Title: NEUDC Draft Presentation
1The State and the Market in Education Delivery
Implications for Implementing the RTE Act
- Karthik Muralidharan
- University of California - San Diego NBER J-PAL
- School Choice National Conference, New Delhi
- 16 December, 2009
2Background
- Central role for education in the uplifting of
historically disadvantaged communities in all
countries - Especially relevant in Indian context, where the
rigidities of caste perpetuated inequalities in
education access across generations, making
improved education access a critical component of
social policy - As recently as 1971, the data shows substantial
under-provision of public goods (schools,
clinics, roads, electricity) in areas with higher
scheduled caste and tribe populations (Banerjee
and Somanathan, 2006) - But combination of political empowerment
(especially of scheduled castes) and policy focus
on universal provision has substantially reduced
inequalities in access to primary education - Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan has been a success in terms
of access and enrollment with over 95 of
children enrolled in school
3The Challenge of Education Quality
- However, successes on the quantity front mask
severe problems in education quality - 60 of children aged 6-14 in India cannot read a
simple paragraph, though over 95 enrolled in
school (PRATHAM, 2008) - Research shows that the returns to education
(both at the individual and aggregate levels) are
driven more by the quality than the quantity of
education (Hanushek and Woesmann, 2008) - The lack of education quality severely limits the
ability of education to serve as a vehicle of
social mobility - As the locus of job creation moves to the private
sector from the public sector, the premium is on
skills as opposed to paper qualifications - Most policy discussions on quality of education
focus on increasing public spending, but very
little on improving effectiveness of the money
that is spent - Teacher accountability and effectiveness is the
central issue (90 of recurrent spending goes to
teacher salaries)
4All India Teacher Absence Map (Public Schools)
State Teacher Absence ()
Maharashtra 14.6
Gujarat 17.0
Madhya Pradesh 17.6
Kerala 21.2
Himachal Pradesh 21.2
Tamil Nadu 21.3
Haryana 21.7
Karnataka 21.7
Orissa 23.4
Rajasthan 23.7
West Bengal 24.7
Andhra Pradesh 25.3
Uttar Pradesh 26.3
Chhatisgarh 30.6
Uttaranchal 32.8
Assam 33.8
Punjab 34.4
Bihar 37.8
Jharkhand 41.9
All India 25.2
Source "Teacher Absence in India A Snapshot"
(Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, Nazmul
Chaudhury, Jeffrey Hammer, Halsey Rogers),
Journal of the European Economic Association,
vol. 3, no. 2-3, April-May 2005, pp. 658-67
5The Emergence of Private Schools
- One response to the lack of performance of
government schools has been a near explosion of
private schools in the past several years - 50 of children in urban India and 20 of
children in rural India attend fee-charging
private schools (IHDS 2005, ASER 2008) - These are not the fancy private schools that
people in urban areas typically think about, but
rather budget private schools that cater to
poor and lower middle class parents (Muralidharan
Kremer, 2007 Tooley 2009, etc.) - Main sources of competitive advantage are
- Higher accountability (175 times more likely to
fire absent teachers) - Flexibility/Responsiveness to what parents want
(Eg. teaching English early) - Significantly higher student outcomes
(attendance, test scores) even after controlling
for observable differences in family background - Much more cost effective (smaller classes, less
multi-grade teaching, though spending/child is
3-4 times lower than spending in government
schools) - The critical driver of private school economics
is lower teacher salaries (which allows hiring
many more teachers), and better accountability
6Salary Distribution by School and Teacher Type
Source Calculated from data collected as part of
ongoing research by author in rural Andhra Pradesh
7Public School Failure and Private School Entry
Source Public and Private Schools in Rural
India by Karthik Muralidharan and Michael Kremer
in School Choice International, MIT Press, 2008
8Exit versus Voice
- People who are dissatisfied with a relationship
can try to improve their outcomes either through
exit or voice (Hirshman, 1972) - To a large extent (but not completely),
accountability in markets works through exit (and
the threat of it), while accountability in
political spaces work through voice - The concepts are inter-linked in that increasing
the power to exit, can also increase voice
because it is more credible - Schools are interesting because they combine
elements of market (possibility of moving to
private schools) and political spaces (community
control and collective action) - So attempts to empower disadvantaged communities
should either strengthen voice or enable exit (or
both) - Assumes that demand is not a constraint (and this
appears to be the case) - Traditional thinking on improving accountability
has focused much more on voice (decentralization,
