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Inventory Management: Cycle Inventory-II

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Title: Planning and Managing Inventories in a Supply Chain Author: Comtech_NB Last modified by: GET805 Created Date: 3/22/2001 11:47:12 AM Document presentation format – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Inventory Management: Cycle Inventory-II


1
Inventory Management Cycle Inventory-II
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1
2
Lessons From Aggregation
  • Aggregation allows firm to lower lot size without
    increasing cost
  • Complete aggregation is effective if product
    specific fixed cost is a
  • small fraction of joint fixed cost
  • Tailored aggregation is effective if product
    specific fixed cost is a large fraction
    of joint fixed cost

2
3
Holding Cycle Inventory for Economies of Scale
  • Fixed costs associated with lots
  • Quantity discounts
  • Trade Promotions

3
4
Quantity Discounts
  • Lot size based
  • Volume based
  • Based on the quantity ordered in a single lot
  • All units
  • Marginal unit
  • Based on total quantity purchased over a given
    period
  • How should buyer react? How does this decision
    affect the supply chain
  • in terms of lot sizes, cycle inventory,
    and flow time?

? What are appropriate discounting schemes that
suppliers should offer?
4
5
Evaluate EOQ for All Unit Quantity Discounts
  • Evaluate EOQ for price in range qi to qi1 ,
  • Case 1If qi ? Qi lt qi1 , evaluate cost of
    ordering Qi
  • Case 2If Qi lt qi, evaluate cost of ordering qi
  • Case 3If Qi ? qi1 , evaluate cost of ordering
    qi1
  • Choose the lot size that minimizes the total cost
    over all price ranges.

Qi
D



DCi
hCi
S
TCi
2
Qi
qi
D



DCi
hCi
S
TCi
2
qi
qi1
D



DCi1
hCi
S
TCi
qi1
2
5
6
Marginal Unit Quantity Discounts
Marginal Cost per Unit
Total Material Cost
C0
C1
C2
Quantity Purchased
Order Quantity
q1
q2
q3
q1
q2
q3
If an order of size q is placed, the first q1-q0
units are priced at C0, the next q2-q1 are priced
at C1, and so on.
6
7
Evaluate EOQ for Marginal Unit Discounts
  • Evaluate EOQ for each marginal price Ci (or lot
    size between qi and qi1)
  • Let Vi be the cost of order qi units. Define V0
    0 and
  • ViC0(q1-q0)C1(q2-q1)???Ci-1(qi-
    qi-1)
  • Consider an order size Q in the range qi to qi1
  • Total annual cost ( D/Q )S
    (Annual order cost)
  • Vi(Q-qi)Ci h/2
    (Annual holding cost)
  • ( D/Q ) Vi(Q-qi)Ci
    (Annual material cost)

2D(SVi-qiCi)
Qi
hCi
7
8
Evaluate EOQ for Marginal Unit Discounts
  • Evaluate EOQ for each marginal price Ci,
  • Evaluate EOQ for each marginal price Ci
  • Case 1 If qi ? Qi lt qi1 , calculate cost of
    ordering Qi
  • Case 2 and 3 If Qi lt qi or Qi gt qi1 , the lot
    size in this range
  • is either qi or qi1
    depending on which has the
  • lower total cost
  • Choose the lot size that minimizes the total cost
    over all price ranges.

8
9
The Comparison between All Unit and Marginal Unit
Quantity Discounts
  • The order quantity of all unit quantity discounts
    is less than the order quantity of marginal unit
    quantity discounts.
  • The marginal unit quantity discounts will further
    enlarge the cycle inventory and average flow time.

9
10
Why Quantity Discounts?
  • Quantity discounts are valuable only if they
    result in
  • Improved coordination in the supply chain
  • Extraction of surplus through price discrimination
  • Coordination max total profits of suppliers and
    retailers
  • Coordination in the supply chain
  • Use price discrimination to max suppliers profits
  • Quantity discounts for commodity products (in the
    perfect competition market, price is fixed)
  • Quantity discounts for products for which the
    firm has market power (in the oligopoly market,
    the determined price can influence demand)

gtTwo-part tariffs gt Volume discounts
10
11
Coordination for Commodity Products
  • Assume the following data.
  • Retailer D 120,000/year , SR100 , hR0.2 ,
    CR3
  • Suplier SS 250 , hS 0.2 , CS 2
  • Retailer cost
  • Suppliers cost is based on retailers optimal
    order size.
  • Supply chain total cost 3,7956,0099,804

11
12
Coordination for Commodity Products
  • Consider a coordinated order size9,165.

