclear reactors
• US
• Arrange provision of 2 light water reactors
• Provide heavy fuel oil
• Lift sanctions, move to diplomatic relations

11
Collapse of Agreed Framework

• Clinton never fully implemented AF, Bush
  effectively destroyed it late 2002
• Charged DPRK having enriched uranium programme
  for weapons
• No evidence, China, ROK dont believe accusation,
  DPRK denies it
• Republicans had opposed AF, Japan-DPRK 2002
  summit triggered action

12
SIX PARTY TALKS

• Brokered by China
• 3 Party April 2003
• 1 27-29 August 2003
• 2 25-28 Feb 2004
• 3 June 2004
• 4 July- August and September 2005

13
Six Party Talks

• Centrality of the US
• Dominates East Asia and for ALL countries the
  relationship with US is most important
• They do things against their own interests eg
  send troops to Iraq to keep US happy
• China plays a waiting game
• Their policy options are limited US is more
  complex

14
Six Party Talks 2005gtgt

• Breakthrough
• Joint Statement 19 September 2005
• Breakdown
• 19/20 September 2005

15
BREAKTHROUGH

• Joint Statement took everyone by surprise
• No indication earlier of any shifting of
  positions
• JS
• Very ambiguous
• Provided a face-saving way for US to return to
  Agreed Framework
• Two interesting omissions

16
Omissions

• Heavy enriched uranium
• Had been the alleged reasons for US tearing up
  Agreed Framework
• Cheney
• Architect of US Korea policy
• Had personally intervened at previous rounds

17
NY Times account

• U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open
• September 20, 2005
• By JOSEPH KAHN and DAVID E. SANGER
• Chinese applied pressure on DPRK, but more on US

18
Chinese pressure

• As this unfolded over the weekend, the Chinese
  increased pressure on the United States to sign -
  or take responsibility for a breakdown in the
  talks.
•  "At one point they told us that we were totally
  isolated on this and that they would go to the
  press," and explain that the United States sank
  the accord, the senior administration official
  said.

19
Why did US sign?

• Cheney absent
• Rice
• Each country, she suggested, would issue separate
  statements describing their understanding of the
  deal, with a specificity that is not in the
  agreement itself
• Did that, in Washington and Beijing, DPRK
  reacted, gtgtBREAKDOWN

20
CHARACTERISTICS of Six Party Framework

• 1 US is salient
• US is by far the most important country for each
  of the others
• Not reciprocated
• All of them want good relations
• Not least DPRK

21
Focus on US

• US is key to peace
• US could soon negotiate end to DPRK programme,
  and move on to peace
• Question is, why does it not?
• Focus in analysis should be on US, not DPRK

22
2 Asymmetry

• Six parties are very disparate
• Population, wealth, military power, political
  system, culture, sovereignty, etc. etc.

23
Sovereignty and power I

• US is the superpower
• No serious threat from any other power
• Question of projecting power
• Iraq shows limits
• Russia, China and Japan
• Equal in military spending
• But Japan not normal country
• Has US bases. large element of US military control

24
Sovereignty and power II

• ROK
• Much bigger and richer than DPRK, much larger
  military spending, advanced equipment.
• But US has wartime control, and bases
• DPRK
• Weakest and smallest
• Limited project of power defense paramount
• No foreign bases, military exercises
• IS DPRK-China mutual defence treaty operable?

25
Asymmetry DPRK and US
26
DPRK

• Negotiations with US key to future
• Mistakes could be fatal
• Only US can attack, or allow attack
• Options limited
• Determined and focussed

27
US

• DPRK itself not important, no threat
• It is implications of DPRK for global and
  regional strategies which is important
• Wide range of problems and issues around the
  world (Iraq, Iran, Islamic nationalism
• Open society, traditionally confident in
  invulnerability and mission
• Partisanship (eg ABCgtgtLWR)
• Many options, no urgency

28
POSITIONS

• Russia, China, ROK fairly similar
• Oppose DPRK nuclear weapons
• Facilitate Japanese remilitarisation and
  nuclearisation
• Could provoke US to war
• War would have horrendous consequences for Korean
  peninsula and region
• China fear that hawks might use opportunity to
  attack

29
Russia, China, ROK

• Want stability, peace
• Different attitudes towards unification but all
  want economic cooperation and growth
• All oppose collapse of DPRK

30
Japan

• Currently a spoiler bringing abductee issue
  to SPT
• Abductee issue good for domestic consumption
• Tension with DPRKgtgtremilitarisation
• Aimed at China
• Worried about Korean reunification

31
US response to JS

• Intensified use of psychowar weaponsgtgtfinancial
  sanctions
• Human rights, allegations about counterfeiting,
  drugs
• Seldom any hard evidence
• Even by US charges, scale of offences small, not
  proportional to effect on SPT
• Deliberate attempt to derail Six Party Talks?

32
DPRK response

• Boycott Six Party Talks until financial sanctions
  lifted
• Missile tests attempt to force US to negotiate
• Return, in effect to Agreed Framework

33
Two strands of logic in US strategy

• Overlapping, sometimes contradictory imperatives
• Global and Regional

34
Global

• DPRK must be punished and destroyed as an example
  to others
• Peaceful coexistence would send wrong message
• Not as pressing an issue as Middle East
• Destruction of DPRK desirable

35
Regional

• Prime objective is containment of China
• US-Japan alliance (now involving Taiwan)
• Overtures to India, support for nuclear
  (missile?) programmes
• DPRK threat and tension essential ingredient
• Keep and consolidate Japan and ROK under US
  hegemony
• Reunification would undercut military presence in
  Korea
• Survival of DPRK desirable

36
Convoluted contestations

• All the six parties are contesting amongst each
  other
• Sometimes openly, sometimes not
• China-DPRK US-ROK
• In official announcements stand
  should-to-shoulder
• Disagreements can be discerned with careful
  reading

37
Implications for Argentina

• US faced with
• Obdurate North Korea
• Wavering South Korea
• Rising China
• ..problems at home and abroad
• Korean situation, Six Part Talks have to be
  interpreted within that context
• Important for Argentina to understand