parent-teacher associations, etc)
9Evidence on the Effectiveness of Voice
- Mixed evidence on PTAs
- Correlations show that the existence of PTAs has
no relation with teacher absence, though a more
active PTA is correlated with lower teacher
absence - Suggests limited effectiveness of a supply-side
initiative to create PTAs - No evidence to suggest decentralization reduces
absence (to date) - We use NUEPA handbooks to code an index of
education decentralization (planning, information
management, etc) - Find no relationship with teacher absence (at
least with current forms of decentralization may
be better with more complete devolvement) - Mixed evidence on the impact of information on
teacher absence - Banerjee et al. find no impact of providing more
information to Village Education Committees in UP
regarding their powers and quality of education - Pandey et al. do find positive effects of an
information intervention in MP - Key challenges to the effectiveness of voice are
- Limited authority of communities over teachers
- Even if the authority were vested in the
communities, there would be a need for effective
collective action, and risks of local elite
capture would remain
10Voice in the face of Elite Exit
- The effectiveness of voice depends on the power
of those exercising it - The challenge for schooling is that the voice
channel is progressively weakened by the exit of
the elite from being recipients of public
schooling (true for other public services as
well) - In our all-India sample (collected in 2003)
- Over 80 of govt. school teachers send their own
children to private schools - In villages with a private school, members of the
Gram Panchayat are around 20 more likely to send
their own kids to the private school - But absence rates are around 17 lower if all GP
members had their own kids in the government
school - Of course, the direction of causation might be
the opposite - The main point is that of multiple equilibria
- In one, the govt. school is good and every one
sends their kids there voice is strong quality
is maintained - In the other, the govt. school is weak private
schools show up elites migrate there poor have
no exit options and limited voice (worst of both
worlds)
11Enrolment and Outcomes by School Type
- Our most recent data (collected across 5
districts in Andhra Pradesh in 2008) show that in
villages with a private school, the patterns of
enrollment by school type and caste are - General 31 Govt. 69 Private
- OBC 39 Govt. 61 Private
- SC 69 Govt. 31 Private
- Not surprising given that private schools charge
fees (typically around Rs. 150-200/month) - Correlations show that the learning levels in the
private schools are significantly higher (0.75
SD) than those in private schools - These are not causal estimates and could reflect
unobserved variables - But the private school effect persists even
after controlling for school and household
characteristics - Process indicators also suggest the superiority
of private schools - Most revealing indicator is parental revealed
preference - What does it say about the quality of the product
(govt. schools) if you cannot even give it away
for free? Even with a positive subsidy!
12Combining the Best of Both Worlds?
- The strength of markets for schools (with
competition among suppliers and basic regulation
on safety etc.) are that they are - Customer-centric, flexible, and responsive
- Accountable
- More likely to engender innovation
- But the main weakness is that the market does not
care for you if you dont have purchasing power - The idea that governments have to provide
education, health, etc is based not just on
public good considerations, but also on the
notion that it is the only way to ensure
universal access - Government provision typically does do a better
job of providing universal access, but severe
problems on the dimensions above - The idea of school vouchers/scholarships
- Fund students and not schools
- Parents can choose any school they like public
or private (subject to basic regulation), pay
with a voucher, and the school is reimbursed
directly by the government (can empanel eligible
private schools for quality control)
13Implications for Empowerment
- The point is not to claim that all private
schools are superior to govt. schools (this is
not the case) - Rather, the point is that the disadvantaged
should have the same capacity to exercise choice
as those who are better off - Why should disadvantaged groups be subject to the
vagaries of state provision, when nearly anyone
who can afford to secede to the private sector
chooses to do so? - Vouchers are a more powerful tool than
reservations, because they can benefit the entire
community as opposed to the few who manage to
secure seats in reserved categories - Vouchers are also a much more flexible instrument
because the value can be calibrated to account
for the extent of disadvantage - Much more likely to engender innovative supply
responses - Relevant to all levels of education
14Concerns about Vouchers/Choice
- Are private schools really the solution?
