Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis

1
Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Cuban
Missile Crisis

• PO 326 American Foreign Policy

2
The Bureaucratic Politics Perspective of the
Crisis

• Unlike the rational and organizational
  perspectives, the bureaucratic politics model
  treats American and Soviet outputs during the
  crisis resulting from compromises or pulling and
  hauling amongst different bureaucratic actors
  within each state, each with differing vantage
  points, concerns, and degrees of power over the
  final outcome

3
Why Were Missiles Deployed?

• The foreign policy of the USSR, a totalitarian
  state, was under the direction of Nikita
  Khrushchev
• Khrushchev was supported by a small group of
  non-experts upon whose support his continued
  power rested (Presidium) unlike the US,
  Khrushchev did not convene a decision-making body
  specifically for the crisis
• In essence, the decision was made almost
  exclusively by Khrushchev several months in
  advance

4
Why Blockade?

• Two key facets of how bureaucratic politics
  helped to shape the ultimate American decision to
  impose a quarantine against the shipment of
  offensive weapons to Cuba
• The discovery of the missiles (and the timing of
  that discovery)
• The choice of the blockade-ultimatum option as an
  initial reaction over several other measures

5
Why Blockade?

• Discovery of Missiles
• Cuba and the Kennedy Administration
• Operation Mongoose Plan to overthrow Castro via
  CIA (begun in 1961)
• Largely a failure by late 1962 led to increasing
  political attacks against Administration
  (Congress)
• CIA Chief McCone, prior to the discovery, had
  predicted missile deployments, but this
  conclusion was unsupported by other officials
  (Sherman Kents analysis)
• Others saw this as a result of McCones desire to
  salvage Mongoose and save face for CIA
• Only McCone linked the SAM deployment (discovered
  in September) to missile deployment, and
  continued to press for strong action

6
Why Blockade?

• Discovery of Missiles
• Bureaucratic Factors and the Discovery
• In order to bolster public perceptions of the
  Administration (and show that McCones concerns
  were unfounded), NSA Bundy suggesting that JFK
  issue a warning to USSR about introduction of
  offensive weapons
• Political maneuver, but had dire consequences
  when Soviets found to be lying
• Even when McCone continued to push, the U-2
  overflight schedule was the result of a
  bureaucratic compromise
• State was afraid of another U-2 shootdown, and
  fought CIA concerning the frequency and location
  of the overflights (no direct overflights)
• Direct overflights were only ordered and the
  discovery of the missiles only made when human
  intelligence from Cuba arrived

7
Why Blockade?

• Choice of Blockade
• It is important to note that the OPLAN for the
  blockade was originally developed by DoD as a
  countermove to a Soviet blockade of Berlin
• Given the context in which the ExComm was
  operating (Soviet pledge, JFKs promise to keep
  offensive weapons out), a failure to act would
  likely have led to the Administrations demise
• BUT different actors within the ExComm had
  different suggestions at the outset, each
  partially reflecting where they sat
• Chiefs (Taylor, LeMay) Invasion (military
  mindset, make up for Bay of Pigs?)
• CIA (McCone) Forceful action (failure of
  Mongoose)
• State (Rusk) Diplomatic concerns original
  advocates of going to Castro (general concern
  with diplomatic activity)
• Defense (McNamara) Strategic balance unaffected
  no need to risk war over meaningless move
  (general concern with defense situation)

8
Why Blockade?

• Choice of Blockade
• According to the bureaucratic politics model, the
  eventual decision was the product of conflict and
  compromise amongst these actors, with Kennedy as
  the final arbiter
• By October 19, positions had changed, but Kennedy
  thought that any immediate airstrikes would
  result in Berlin retaliation
• As a compromise between harsh action (which would
  show resolve) and inaction (which would show
  weakness), the blockade was favored as an initial
  response
• This decision still met resistance by both hawks
  and doves
• Even when chosen, Kennedy had to decide whether
  the blockade would be used as a negotiating tool
  (Rusk, Sorenson) or be followed by an ultimatum
  remove missiles or face further action. The
  ultimatum approach won out

9
Why Were the Missiles Removed?

• According to the bureaucratic politics model, the
  decision to remove the missiles should have been
  the result of pulling and hauling amongst members
  of the Presidium
• While such pulling and hauling is not readily
  apparent (centralized decision structure),
  aspects of bureaucratic politics factored heavily
  into decision-making concerning the withdrawal on
  both sides
• Khrushchev sought on several occasions to present
  Presidium with faits accomplis in order to
  maintain control amongst bureaucrats (e.g., halt
  to IRBM carriers)
• Fomin indicated acceptability of no invasion deal
  without authorization from Moscow (bureaucrats
  impacting high-level decisions)
• Shootdown of U-2 cannot be explained by RCT or
  Organizational Models due instead to vagaries of
  command and control system
• Meeting of smaller ExComm group following
  shootdown specifically geared to development of
  Turkish deal presented to Dobrynin (avoidance of
  bureaucratic pressures)

10
Reflections on the Bureaucratic Politics Model

• When making extremely momentous decisions,
  leaders are often at the mercy (and often place
  themselves at the mercy) of compromise decisions
  reached by competing high-level bureaucrats, each
  with different views, goals, and interests
• Place and power in action channels are crucial
  determinants of the choices finally reached
• What if no bureaucrats desired diplomatic
  measures?
• Personalities what if different figures had
  been at the helm (e.g., LeMay instead of Taylor
  as CJCS)?

11
Reflections on the Three Models

• Each model not only provides different answers to
  the same questions, but also, to a certain
  extent, produce explanations for quite different
  occurrences
• Main contention of Allison and Zelikow because
  there are multiple determinants of foreign policy
  outcomes within each state, the RCT approach is
  insufficient by itself must look inside black
  box
• Because of this explanatory richness, it is often
  favorable to use all or several approaches in
  concert