ECONOMICS 3150C Lecture 7 November 18 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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ECONOMICS 3150C Lecture 7 November 18

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Title: ECONOMICS 3150C Lecture 7 November 18


1
ECONOMICS 3150CLecture 7November 18
2
Monopolistic Competition Model
  • Large number of competitors (large undefined)
    producing different, yet similar products
    (product differentiation)
  • Problems
  • Competitive advantage and creation and
    introduction of different varieties of product
    why does one firm produce a particular
    brand/variety?
  • Defining industry boundaries
  • Stability tendency for consolidation if there
    is value in brand names imperfect information
    and brand names as signal for quality
  • First mover advantages distribution channels,
    brand name reputation, market pre-emption
  • Linear model
  • Circular model
  • Full price to consumers of variety j Pj
    disutility of variety j differing from desired
    variety tabs(Zj Z)

3
Monopolistic Competition Model
  • Entry/exit process in circular model
  • Pre-emption
  • Fighting brands
  • Distribution channels economies of scale,
    transactions costs
  • If Y1 characterized by monopolistic competition
    and Y2 is homogeneous product with constant
    returns to scale
  • Intra-industry trade
  • Inter-industry trade based on comparative
    advantage
  • Trade will lead to lower prices, lower unit costs
    and more varieties ? gains from trade greater
    than in standard trade model with constant
    returns to scale

4
Monopolistic Competition Model
  • Standard m.c. model
  • Equilibrium no. of firms, economies of scale,
    production point relative to MES
  • No. of firms and no. of varieties
  • Who created first variety? Competitive advantage
  • Effects of entry ? resulting from increase in D
  • P, output, production efficiency, profits, no. of
    firms and varieties
  • In industries with economies of scale, variety of
    goods and scale of production constrained by size
    of countrys market

5
Monopolistic Competition Model
  • Trade results from economies of scale and
    multiple varieties of product
  • Trade expands size of market ? each country can
    specialize in narrow range of products/varieties
  • Gains from trade lower per unit costs and prices
    (increased production per firm) less excess
    capacity more varieties thus wider range of
    choices
  • More firms serving combined markets, more output
    per firm ? closer to most efficient scale of
    production, less excess capacity
  • Internal economies of scale and comparative
    advantage
  • What country produces what varieties?
  • Intra-industry trade

6
Monopolistic Competition Model
  • Extension of H-O model with internal economies of
    scale and monopolistic competition
  • Assumptions
  • Two countries
  • Two products Y1 heterogeneous product subject
    to economies of scale Y2 homogeneous product
    with constant returns to scale
  • Two factors of production
  • Y1 uses X1 relatively more intensively
  • A has relative abundance of X1
  • Outcomes
  • A net exporter of Y1, net importer of Y2
  • Both intra-industry (Y1) and inter-industry trade
    (Y1, Y2)
  • B will produce and export some varieties of Y1,
    but be a net importer

7
Monopolistic Competition Model
  • Outcomes (contd)
  • No income distribution effects from
    intra-industry trade
  • Pattern of intra-industry trade cannot be
    predicted
  • A will produce more varieties, but cannot predict
    which ones
  • Adjustment costs as some producers of Y1
    disappear in both countries
  • Relative importance of intra and inter-industry
    trade depends on how similar are the two
    countries the more similar the more important
    intra-industry trade
  • If B larger country, no differences in relative
    availabilities of factors of production and no
    differences if factor intensity of production
  • B net exporter of Y1 more firms and varieties
    pre-trade

8
Brand Names
  • Imperfect information
  • Re. product quality/safety lemons model
    consumers believe all suppliers produce lowest
    quality and so bad drive out good suppliers
  • Re. risks adverse selection (insurance markets)
    only bad risks buy insurance, good risks
    squeezed out (experience rating) credit crunch
    because of inability to quantify credit risks
    (credit risks improperly priced) magnitude of
    liabilities stemming from terrorist attack
    (following 9-11, insurance companies tried to
    terminate insurance for terrorist attacks)
  • Re. quality, motivation of workers statistical
    discrimination (do not hire from among certain
    groups of job applicants)

9
Brand Names
  • Brand names a signal for quality quality
    difficult to measure without repeated use of
    product brand name developed over time provides
    some assurance to consumers about quality of
    product
  • Developing a brand name
  • Consumers willing to pay price premium for
    established brand name products
  • Travel abroad, willing to purchase brands
    recognized from home (hotels, consumer goods,
    financial institutions, entertainment)
  • Example of products from China