- Family differences could be the main driver of
differences with govt. schools - Private schools are also club goods who market
themselves by their exclusivity and by who they
exclude as much as who they include - Many schools may exclude children from
disadvantaged communities even with a voucher - Can poor/illiterate parents make well informed
schooling choices? - Will it lead to fraudulent enrollment and kids
not going to school? - Could it lead to a balkanization of schools along
ideological/ religious/ethnic lines? - Schools are also about producing a shared civic
identity and not just knowledge and skills - Does it mean giving up on the public system and
the government abdicating responsibility for
education? - Let us address each of these concerns
15Summary
- Aim of this talk has not been to promote private
schools, but to present the facts on public and
private schools and to provoke thinking about
alternative means to empowerment beyond state
provision - The economic case for vouchers is not based on
public vs. private but rather on the idea
that increased competition and choice will
improve both public and private schools - But the most compelling reason to consider the
idea is on grounds of equity and social justice - Vouchers are not a panacea to the problem of
quality education (many private schools are also
bad), but can provide disadvantaged communities
choices similar to those available to better off
groups - Several practical questions need to be answered
but these are empirical and not theoretical
questions and are best addressed by conducting
small pilot projects with rigorous impact
evaluation - The 25 provision in the RTE Act provides an
opportunity for such pilots - We are conducting one such pilot project in
Andhra Pradesh with Azim Premji Foundation to
study the impact of such a scholarship program - Designed to be directly relevant to the
implementation of the 25 provision
16Design of AP School Choice Pilot and Study
- Aim is to provide poor children in rural AP with
increased choice to attend a school of their
choosing by providing a scholarship to cover the
fees of private schools - Baseline test conducted for all UKG and Class 1
children in 180 villages in 5 districts of AP - Parents of children who took the assessment and
had never been in a private school were invited
to apply for the scholarships - All fees, books, uniforms, materials covered
(paid directly to schools) meals and transport
were not covered (average scholarship value of
Rs. 3,000/year which is 25 of per child
spending in govt. schools) - Scholarships can only be used in recognized
private schools - Excess demand for scholarships, allocated by
lottery - Schools cannot pick and choose better kids
have to accept all or none of the lottery winners
(APF signs agreement with all participating
schools - participation is completely voluntary) - Annual assessments at the end of each school year
- Allocation of scholarship by lottery allows us to
estimate the impact of private schools in value
addition without being confounded by other
variables - The process also generates a lot of learning for
scale up and for figuring out the operating
principles by which this component of the RTE can
be notified
17Implications for RTE Notification
- The idea of leveraging private schools does not
take away the relevance of using voice to
improve the quality of govt. schools especially
on issues of teacher performance and
accountability - But, it is a long route to accountability that
will take a longer time, while every passing year
is another cohort that has experienced poor
quality education - Telling quote from Sarpanch in MP (an SC himself)
on why he sent his children to the private school
instead of trying to improve the govt. school - Jab tak main ye school ko sudhaar sakoon, tab
tak mere bachchon ka bhavishya hamesha ke liye
bigad gaya hoga - Expanding private schooling options (through the
25 clause of the RTE) has the potential to
empower entire disadvantaged communities as
opposed to the select few who benefit from the
status quo policies to promote social justice - Well worth thinking hard about the details of how
this will be implemented in practice and how it
will be evaluated