NSTX presentation

1
NSTX-U
Supported by
Safety Assessment Document Safety Certificate
Coll of Wm Mary Columbia U CompX General
Atomics FIU INL Johns Hopkins U LANL LLNL Lodestar
MIT Lehigh U Nova Photonics Old
Dominion ORNL PPPL Princeton U Purdue U SNL Think
Tank, Inc. UC Davis UC Irvine UCLA UCSD U
Colorado U Illinois U Maryland U Rochester U
Tennessee U Tulsa U Washington U Wisconsin X
Science LLC
Culham Sci Ctr York U Chubu U Fukui U Hiroshima
U Hyogo U Kyoto U Kyushu U Kyushu Tokai
U NIFS Niigata U U Tokyo JAEA Inst for Nucl Res,
Kiev Ioffe Inst TRINITI Chonbuk Natl
U NFRI KAIST POSTECH Seoul Natl
U ASIPP CIEMAT FOM Inst DIFFER ENEA,
Frascati CEA, Cadarache IPP, Jülich IPP,
Garching ASCR, Czech Rep
Jerry Levine, Head ESHS
Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory NSTX Upgrade
Project Readiness For Operations Review LSB
B318 December 9-11, 2014
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Charge Question 1
Do the approved NSTX-U Safety Assessment Document
(SAD) and pending Safety Certificate adequately
define the safe operating envelope for NSTX-U
operations?
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Requirements

• PPPL uses ESHD 5008 (Safety Manual) Section 11
  (Operations Hazard Criteria and Safety
  Certification) as part of its implementation of
  the Integrated Safety Management (ISM) Guiding
  Principle for Operations Authorization of
  experimental projects.
• Section 11 Chapter 1 requires large research
  experiments to prepare a Safety Assessment
  Document (SAD) and to obtain a Safety Certificate
  authorizing operations.

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Requirements

• SADs are required to address (5008 Sect. 11 Ch.
  1)
• An overview of the operation (project or
  experimental device), including mission, goals,
  and/or objectives.
• Descriptions of structures, systems and
  components relevant to the operation, with
  emphasis on environment, safety and health (ESH)
  features.
• Identification of hazards associated with the
  operation and methods employed for their
  mitigation.
• Description of how operations will be conducted,
  with emphasis on ESH features.
• SADs are reviewed and approved by the PPPL Safety
  Review Committee and the Project Activity
  Certification Committee (ACC-appointed by ESH
  Executive Board).

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Requirements

• The Safety Certificate constitutes PPPL approval
  to conduct operation of a large research
  experiment within the conditions and/or
  constraints indicated therein (5008 Sect. 11 Ch.
  2).
• Issued by the PPPL ESH Executive Board based on
  ACC recommendations.
• ACC includes PPPL and DOE Princeton Site Office
  (PSO) members. Remains intact for duration of
  research operations.
• ACC reviews SAD, preoperational test plans and
  operating procedures, and walks down equipment
  with subject matter experts.
• Safety Certificate posted prominently in a
  location visible to operations personnel.

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Requirements

• Changes to large research experiment equipment
  and operational parameters follow the provisions
  of PPPL ESHD 5008 Section 11 and PPPLs Work
  Planning Procedure (ENG-032).
• Completion of work planning forms, peer and
  design reviews.
• Reviews and approvals of new procedures.
• Any relevant changes to the SAD.
• ACC review of new equipment and operational
  parameters that have implications for the Safety
  Certificate.
• ACC recommendations to ESH Executive Board on
  changes to Safety Certificate.

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NSTX-U SAD
CONTENTS

• Introduction Overview of NSTX-U Mission
  Upgrade Project
• Summary of SAD and Conclusions of the Analysis
• Facility Systems Descriptions
• Includes buildings, shielding, torus systems,
  heating/current drive, auxiliary systems
  (e.g.,vacuum, gas delivery, lithium deposition,
  bakeout, etc.), diagnostics, electrical power,
  IC (e.g., hardwired interlock system).
• Emphasis on relevant safety aspects.
• Hazard Analysis
• Addresses 22 hazard categories from chemicals to
  waste handling.
• Includes mitigation techniques, and pre- post-
  mitigation risks.

