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Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff

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Title: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff


1
OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY MAGDEBURG BEIJING
NORMAL UNIVERSITY
Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff, Marjaana Rehu,
M.A. Otto-von-Guericke-University, Germany
II. Human Resource Management
Variable or Fixed Salary
2
Recap Session I
  • ... three critical aspects of organization
  • The assignment of decision rights within the
    company
  • The methods of rewarding individuals
  • The structure of systems to evaluate the
    performance of both individuals and business
    units
  • (BSZ 5)


3
Outline
  • 1. Incentive Problem
  • 2. Compensation Contracts
  • 3. Output-Based Pay
  • 4. Input-Based Pay
  • 5. Incentive Pay

Source www.msn.de
4
1. Incentive Problem Coordination and Motivation
Problem
                   
 
Task
Coordination Who does what, when,...
Motivation How do I get somebody to perfom a
task, improve the quality,... gt Incentive Problem
Distribution of Output
Allocation of Input Resources
Individual
Source Wolff/Lazear (2001) Einführung in die
Personalökonomik, Stuttgart Schäffer-Poeschel,
S. 51
5
1. Incentive Problem Why do Incentive Problems
Exist?
  • Why do Incentive problems exist?
  • Employee and employer have different interests
  • Employer would want the employee to take actions
    that maximize the profit of the firms, but the
    employee might rather like spending his time with
    his/her family or play golf
  • All actions of the employee cannot be monitored
    and/or controlled by contracts (risk for the
    employer)
  • Employers have to compensate employees for doing
    undesirable tasks

6
1. Incentive Problem How can Incentive Problems
be Solved?
  • Incentive Problems can be solved through
    effective compensation contracts
  • Compensation contracts have two functions
  • Motivate employees
  • Share risk more efficiently

Source www.euro.fi
7
2. Compensation Contracts
Compensation Contracts
Variable Pay
Fixed Salary
Payment by Output
Payment by Input
Subjective Performance Measures
Subjective Performance Measures
Objective Performance Measures
Objective Performance Measures
8
2. Compensation Contracts Payment by Input versus
Payment by Output
Variable Pay (payment by output)
Straight Salary (payment by input)
  • Compensation depends on measure of what comes
    out
  • Amount of time spent on work does not affect
    workers compensation
  • Problem ? Output not always easy to measure
  • Compensation depends on the amount of time or
    effort spent on an activity
  • Independent of output consideration
  • Problem ? Input also not always easy to
    measure
  • Time at work as a proxy in order to assess
    workers effort

Examples
Examples
  • Wage per work hour
  • Monthly salaries
  • Annual salaries
  • Agricultural workers piece rates p. tray
  • A salesperson on straight commission
  • Compensation of top executives by stocks or
    stock options

9
2. Compensation ContractsHow can the Performance
of an Employee be Measured?
  • Objective Performance Measure
  • Measure that is easily observable and
    quantifiable, e.g. parts produced, hours worked
    etc.
  • Subjective Performance Measures
  • An evaluation which is based on personal opinion
    of a supervisor, customer, peers, etc.

Type of evaluat. Database objective subjective
Output revenue, dividend customer satisfaction
Input time qualification
10
2. Compensation Contracts Examples of Different
Variables as a Basis of Output-Related Pay
Basis Variables for output-based pay
Quantity of production pieces, weight, size/height
Quality of production Rejects, grade, customers satisfaction, individual targets
Input reduction Reduction of input factors raw material, energy, work time
Capacity utilization slack-, repair- and waiting periods
Be on schedule Timeliness vis à vis internal and external customers
Value of the firm stock price, economic value added
11
3. Output-Based Pay
Advantages of output-based pay
Selection effect
Motivation effect
  • efficient workers with a high productivity
    will join the firm/stay
  • inefficient workers with a low productivity
    will not join/leave the firm
  • output-based pay motivates workers to put
    forth more effort

Source www.kone.fi
12
3. Output-Based Pay Selection Effect An Example
of Compensating Salespeople
World Book Britannica
Offered compensation scheme variable pay W 100 . x fixed salary W 500
Labor costs of 10 sets Cost per set 1,000 ? 100 per set 500 ? 50 per set
What type of salesperson will stay with the firm? high productive sp.x ? 5 low productive sp.x ? 5
Labor costs of 3 sets Cost per set 300 ? 100 per set 500 ? 166,67 per set
13
3. Output-Based Pay Selection Effect An Example
of Compensating Salespeople (cont.)
W ...Weekly Pay
A (World Book)
500
B (Britannica)
300
3
x ... Number of encyclopedia
5
? Higher-productivity workers will leave
Britannica, because they will earn more at
World Book. Only lower-productivity workers will
stay at Britannica
14
3. Output-Based Pay Disadvantages of Output-Based
Pay
  • Disadvantage of piecework Variations of output
    can be beyond the workers control

