Wed. Mar. 19

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Wed. Mar. 19
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Dépeçage
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renvoi désistement
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Contract in CT, performance in MassMass court
would use law of place of contractingCT court
would use law of place of performance
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- CA court is entertaining an action brought by a
NY guest against an Ontario host concerning an
accident in Ontario.- NY court would apply
Ontario law- does that mean that a CA ct cannot
apply NY law?
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complex litigation
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In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago(7th Cir.
1981)
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Filed in CA, NY, Mich, Hawaii, PRPs domiciles
CA, CT, Hawaii, Ill, Ind, Mass, Mich, NJ, NY, VT,
PR, Japan, Netherlands, Saudi ArabiaDs
domicile McDD MO, American (NY or TX)Place of
harm Ill.Place of wrongdoing McDD (CA
designing), American (OK servicing)Punitives
Yes - MO, TX, OK No Ill, CA, NY
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Illinois 2nd Restatement
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• 145. The General Principle(1) The rights and
  liabilities of the parties with respect to an
  issue in tort are determined by the local law of
  the state which, with respect to that issue, has
  the most significant relationship to the
  occurrence and the parties under the principles
  stated in 6.

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• (2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying
  the principles of 6 to determine the law
  applicable to an issue include(a) the place
  where the injury occurred,(b) the place where
  the conduct causing the injury occurred,(c) the
  domicil, residence, nationality, place of
  incorporation and place of business of the
  parties, and(d) the place where the
  relationship, if any, between the parties is
  centered.
• These contacts are to be evaluated according to
  their relative importance with respect to the
  particular issue.

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Nor do the domiciliary states have an interest in
imposing punitive damages on the defendants. The
legitimate interests of these states, after all,
are limited to assuring that the plaintiffs are
adequately compensated for their injuries and
that the proceeds of any award are distributed to
the appropriate beneficiaries. Those interests
are fully served by applying the law of the
plaintiffs' domiciles as to issues involving the
measure of compensatory damages (insofar as that
law would enhance the plaintiffs' recovery) and
the distribution of any award. Once the
plaintiffs are made whole by recovery of the full
measure of compensatory damages to which they are
entitled under the law of their domiciles, the
interests of those states are satisfied.
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Finally, application of Illinois law comports
with the general criteria of the Restatement
(Second) which emphasize certainty,
predictability, uniformity of result, and ease in
the determination and application of the law to
be applied. In this case, it is important to
resolve the conflict between states by a
principled means. Determining that all other
factors being equal, the law of the place of
injury shall be used, provides a principled means
of decision which also creates certainty. Future
defendants cannot predict, of course, where
airplane disasters will occur. But air
transportation companies will now be on notice
that, under the "most significant relationship"
test, when there is a true conflict between laws
of states having equal interests in the issue of
punitive damages, and when the place of injury
has a strong interest in air safety and in
protection of air transportation corporations,
the law of the place of injury will apply.
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California - comparative impairment
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NYNeumeier rules
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Michiganinterest analysis with a strong lex fori
approach
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In re Agent Orange(EDNY 1984)
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Kramer If choice of law is substantive (in the
sense that it defines the parties' rights), then
courts should not alter choice-of-law rules for
complex cases. The reasoning is straightforward.
We start with claims that everyone concedes would
otherwise be adjudicated under different laws. We
combine these claims, whether through transfer
and consolidation or by certifying a class, on
the ground that we can adjudicate the parties'
rights more effectively and efficiently in one
big proceeding. So far, so good. Then, having
constructed this proceeding, we are told we must
change the parties' rights to facilitate the
consolidated adjudication. And that makes no
sense. If the reason for consolidating is to make
adjudication of the parties' rights more
efficient and effective, then the fact of
consolidation itself cannot justify changing
those rights. To let it do so is truly to let the
tail wag the dog.
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