Title: Regulation and Antitrust Law
1Regulation and Antitrust Law
- Principles of Microeconomic Theory, ECO 284
- John Eastwood
- CBA 247
- 523-7353
- e-mail address John.Eastwood_at_nau.edu
2Learning Objectives
- Define regulation and antitrust law
- Distinguish between the public interest and
capture theories of regulation - Explain how regulation affects prices, outputs,
profits, and the distribution of the gains from
trade between consumers and producers
3Learning Objectives (cont.)
- Explain how antitrust law has been applied in a
number of landmark cases - Explain how antitrust law is used today
4Learning Objectives
- Define regulation and antitrust law
- Distinguish between the public interest and
capture theories of regulation - Explain how regulation affects prices, outputs,
profits, and the distribution of the gains from
trade between consumers and producers
5Market Intervention
- Government intervention in the monopolistic and
oligopolistic markets - Regulation
- Antitrust law
6Market Intervention
- Regulation
- Rules administered by a government agency to
influence economic activity - Antitrust Law
- Laws that regulate and prohibit certain kinds of
market behavior
7Learning Objectives
- Define regulation and antitrust law
- Distinguish between the public interest and
capture theories of regulation - Explain how regulation affects prices, outputs,
profits, and the distribution of the gains from
trade between consumers and producers
8Economic Theory of Regulation
- Four Factors Affecting the Demand for Regulation
- Consumer surplus per buyer
- Number of buyers
- Producer surplus per firm
- Number of firms
9Economic Theory of Regulation
- Three Factors Affecting the Supply of Regulation
- Consumer surplus generated per buyer
- Producer surplus generated per firm
- The number of voters benefited
10Economic Theory of Regulation
- Political Equilibrium
- The amount of regulation is such that no interest
group finds it worthwhile to press for changes
and no group of politicians finds it worthwhile
to offer different regulations.
11Economic Theory of Regulation
- Political Equilibrium
- Public Interest Theory
- Regulations are supplied to satisfy the demand of
consumers and producers to maximize total surplus - Capture Theory
- Regulations are supplied to satisfy the demand of
producers to maximize producer surplus--maximize
economic profit.
12Regulation and Deregulation
- Numerous regulatory agencies have been developed
since 1887. - Since 1977, industry has been going through a
gradual process of deregulation.
13Regulation and Deregulation
- The Regulatory Process
- Bureaucrats are appointed
- Agencies adopt a set of practices and rules
- Agency grant certification to a company
- Price and Quantity Regulation
14Regulation and Deregulation
- Natural Monopoly
- Industry in which one firm can supply the entire
market at a lower cost than two or more firms can
15Regulation and Deregulation
- Marginal Cost Pricing Rule
- Sets price equal to marginal cost
- If the Firm Incurs a Loss
- Price discrimination
- Two-part tariff
- Subsidy
16Learning Objectives
- Define regulation and antitrust law
- Distinguish between the public interest and
capture theories of regulation - Explain how regulation affects prices, outputs,
profits, and the distribution of the gains from
trade between consumers and producers
17Natural MonopolyMarginal Cost Pricing
30
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
15
ATC
10
MC
D
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
18Natural MonopolyMarginal Cost Pricing
30
Total surplus
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
Loss per household
15
ATC
10
MC
D
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
19Regulation and Deregulation
- Average Cost Pricing Rule
- Sets price equal to average total cost
- Firm Earns a Normal Profit
20Natural MonopolyAverage Cost Pricing
30
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
15
ATC
10
MC
D
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
21Natural MonopolyAverage Cost Pricing
30
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
Consumer surplus
15
ATC
Producer surplus
10
MC
Deadweight loss
D
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
22Regulation and Deregulation
- Capturing the Regulator
- Maximizes profit
23Natural MonopolyProfit Maximization
30
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
18
15
ATC
10
MC
D
MR
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
24Natural MonopolyProfit Maximization
30
Consumer surplus
25
Deadweight loss
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
18
15
ATC
Economic profit
10
MC
D
MR
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
25Regulation and Deregulation
- How do agencies determine a regulated price?
- Answer Rate of Return Regulation
26Regulation and Deregulation
- Rate of Return Regulation
- Sets price that enables the firm to earn a
specific percent of return on its capital - Inflating Costs
- Firms will be motivated report costs as high as
possible.
27Natural MonopolyInflating Costs
30
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
18
ATC (inflated)
15
ATC
10
MC
D
MR
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
28Natural MonopolyInflating Costs
30
Profit is maximized
25
Price Cost (dollars per household per month)
20
18
ATC (inflated)
15
ATC
Economic profit
10
MC
D
MR
0
2
4
6
10
8
Quantity (millions of households)
29Regulation and Deregulation
- Incentive Regulation Schemes
- Gives a firm an incentive to operate efficiently
and keep costs under control. - Public Interest or Capture?