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NSTX-U SAD
CONTENTS (Continued)

• Safety Envelope
• Constitutes the set of Conditions/Limitations in
  the Safety Certificate.
• Based on the Hazard Analysis in the SAD.
• NSTX-U Operations
• Typically 12-18 weeks of plasma operations, 6-8
  months maintenance period each year.
• Quality Assurance (including design reviews, ESH
  reviews and testing procedures)
• Environmental Monitoring Program
• Failures Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA)
• For each system discussed in SAD, covers failure
  modes, effects, detection recovery, qualitative
  probabilities consequences.

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NSTX-U SAD
Some Key Points from Facility/Systems Descriptions

• NSTX-U is situated in a heavily shielded room
  with fire protection controlled access doors.
  No one is permitted in the room during plasma
  operation.
• For plasma operations, fixed and portable neutron
  and gamma monitors will be setup at various
  locations within the facility and at the D-Site
  fence line to evaluate shielding effectiveness.
  Tritium is monitored at the stack D-Site fence
  line.
• The deuterated Trimethylboron (TMB) gas cylinders
  are contained in a sealed gas cabinet specially
  designed for toxic gas storage and delivery.
• Lithium Evaporator (LITER) is operated under an
  argon atmosphere to minimize potential adverse
  reactions with air.
• The vacuum vessel PFC bakeout systems include
  interlocks and other protective features to
  prevent excessive temperatures pressures.

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NSTX-U SAD
Some Key Points from Facility/Systems
Descriptions (contd)

• All NSTX-U subsystems' equipment have built-in
  self-protection. However, the NSTX-U Safety
  System provides system-wide coordination for
  personnel and hardware safety through monitoring
  subsystems status, Kirk Keys, E-Stops, and door
  limit switches.
• The Safety System
• Monitors and alarms critical subsystems, and
  invokes mitigating action to ensure personnel and
  hardware protection when required.
• Inhibits personnel access to the NSTX Test Cell
  (NTC) and cable spread room when the Safety
  Lockout Device (SLD) is in an unsafe position.
• Controls and monitors personnel entry to the NTC
  to ensure personnel safety.
• Provides subsystem equipment permissive status,
  inter-system interlock status, SLD status, and
  access mode status to operators in the Control
  Room.

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NSTX-U SAD
Evaluation of NSTX-U Hazards Risks

• Hazards of operations mitigation evaluated
  risks assessed based on approach in PPPL Work
  Planning Procedure (ENG-032).

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NSTX-U SAD
Evaluation of NSTX-U Hazards Risks Examples

• Ionizing Radiation Hazards
• Increased neutron/gamma generation from plasmas
  (up to 4E18 DD neutrons/year vs 1E17 DD n/yr
  before Upgrade).
• Increased low level activation of NSTX
  components.
• Increased low level tritium contamination of
  internal NSTX components.
• Note NSTX-U will remain Below Hazard Category 3
  (Radiological) Facility (sum of radionuclides
  30 Cat 3 threshold).
• Hazard Mitigation
• Limiting annual D-D neutron generation rate,
  shielding, access controls, radiation monitoring
  and surveys, procedures.
• Occupational exposures (lt100 mrem/yr) will comply
  with 10CFR835.
• Routine offsite exposures are expected to be
  lt0.006 mrem/yr.
• "Worst case" tritium release (0.26 Ci from major
  torus leak) could cause maximum potential
  exposures of 0.004 mrem to offsite individual
  and 28 mrem to worker.
• .

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NSTX-U SAD
Evaluation of NSTX-U Hazards Risks Examples

• Lithium Hazards
• Fire or explosion hazards due to the high
  reactivity of lithium.
• Health hazards due to the corrosive and toxic
  nature of some stable end products of lithium
  reactions (e.g., LiOH, LiH).
• Hazard Mitigation
• Limiting active lithium inventory in NTC to 2 kg.
• Avoiding lithium contact with moisture.
• Keeping lithium sealed and under inert (argon)
  atmosphere whenever possible.
• Availability of special Class D fire
  extinguishers.
• Passivating lithium inside vacuum vessel before
  allowing worker entry, and worker PPE usage.
• Potential accident scenarios (accidental torus
  vents with maximum lithium coating) would result
  in no serious damage to NSTX-U and no adverse
  consequences to workers, the public or the
  environment.

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NSTX-U SAD
Evaluation of NSTX-U Hazards Risks Examples

• dTMB Hazards
• Toxic (7ppm Threshold Limit Value (TLV), based
  upon the TLV of the reaction product B2O3).
• Pyrophoric in air.
• Hazard Mitigation
• Limiting dTMB inventory to 50 g in NTC.
• Storage of dTMB in specially designed gas
  cabinet.
• Component leak checking (if gt 1 atm) prior to
  use.
• Double-jacketed delivery lines.
• NTC access restrictions for untrained personnel
  during dTMB use.
• Interlocks to stop injection during system
  upsets.
• Nitrogen purging of stack vent line to prevent
  flammable mixture development.
• Potential accidental 50 g dTMB release to NTC
  would not exceed TLV.