(Increased by 264)
(decreased by 903)
  • Supply chain total cost4,0595,106
    9,165(decreased by 639)
  • Coordination through all unit quantity discounts.
  • 3 for lots below 9,165
  • 2.9978 for lots of 9,165 or higher
  • Increase in retailers holding cost and order
    cost can be compensated
  • by the reduction in material cost.?
    120,000(3-2.9978)264
  • Decrease in suppliers cost supply chain
    savings 903264639 (can be further shared
    between two parties)

12
13
Coordination for Commodity Products
  • Since the price is determined by the market,
    supplier can use lot-
  • size based quantity discounts to achieve
    coordination in supply
  • chain and decrease supply chain cost.
  • Lot size-based quantity discounts will increase
    cycle inventory.
  • In theory, if supplier reduces its setup or order
    cost, the discount it
  • offers will change and the cycle inventory
    is expected to decrease.
  • In practice, the cycle inventory does not
    decrease in the supply
  • chain because in most firms, marketing and
    sales department
  • design quantity discounts independent of
    operations department
  • who works on reducing the order cost.

13
14
Quantity Discounts When Firm has Market Power
  • No inventory related costs.
  • Assume the following data
  • Demand curve 360,000-60,000p (p is
    retailers sale price)
  • CS 2 (cost of supplier).
  • Need to determine CR (Supplers charge on
    retailer) and p.

p
CR
CS 2
Retailer
Supplier
Demand 360,000-60,000p
14
15
Scenario 1 No Coordination
  • Maximize individual profits and make pricing
    decision independently
  • Demand 360,000-60,000(5)60,000
  • Profit for retailer (5-4)(60,000)60,000
  • Profit for supplier (4-2)(60,000)120,000
  • Profit for supply chain 60,000120,000180
    ,000

(p-CR)
ProfitR
(360,000-60,000p)
ProfitS
(CR-2)
(360,000-60,000p)
15
16
Quantity Discounts When Firm has Market Power
  • No inventory related costs.
  • Assume the following data
  • Demand curve 360,000-60,000p (p is
    retailers sale price)
  • CS 2 (cost of supplier).
  • Need to determine CR (Supplers charge on
    retailer) and p.

p
CR
CS 2
Retailer
Supplier
Demand 360,000-60,000p
16
17
Maximize Supply Chain Profits
  • Profit for supply chain
  • Demand 360,000-60,000(4)120,000
  • Profit for supple chain (4-2)(120,000)240,000
    gt 180,000

(p-Cs)
(360,000-60,000p)
(p-2) (360,000-60,000p)
Þ p4
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Microsoft?
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How to increase the total profit through
coordination ?
17
18
Scenario 2 Coordination through Two-Part Tariff
-I
  • Supplier charges his entire profit as an up-front
    franchise fee.
  • Supplier sells to the retailer at
    production cost (CS).
  • ProofAssume demand function a-bp (a, b
    are constants)

Then retailers profit (p-cR)(a-bp)-F (F
franchise fee)
The supply chains profit (p-cS)(a-bp)
Maximize both profits will obtain
18
19
Scenario 2 Coordination through Two-Part
Tariff-II
  • Supplier charges his entire profit as an up-front
    franchise fee.
  • Supplier sells to the retailer at
    production cost (CS).
  • ProofAssume demand function a-bp (a, b
    are constants)

Then retailers profit (p-cR)(a-bp)-F (F
franchise fee)
The supply chains profit (p-cS)(a-bp)
Maximize both profits will obtain
19
20
Scenario 2 Coordination through Two-Part
Tariff-III
  • Supplier charges his entire profit as an up-front
    franchise fee.
  • Supplier sells to the retailer at
    production cost (CS).
  • ProofAssume demand function a-bp (a, b
    are constants)