10
Brand Names
  • Value of brand name Apple, Armani, BMW, Canali,
    Coach, Coca Cola, Disney, Ferrari, Goldman Sachs,
    GE, Google, Harvard, HM, IBM, Ikea, McKinsey,
    Mercedes, Miele, Nike, Prada, Starbucks, Tata,
    Toyota, Trump, Virgin Group, Wynn, etc.
  • Transferable to other markets? geographic,
    product

11
Intra-Industry Trade
  • 25 of world trade
  • Most significant in sophisticated manufactured
    products (machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
    telecommunications equipment, autos, aerospace)
    and trade among industrialized countries
  • Intra-industry trade often takes the form of
    production of specialized, skill or
    technology-intensive components in one country
    and assembly in another country
  • Nokia develops a technology manufactured by an
    EMS company, perhaps in Canada or in some other
    country (costs and productive/technology
    capacity) then sold as part of system or network
    by Nokia

12
Intra-Industry Trade
  • Competitive advantage and introduction of new
    product/variety
  • Caters to domestic demand (tastes, income levels)
  • Uses familiar technology
  • PLC growth in domestic demand ? entry expansion
    of demand in other markets
  • Small size initially of foreign markets ? with
    economies of scale, supply foreign markets from
    domestic plants
  • Growth in foreign markets ? expansion of
    production, creation of subsidiaries as
    consolidation reduces number of competitors
  • Companies with foreign subsidiaries will transfer
    production more quickly

13
Canada-US FTA
  • Gains from trade
  • Traditional comparative advantage, new products
  • Larger markets economies of scale, plant
    economies (specialization), learning curves
  • Increased competition new products, higher
    quality, lower prices, efficiency
  • Minimize trade disputes less likely to be
    side-swiped when trading partner initiates trade
    dispute against other countries dispute
    resolution mechanism fairer and quicker in
    resolving trade disputes
  • Consider softwood lumber under NAFTA, subsidies
    for regional jets
  • Losses
  • Income losses for owners of relatively abundant
    resources
  • Adjustment to new trade patterns unemployment
    during transition

14
Canada-US FTA
  • Argument in favour of FTA with US based on Canada
    exploiting economies of scale and gaining secure
    access to US market (required to encourage
    investment in Canada and restructuring)
  • Productivity levels in Canada 25 below US
    because Canadian branch plant replica of US
  • Same number of varieties and shorter production
    runs
  • Less competition thus X-inefficiency and less
    incentive to innovate
  • Plant economies of scale
  • Standard internal economies of scale and per unit
    costs decrease with reduction in number of
    products produced in each plant

15
Canada-US FTA
  • Problems with argument
  • If economies of scale so important why did some
    firms not specialize and drive competitors out of
    the market?
  • Tariff barriers had been declining since 1947
    what if management a problem?
  • Security of access limited incentives to
    restructure

16
FTA, NAFTA
  • Objectives
  • Eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services
  • Expand liberalization of conditions for
    cross-border investments
  • Dispute resolutions more binding, more
    effective enforcement
  • Facilitate conditions for fair competition (labor
    and environment codes)
  • Rules of origin 50 of value added (62.5 for
    autos) must originate in free trade area
  • Eliminates import and export restrictions on
    energy products, no price discrimination between
    domestic and foreign consumers of energy products
  • National treatment
  • Trade in services subject to regulation
    (professional services) labor mobility foreign
    ownership restrictions (financial services,
    broadcasting, transportation)

17
FTA, NAFTA
  • Security of access not achieved trade remedy
    laws and trade disputes (S. 301 cases) dispute
    resolution enforcement mechanisms,
    effectiveness (incentives to abide by decisions)
    no list of exempt policies ? Canadian government
    policies at risk
  • Ambiguous enforcement susceptible to political
    pressures ambiguous interpretation of laws
    (damage, source of damage) harassment potential
    asymmetric costs of fighting complaints
    uncertainty for customers (countervailing duties)
  • Options for Canada
  • Fight complaints in US courts and build up case
    law
  • Go to WTO
  • Case-by-case negotiations (example of softwood
    lumber)

18
GATT
  • GATT/WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and
    Trade/World Trade Organization
  • 3 basic principles
  • Nondiscrimination (MFN) preferential trading
    arrangements violate this principle NAFTA an
    example of preferential trading arrangement
  • Elimination of quotas (except for balance of
    payments problems) international system of
    quotas in textiles, proliferation of VERs,
    exploitation of escape clause
  • Consultation to solve trade disputes weak
    enforcement mechanism US domestic laws supercede
    GATT, NAFTA
  • As Tariffs ?, NTMs ? because D for protection
    constant
  • NTMs higher cost form of protection
  • Canada essentially bystander in MTNs EU, US and
    Japan dictated outlines of agreements