Variable pay
Straight salary
  • Variable pay depends on invested effort and
    exogenous risks risky form of compensation
  • ? Firm should smooth out exogenous risks
    from workers compensation
  • Firm should bear exogenous risks but
    endogenous risks should remain with workers
  • Trade-off More risk?higher compensation
  • Opportunity participate in good economic
    development
  • Stronger incentives
  • Fixed salary doesnt depend on exoge- nous
    factors low-risk form of compensation
  • ? Workers are insured against volatilities
  • ? Firm provides the insurance for risks
  • Lower compensation level
  • Can not participate in good economic
  • development
  • Weaker incentives

15
3. Output-Based PayRisk in Output-Based Pay
  • The firm should bear the largest portion of risk
    because of risk pooling abilities
  • Workers with a high average compensation should
    bear more risks than workers with a low average
    compensation.

Source www.kone.fi
16
4. Input-Based Pay
  • In spite of all the advantages of output-based
    schemes A large proportion of workforce is paid
    by input
  • Compensation depends on the amount of time or
    effort spent on an activity
  • Independent of output consideration
  • ? Time at work as a proxy to assess workers
    effort

Source www.euro.fi
Examples wage per work hour, monthly salaries,
annual salaries
17
4. Input-Based PayBenefits of Input-Based Pay
  • Problems of output-based pay solved by time-based
    (input-based) pay
  • Finding the right output measure
  • Costs of measurement
  • Overemphasizing quantity, reduction of quality
  • Risk aversion of workers
  • Promoting long-run performance

However, in many cases output-based schemes could
be used if only they were designed correctly!
18
Compensation Schemes Balancing Quantity and
Quality
  • Piece rates could induce workers to focus on
    high numbers of low quality products meeting only
    the sufficient quality level to count
  • ? Appropriate compensation schemes could solve
    this problem

Example Typists compensation
Errors p. page Price p. page Minutes p. page Revenue per hour
0 8 20 24
1 7 15 28
2 5 12 25
3 3 10 18
4 0 9 0
5 0 8 0
19
4. Input-Based Pay Using the Appropriate Time Unit
Input-based pay
Hourly wages
Monthly salary
Annual salary
  • Production workers
  • Clerical workers
  • Top Management
  • Managerial workers

Tasks not experienced and difficult to
prescribe often to be defined by top manager
Tasks less experienced and not easy to prescribe
Tasks experienced and easy to prescribe
  • Low correlation between effort and work time
  • Time input bad measure for effort ?
    overinvestment in easy (pleasant) tasks
  • High correlation between effort and time
    invested
  • Time input as a pretty good indicator for
    effort
  • Undefined set of tasks (goal), discretion
    over work
  • Importance of other incen- tives to motivate
    for effort (long-term, e.g. stock options)

20
5. Incentive PayOptimal Level of Variable Pay
  • Since employees do not diversify their risk
  • Large exogenous risks should be born by owners
  • Fixed salary
  • However, employees are motivated by pay for
    performance
  • Variable Pay
  • Part of the pay should be fixed and part variable

21
5. Incentive Pay Forms of Incentive Pay
  • Rewards do not need to be monetary, they can
    consist of anything that employees value
  • E.g
  • Piece rates and commissions
  • Bonuses
  • Parking spots
  • Days off
  • Promotion
  • Training
  • Stock ownership
  • Health care plan
  • Housing
  • Education for kids
  • Retirement Plan
  • Party

22
5. Incentive Pay Criticism to Incentive
Compensation
  • Often heard critics to incentive compensation
  • Money does not motivate
  • It is difficult to design effective incentive
    schemes
  • Incentives certainly entail costs
  • The major problem is to design incentive schemes
    where the benefits exceed the costs

23
Furter Readings
Brickley, J. A./Smith, C. W. Jr./Zimmerman, J. L.
(2001) Organizational Architecture, 2nd ed.,
Irwin Book Team. Lazear, E. P. (1998) Personnel
Economics for Managers, New York (John Wiley
Sons)
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