Then retailers profit (p-cR)(a-bp)-F (F
franchise fee)
The supply chains profit (p-cS)(a-bp)
Maximize both profits will obtain
\ CR CS
In our example, CR CS 2 , p 4,
demand120,000 Assume a franchise fee of
180,000 Retailers profit (4-2)(120,000)-180,000
60,000 (same as before) Suppliers profit F
180,000 Supply chains profit
60,000180,000240,000

20
21
Scenario 3 Coordination through Volume- based
Quantity Discounts
  • The two-part tariff is really a volume-based
    quantity discounts.
  • Supplier offers the volume discounts at the
    break point of optimal
  • demand.
  • Supplier offers the discount price so that the
    retailer will have a profit ?
  • the profit of no coordination and no discount.

In our example, design the volume discounts
CR 4 (for volume lt 120,000)
CR 3.5 (for volume ? 120,000) To sell
120,000, the retailer sets price at p 4.(from
the demand function) Retailers profit
(4-3.5)(120,000)60,000 (same as before)
Suppliers profit (3.5-2)(120,000) 180,000
Supply chains profit 60,000180,000240,000
21
22
Lessons From Discounting Schemes
  • Lot size-based discounts increase lot size and
    cycle inventory in the supply chain.
  • Lot size-based discounts are justified to
    achieve coordination for
  • commodity products.
  • Volume-based discounts with some fixed cost
    passed on to retailer
  • are more effective in general
  • Volume-based discounts are better using rolling
    horizon to avoid the
  • hockey stick phenomenon.

22
23
Price Discrimination to Max Supplier Profits
  • Price discrimination is the practice which a firm
    charges differential prices to maximize profits.
  • Price discrimination is also a volume-based
    discount scheme.
  • Consider an example
  • Demand curve (supplier sells to
    retailer)200,000-50,000CR
  • CS 2
  • Profit of supplier (CR-2)(200,000-50,000CR)
  • What is the optimal fixed price CR to
    maximize profit ?

Þ CR 3
Demand200,000-50,000(3)50,000
Profit (3-2)(50,000)50,000
23
24
Demand Curve and Demand at Price of 3
  • The fixed price of 3 does not maximize profits
    for the supplier.
  • The profit is only the shaded area in the
    following figure.
  • The supplier could obtain the entire area under
    the demand curve
  • above his marginal cost of 2 (the triangle
    within the solid lines) by
  • pricing each unit differently.

Price
p4
p3
Marginal cost 2
p2
200,000
Demand
50,000
100,000
24
25
An Equivalent Two-Part Tariff to Price
Discrimination
  • The entire triangle under the demand curve (above
    the marginal
  • cost of 2) franchise fee
    1/2(4-2)(100,000)100,000
  • The selling price to retailer CR CS 2.
  • Demand 200,000-50,000(2)100,000
  • Profit of supplier F 100,000

25
26
Demand Curve and Demand at Price of 3
  • The fixed price of 3 does not maximize profits
    for the supplier.
  • The profit is only the shaded area in the
    following figure.
  • The supplier could obtain the entire area under
    the demand curve
  • above his marginal cost of 2 (the triangle
    within the solid lines) by
  • pricing each unit differently.

26
27
Holding Cycle Inventory for Economies of Scale
  • Fixed costs associated with lots
  • Quantity discounts
  • Trade Promotions

27
28
Trade Promotion
  • Goals
  • Induce retailers to spur sales
  • Shift inventory from manufacture to retailer and
    the customer
  • Defend a brand against competition
  • Retailer options
  • Pass through some or all of the promotion to
    customers to
  • spur sales
  • Pass through very little of the promotion to
    customers but purchase in greater quantity to
    exploit temporary reduction
  • in price (forward buying)

28
29
Inventory Profile for Forward Buying
I(t)
Qd lot size ordered at the discount price Q
EOQ at normal price
Qd
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
t
29
30
Forward Buying Decisions
  • Goal
  • Assumptions
  • Identify Qd that maximizes the reduction in total
    cost (material cost order cost holding cost)
  • Discount will only be offered once.
  • Order quantity Qd is a multiple of Q.
  • The retailer takes no action to influence the
    demand.

