Title: Neocons and neolibs? Their edifice has crumbled.
1Neocons and neolibs?Their edifice has crumbled.
- Chet RichardsJ. Addams Partners, Inc.December
2006
2Are we facing a new form of warfare?
- We dont know still being worked out. To be
useful, it has to be something other than state
military vs. state military or insurgency vs. a
state. Possibilities include state vs. state
(nonmilitary) and state vs. nonstate (other than
classical insurgency). - Major Issues
- Is it war? Is there anything wrong with calling
it war? - Regardless, how do we end these conflicts on
favorable terms? Neocons and neolibs prescribe
more military force. Is there an alternative?
3Is it war?
- Depends on what you mean.
- For a long time, people didnt want to call it
war, using terms like low-intensity conflict
and even military operations other than war
(MOOTW). - Others, while granting that it might be war,
dont see anything different. - Now, however, a growing group of observers use
labels like fourth generation warfare and
nontrinitarian warfare. Nothing wrong with
this, so long as we are specific in what we mean. - Is it important what we call it? Possibly,
because how you view a situation may affect how
you deal with it.
4What would be wrong with calling it war if it
really isnt?
- You might do counterproductive things. Like
- thinking the military is the solution and then
- outspending the rest of the world, combined
- in order to fight a rag-tag insurgency, militias,
and criminal gangs.
Note the Journal does not mention that defense
spending even in inflation-adjusted dollars is
now higher than it was during the Vietnam War.
The percentage is lower because the economy has
grown so much.
5Lets go and fight us some insurgents
- Solutions to insurgencies are largely political,
which is why insurgencies get going in the first
place. - In other words, an insurgency often arises as the
solution to a larger problem. - So why is our military budget equal to the rest
of the worlds combined? - Once things get so bad that a state has to ask
for outside (read gringo, infidel, kaffir, etc.)
help, is there any chance? - And as a revolutionary state ourselves, shouldnt
we be supporting the insurgency most of the time?
6Lets go and fight us some insurgents
- Solutions to insurgencies are largely political,
which is why insurgencies get going in the first
place. - In other words, an insurgency often arises as the
solution to a larger problem. - So why is our military budget equal to the rest
of the worlds combined? - Once things get so bad that a state has to ask
for outside (read gringo, infidel, kaffir, etc.)
help, is there any chance? - And as a revolutionary state ourselves, shouldnt
we be supporting the insurgency most of the time?
7Perhaps we can glean something from
counter-guerrilla warfare
- Action
- Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their
cohesion by demonstrating integrity and
competence of government to represent and serve
needs of peoplerather than exploit and
impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy
elite. - Take political initiative to root out and visibly
punish corruption. Select new leaders with
recognized competence as well as popular appeal.
Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate
grievances and connect government with grass
roots. - Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ
population for intelligence about guerrilla
plans, operations, and organization. - yadda, yadda,
- ___________
- If you cannot realize such a political program,
you might consider changing sides!
Because its a lot more fun to be on the winning
side! John Boyd
John R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, Chart 108
8Think the first two bullets are easy?(a sample
from the new C/I manual)
- 1-118. Commanders and staffs must continually
diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean
to the HN population. The populations
expectations will influence all ensuing
operations. - 1-120. Military action can address the symptoms
of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can
eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents.
However, success in the form of a durable peace
requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn,
requires the use of all instruments of national
power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting
success without the HN government achieving
legitimacy. (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 1-21, 22).
9Conclusion Counterinsurgency is a losing lost
game.
- 1-118. Commanders and staffs must continually
diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean
to the HN population. The populations
expectations will influence all ensuing
operations. - 1-120. Military action can address the symptoms
of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can
eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents.
However, success in the form of a durable peace
requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn,
requires the use of all instruments of national
power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting
success without the HN government achieving
legitimacy. (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 1-21, 22).
- How does a foreign army of occupation restore
legitimacy to a government? - What do soldiers know about restoring legitimacy?
- What does anybody?
- How will locals feel about being the recipients
of all instruments of US national power? - Wouldnt it be better to be on the winning side,
occasionally? - If you cannot realize such a political program,
you might consider changing sides!
10Neocons neolibs Use military force to make a
better world.
- Reality, though, intrudes
- Enemy military forces are the least of our
problems. - Occupations are unpredictable in result, but
always expensive - nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism, etc.
- resistance via guerrilla warfare is inevitable.
- We never fund reconstruction adequately.
- And then theres corruption.
If you invade and destroy an existing state,
nobody may be able to build it back. Bill Lind.
11However, nonmilitary offensives are possible
- Developed world must combine
- patience,
- judicious use of military force, primarily for
containment and the occasional insurgency, - police and intelligence initiatives,
- with strong preemptive incentives
- financial
- commercial
- political
- diplomatic
- personal
12Whats going to happen to armies?
- Distinctions between war and crime will break
down (204) as will the difference between armed
forces and civilians (194) - Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
and massacres - Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
is likely to be serious (211) - Much of the task of defending society against
nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
security companies, with a corresponding decrease
in the utility, size, and technological
complexity (cost) of military forces - Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
replaced by police-like security forces on the
one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
the difference is always clear, even today) (225) - Van Creveld, Transformation of War
13Whats going to happen to armies?
- Distinctions between war and crime will break
down (204) as will the difference between armed
forces and civilians (194) - Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
and massacres - Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
is likely to be serious (211) - Much of the task of defending society against
non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
security companies, with a corresponding decrease
in the utility, size, and technological
complexity (cost) of military forces - Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
replaced by police-like security forces on the
one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
the difference is always clear, even today) (225) - Van Creveld, Transformation of War
14Why privatize?
- Our (largely) public system isnt working.
- 500 BN/yr rest of world, combined
- cant suppress a pick-up insurgency/civil war in
Iraq - More of same will only produce more of same, but
at higher cost. - Our opponents are already privatized.
- non-state
- cellular, networked, distributed, global
- low cost of entry (and exit)
- Rate of evolutionary change is a function of the
amount of variation present in the population
(Fishers Law).
15Why privatize?
- Bankrupt organizations can go out of business.
- Markets unleash competition.
- variety, rapidity, initiative, creativity
- Privatization has a long military history.
- privateers mercenaries
- British East India Company(1600-1858)
- PMCs today
- Nothing less will force the amountof change that
we need. - As Van Creveld suggests, its goingto happen
anyway.
16Obvious solution
- Because military force has limited (not to say
no) utility, - and we already have vastly more than we need,
- and we cannot afford what we have,
- and we are thereby shortchanging other elements
of our national well-being, - and transformation of large, non-competitive
bureaucracies is impossible, - therefore We must eliminate what we dont need,
and we should privatize most of the rest.
17Sign-off sermonette
- It is far from clear whether good intentions
plus stupidity or evil intentions plus
intelligence have wrought more harm in the
world. - Dörner, The Logic of Failure, 8
- A great nation is like a great man When he makes
a mistake, he realizes it. Having realized it,
he admits it. Having admitted it, he corrects it
He thinks of his enemy as the shadow that he
himself casts. - Tao Te Ching (Mitchell trans., 61)
18Questions?Comments?Accolades?
19T
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