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NSTX-U SAD
Other Hazards Evaluated

• Electrical Confined Spaces
• Fire Material Handling
• Seismic Waste Handling
• Vacuum Windows Environmental
• Magnetic Fields Chemical
• Radiofrequency (RF) Fields Elevated Work
• Mechanical Uneven Work Surfaces
• Hot Fluids Noise
• Gases Cryogenic Liquids Ergonomic
• Lasers

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NSTX-U SAD
Conclusions of the Hazard Analysis
Application of the control measures and hazard
mitigation features described in the SAD will
maintain risks associated with the NSTX Upgrade
Project at the Standard Level, i.e., low
potential impacts to environment, safety and
health that are well within regulatory, DOE and
PPPL limits and guidelines.
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NSTX-U SAD
Safety Envelope (SAD Chapter 5)
1. All activities must be performed in accordance
with approved Laboratory and NSTX-U Project
procedures, and the NSTX-U safety analysis
documented in the approved Safety Assessment
Document (SAD). 2. Relevant criteria of procedure
OP-NSTX-02 (Integrated Systems Test Procedure)
must be satisfied. 3. Maximum neutron generation
rate from plasma operations is 4 x 1018 D-D
neutrons/year. 4. Operation of the Bakeout
Systems may be performed with helium and water to
heat the plasma facing components (PFCs) to
temperatures up to 350C and the torus vacuum
vessel to temperatures up to 150C. 5.
Boronization with deuterated Trimethylboron
(dTMB) may be performed with no more than 50
grams of dTMB at risk in the NSTX Test Cell at
any time. 6. The total maximum active elemental
lithium inventory in the NSTX Test Cell during an
experimental campaign will not exceed 2000g.
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NSTX-U Safety Certificate
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NSTX-U SAD Review

• The SAD was substantially rewritten and
  reorganized this summer based on comments
  received from the DOE Office of Science (SC).
  Comments changes focused on
• More clearly identifying hazards and their
  controls.
• Clarifying capability of hazard controls for
  meeting relevant requirements.
• Spelling out the NSTX-U Safety Envelope.
• SC observations on the revised SAD The overall
  document is improved and the quality of the
  hazard analysis and hazard description is much
  better. The SAD provides a good description of
  NSTX-U SSCs, operations, and associated hazards
  and controls. Also, the hazard categorization of
  the facility (i.e., below HC3 TQs) appears to be
  appropriate. Given the inventories of hazardous
  materials and energies presented in the SAD,
  there appears to be reasonable assurance of
  protection of collocated workers, public, and the
  environment from consequences associated with
  normal and abnormal operations and postulated
  accidents.
• The rewritten SAD was reviewed by a number of

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NSTX-U SAD Review

• The rewritten SAD was reviewed by a number of
  NSTX-U Project staff, senior PPPL managers PSO
  staff. Comments were incorporated.
• Next, the SAD was reviewed by the NSTX Activity
  Certification Committee (ACC), Safety Review
  Committee (SRC), and Lithium Experts Committee
  (LitEC) as required by PPPL policies and
  procedures. Comments incorporated.
• Then, the SAD was circulated for final signoff by
  the NSTX Project Director, NSTX Project
  Engineering Manager, PPPL Safety Review Committee
  Chair, and the PPPL ESH Executive Board Chair.
• The FMEA (SAD Appendix) is also separately signed
  off by the NSTX systems engineers, NSTX Project
  Engineer, NBI Upgrade and Center Stack Upgrade
  Managers, PPPL ESH Department Head NSTX-U
  Project Manager.

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NSTX-U Safety Certificate Approval

• The NSTX-U ACC will present the results of its
  review of the SAD, and preoperational test plans
  and operating procedures, and its walk downs of
  equipment with subject matter experts at a
  meeting of the ESH Executive Board.
• The ACC presentation will include its
  recommendation to the Board on issuance of a
  Safety Certificate for NSTX-U plasma operations.
• If approved by the Board, the ESH Executive
  Board Chair (Deputy Laboratory Director for
  Operations/COO) will sign the Safety Certificate.