30
31
Decision on Qd
  • Assume the following data
  • Normal order quantity EOQ
  • The discount d.
  • The discounted material cost (C-d )
  • Now estimate the total cost of ordering Qd in the
    discount period
  • TC(Qd) material cost order cost
    inventory cost

(C-d)Qd
S
Qd/2 (C-d)h Qd/D
(C-d)Qd S (Qd/D)2 (C-d)h / 2D
Note Discount period Qd/D
31
32
Decision on Qd
  • Now estimate the total cost of ordering Q in the
    discount period

Annual TC(Q) material cost order cost
inventory cost
CD
Discount period TC (Q) Qd/D Annual TC(Q)
  • Define the cost reduction in the discount period
  • F(Qd) TC(Qd) Discount period TC(Q)
  • Forward buy Qd Q

32
33
Decision on Qd
  • Now estimate the total cost of ordering Q in the
    discount period

Annual TC(Q) material cost order cost
inventory cost
CD
Discount period TC (Q) Qd/D Annual TC(Q)
  • Define the cost reduction in the discount period
  • F(Qd) TC(Qd) Discount period TC(Q)
  • Forward buy Qd Q

33
34
Decision on Qd
  • Now estimate the total cost of ordering Q in the
    discount period

Annual TC(Q) material cost order cost
inventory cost
CD
Discount period TC (Q) Qd/D Annual TC(Q)
  • Define the cost reduction in the discount period
  • F(Qd) TC(Qd) Discount period TC(Q)
  • Forward buy Qd Q

34
35
Example
  • Assume the following data without promotion.
  • D 120,000/year , C 3 , h 0.2 , S 100
  • then ?Q 6,324
  • Cycle inventory Q/2 3,162
  • Average flow time Q/2D
  • 0.02635(year) 0.3162 (month).
  • Forward buy 38,236 6,324 31,912
  • Trade promotions lead to a significant increase
    in lot size
  • and cycle inventory because of forward
    buying by the
  • retailer.
  • Trade promotions generally result in reduced
    supply chain
  • profits unless the trade promotions reduce
    demand
  • fluctuations.
  • Assume a promotion is offered (d 0.15)

38,236
Cycle inventory Qd/2 19,118 Average flow time
Qd/2D 0.1593(year) 1.9118 (month).
35
36
Promotion Pass through to Customers
  • Assume demand function a-bp (a, b are
    constants)
  • Then retailers profit p-CRa-bp
  • Maximizing retailers profits will obtain
  • If a discount d is offered, the new C RCR-d
  • Then the new
  • Retailers optimal response to a discount is to
    pass only 50 of the discount to the customers.

36
37
Example-I
  • Demand curve at retailer 300,000 60,000p
  • Normal supplier price, CR 3.00
  • Promotion discount 0.15
  • Retailer only passes through half the promotion
    discount
  • Optimal retail price 4.00
  • Customer demand 60,000

37
38
Example-II
  • Demand curve at retailer 300,000 60,000p
  • Normal supplier price, CR 3.00
  • Promotion discount 0.15
  • Retailer only passes through half the promotion
    discount
  • Optimal retail price 4.00
  • Customer demand 60,000

38
39
Example-III
  • Demand curve at retailer 300,000 60,000p
  • Normal supplier price, CR 3.00
  • Promotion discount 0.15
  • Retailer only passes through half the promotion
    discount
  • Optimal retail price 4.00
  • Customer demand 60,000
  • Optimal retail price 3.925
  • Customer demand 64,500
  • Demand increases by only 7.5
  • Cycle inventory increases significantly

39
40
Trade Promotions
Goal is to discourage forward buying in the
supply chain
  • Counter measures
  • EDLP
  • Scan based promotions
  • Customer coupons

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40
41
Levers to Reduce Lot Sizes Without Hurting Costs
Cycle Inventory Reduction
  • Reduce transfer and production lot sizes
  • Aggregate fixed cost across multiple products,
    supply points,
  • or delivery points.
  • Are quantity discounts consistent with
    manufacturing and
  • logistics operations?
  • Volume discounts on rolling horizon
  • Two-part tariff
  • Are trade promotions essential?
  • EDLP
  • Base on sell-thru rather than sell-in

41
42
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42
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