- Not completely clear which one
- Both predict Price exceeds MC
- Except for local phone service
30Rate of Return inRegulated Monopolies
Years Industry 196269 19707
7
- Electricity 3.2 6.1
- Gas 3.3 8.2
- Railroad 5.1 7.2
- Average of above 3.9 7.2
- Economy Average 6.6 5.1
31Gains from DeregulatingNatural Monopolies
- Consumer Producer Total
- surplus surplus surplus
- Industry (billions of 1990 dollars)
Railroads 8.5 3.2 11.7 Telecommunications 1.2 0.0
1.2 Cable television 0.8 0.0 0.8 Total 10.5 3.2 13
.7
32Regulation and Deregulation
- Cartel Regulation
- Place an output limit on each firm in the
industry. - Prevent cheating
- Regulation - Which One is Used?
- Public interest
- Capture theory
33Collusive Oligopoly
50
Producer interest regulation
MC
40
Price Cost (dollars per trip)
30
Public interest regulation
20
10
D
MR
0
100
200
300
500
400
Quantity (number of trips)
34Rates of Return in Regulated Oligopolies
Years Industry 196269 19707
7
- Airlines 12.8 3.0
- Trucking 13.6 8.1
- Economy Average 6.6 5.1
35Gains from Deregulating Oligopolies
- Consumer Producer Total
- surplus surplus surplus
- Industry (billions of 1990 dollars)
Airlines 11.8 4.9 16.7 Trucking 15.4 -4.8 10.6 Tot
al 27.2 0.1 27.3
36Regulation and Deregulation
- Making Predictions
- Why were the transportation and
telecommunications industries deregulated? - Economists became more confident and vocal
- We can expect to see more deregulation.
37Learning Objectives (cont.)
- Explain how antitrust law has been applied in a
number of landmark cases - Explain how antitrust law is used today
38Antitrust Laws
Year Name of law Passed What the
law prohibits
- Sherman Act
1890 Combination, trust or conspiracy to
restrict interstate or international
trade. - Monopolization or attempt to monopolize
interstate or international trade - Clayton Act 1914 Price
discrimination if the effect is to
Robinson-Patman 1936 substantially
lessen competition or create Amendment
monopoly and if such discrimination is not
Cellar-Kefauver 1950 justified
by cost differences - Amendment Contracts force other goods to be
bought from same firm - Acquisition of competitors shares or assets
- Interlocking directorships among competing
firms -
39Antitrust Laws
Year Name of law Passed What the
law prohibits
- Federal Trade 1914 Unfair methods of
competition and - Commission Act unfair or deceptive business
practices
40Landmark Antitrust Cases
- Federal Trade Commission was established in 1914
to enforce the antitrust laws. - Rule of reason
- Monopolies arising from mergers and agreements
are not necessarily illegal. - Vertical and Horizontal Integration were found to
be illegal
41Landmark Antitrust Cases
Case Year Verdict and consequence
- American Tobacco 1911
Guilty Ordered to divest themselves of - and Standard Oil Co. Large holdings in other
companies rule - of reason enunciated--only unreasonable
- combinations guilty under Sherman Act.
- U.S. Steel Co. 1920
Not Guilty U.S. Steel had a very large
market share (near monopoly), mere size alone
is not an offense application of the rule of
reason. - Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 1940 Guilty
Combination was formed for price fixing no
consideration of - reasonableness applied.
-
42Landmark Antitrust Cases
Case Year Verdict and consequence
- Alcoa 1945
Guilty Too big--had too large a share of
the - market end of rule of reason.
- General Electric, 1961
Guilty Price-fixing conspiracy executives - Westinghouse others fined and jailed
- Brown Shoe 1962
Guilty Ownership of Kinney, a retail chain, - reduced competition ordered to sell Kinney
shoes, (Brown supplied 8 percent of Kinney's and
Kinney sold 2 percent of nations shoes) - Vons Grocery 1965
Guilty Merger of two supermarkets in - Los Angeles would restrain competition
(the merged firm would have had 7.5 percent of
the L.A. market).
43Landmark Antitrust Cases
Case Year Verdict and consequence
- IBM
1982 Case dismissed as being without merit. - ATT
1983 Agreement between ATT and - government that the company would
- divest itself of all local telephone
operating companies --80 of its assets.
44Learning Objectives (cont.)
- Explain how antitrust law has been applied in a
number of landmark cases - Explain how antitrust law is used today
45Landmark Antitrust Cases
- Three Recent Antitrust Cases
- IBM
- ATT
- Microsoft
46Landmark Antitrust Cases
- Current Merger Rules
- The Department of Justice uses the
Herfindahl-Hirschmand (HHI) to evaluate mergers. - Less than 1,000 competitive
- 1,000 to 1,800 moderately concentrated
- challenged if merger would increase the index by
100 points - above 1,800 concentrated market
- challenged if merger would increase the index by
50 points
47The HHI Merger Guidelines
48Proposed Mergers (1986)
- Market definition
- Narrow carbonated soft drinks HHI gt 2400
highly concentrated - Coke 39
- PepsiCo 28
- Dr Pepper 7
- 7-Up 6
- RJR 5
- Market definition
- Broad carbonated soft drinks, fruit juices and
bottle water sold by these four companies - HHI 120 highly competitive
- Dept. of Justice chose the narrow definition
blocked both mergers
49Landmark Antitrust Cases
- Is the public interest served?
- Original intent was to protect and pursue the
public interest - However, the interest of the producer sometimes
comes into play. - Is our court system more likely to serve the
public interest than our regulators?