19
GATT
  • 9 Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations
    Kennedy, Tokyo, Uruguay and Doha rounds addressed
    NTMs as first 5 focused on tariffs only
  • Tokyo, Uruguay and Doha also attempted to extend
    trade rules to services and establish investment
    rules
  • WTO created to replace GATT secretariat
  • Responsible for enforcement of agreement and
    dispute resolution
  • More formal procedures with tighter deadlines
  • GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services)
  • TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
    Intellectual Property

20
GATT
  • Difficulties in reducing NTMs
  • Definition of subsidies
  • Escape clause provisions
  • Dispute settlement mechanism with effective
    enforcement market power of different countries
  • Trade-offs Problems in measuring concessions
  • North-South issues need to develop economies
  • Agriculture sector and political importance of
    farmers
  • Major problem for Doha Round

21
Agriculture Support
  • Government support, 2007 of gross farm
    receipts
  • Canada 19.4
  • Australia 6.7
  • Brazil 5.0
  • China 8.6
  • EU27 25.5
  • Japan 47.5
  • Russia 10.8
  • S. Korea 65.1
  • Mexico 13.6
  • South Africa 3.3
  • Turkey 18.9
  • US 10.2

22
GATT
  • GATT includes articles on anti-dumping (Article
    6), countervail (Article 16) and escape clause
    (Article 19)
  • Dumping export price below domestic market price
    (below cost of production or normal home market
    price)
  • Escape clause temporary protection to limit
    imports causing serious injury to domestic
    producers
  • Countervail tariffs to offset effects of
    subsidies
  • Problems defining subsidies, determining
    existence of dumping, measuring degree of
    dumping, measuring injury, determining causation

23
GATT and US Trade Laws
  • US contingency protection legislation
    countervail, anti-dumping, escape clause and
    unfair trade (S. 301)
  • First three deal with imports, unfair trade deals
    with exports as well
  • US definitions of injury and causation differ
    from spirit and letter of GATT
  • Unfair trade not part of GATT trade panel has
    found S. 301 to violate GATT
  • Issue of sovereignty for US

24
GHG Caps
  • Canadas position at Bali conference on climate
    change
  • All countries must agree to carbon emission
    limits, not just developed countries
  • No trade advantage because of different rules
  • Longer time frame to achieve significant GHG
    reduction targets

25
GHG Caps
  • Options
  • Carbon tax
  • Magnitude
  • Unilateral, multilateral
  • Use of proceeds
  • Regulations
  • Energy efficiency standards autos
  • Emission limits
  • Unilateral, multilateral
  • Monitoring and enforcement
  • Cap and trade systems
  • Specific industries or general system
  • Setting limits each year whose responsibility?
  • Unilateral, multilateral
  • Monitoring, enforcement
  • Gaming of system for competitive advantage

26
GHG Caps
  • U.S.
  • Companies reducing emissions to prevent class
    action law suits along the lines of those in the
    tobacco industry
  • Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act
  • Cap U.S. carbon consumption through tradable
    permit plan
  • Criticisms What level of emission reductions is
    realistic? Damage competitiveness of U.S. based
    companies without parallel commitments from
    trading partners

27
Dumping
  • Requirements
  • Imperfect competition price setters rather than
    price takers
  • Segmented markets no arbitrage
  • By firms in A into B
  • Price in B below price in A
  • P(B) lt AC(A)
  • P(B) lt AVC(A)
  • Price discrimination
  • Elasticity of demand differs between A and B
  • Prevent arbitrage
  • Warranties
  • Price discrimination model
  • MC(A) MR(A) MR(B)
  • P(A) gt P(B)

28
P1
P1(A)
P1(B)
MC(A)
D(B)
MR(B)
MR(A)
D(A)
Y1
29
Dumping
  • P(B) lt AVC(A)
  • Beach-head strategy
  • Price in short run lt price in long run
  • Improved competitive position in future and
    ability to charge higher price
  • P(B) lt AVC(A)
  • Learning curve
  • AVC in short run gt AVC in long run
  • Pricing to move down learning curve and develop
    cost-based competitive advantage
  • Lower price increases demand and production per
    period of time

30
Dumping
  • P(B) lt AVC(A)
  • Objective drive competitors out of market to
    monopolize market
  • How to distinguish predatory dumping from dumping
    based on competitive behaviour not aimed at
    monopolization?
  • Substitute domestic competition law for
    anti-dumping provisions in trade agreements ?
    companies may be driven out of market before case
    is resolved
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