Lecture 10: Employment and Underemployment

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Lecture 10 Employment and Underemployment
GEE 263S/SWK 2160 Economic Insecurity and Social
Security

• Instructor Dr. Wong Hung

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  ?5.8????,??????????????,?2002???????,??????6.7,?
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  ?300,000???, ????????4.3, ?151 000?????

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(No Transcript)
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??????

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  ???????????,???????????????

5
?????(polarization)

• ????????????????????,????????????????????(core)???
  ???(peripheral)????????(polarized labour market)
• ?????????,??????????????????????????????,????????
  ????????????
• ??????????????????????????????????,???????????????
  ?????

6
?????(polarization)

• ????????????????(flexible management)??,??????????
  ????????????????????????????,?????????????????????
  ??????????(internal labour market)?????
• ?????????,?????????????????????????,??????????????
  ???(Hakim, 1995 ??, 1999)

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?????(polarization)

• ??????????????????????????????,???????????????,???
  ????????(social exclusion)???,?/?????????????,????
  ???????
• ???????,???/???????,??????????????????????????????
  ???????????????,???????????,???????????????

8
????????

• ????????(status attainment theories)?????????(????
  ?????)???????(??????????????)???????????????????
• ???????(human capital theories)???????????????????
  ??????????????????????????
• ????????(social capital theories)??????????,??????
  ??????????????????????

9
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  ????????
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?????????(segmented labour market theory)

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11
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  ???????????

12
?????????????

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  ?????????????????????????,?????????????

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??/?????????????????

• ?80?????????90???????,??????????????????????
• ??????????????????????,??????????/??????????????,
• ???????????????????????,?????????????????????,????
  ???????
• ???,????????????????????????????

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Grubb (2000)????????????????

• ??(?????)??, ??????, ?????(work-based Learning)
  ,???????,???????
• ???????????
• ??????????????????????????
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• ?????????, ????????????

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????????(OECD) (2000) From Initial Education to
Working Life Making Transitions Work

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?????

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  ??
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????????(OECD

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• ????????????????,
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• ?????????
• ?????????
• ?????????????(workfare)
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• ???????????,??????????,
• ????
• ???????????

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????????ALMP

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• ????????????????,?????????????????
• ??????????,???????????????????????????????????????
  ??????????????????????????????????

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????????ALMP

• ???????????????????????????????
• ???????????,???????????????????????????????
• ?????????????????????,????????????
• ???????????????????????,??????????????????????

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Centre for Employment Training (CET)

• Centre for Employment (CET)??????????????????
• ???????????????????????,?????????,????????????????
  ?,?????????????

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Centre for Employment Training

• CET?????San Jose???,??????
• ?????????????????????CET??????????????????????????
  ?,????????(6??)????????

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Centre for Employment Training (CET)

• CET??????????????????????????????,????????????
• ??????CET????????,??????????,?????????????????????
  ???????????????????????????

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Centre for Employment Training (CET)

• CET????????????????????????????????????????
• CET??????? ????????????????????????,????????
• ?Harrison Weiss (1998) ?????CET???????,?????????
  ???????????

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CET?????

• ????????????????????????CET?????????,????????????(
  ??????????????????????),?????????????????????
• ??????????????????????????,???????????????????,???
  ???????(??)????

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CET?????

• ?CET?????,?????????????????
• CET???????????????(Industrial Advisory
  Boards)??????????(Technical Advisory
  Committees),????????????????????????????????????
• ?????????????????????????????????,????,???????????
  ?????????????????????????

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CET?????

• CET?????????????????????????????
• ?????????????????????????,??????????(United
  farmworkers of America UFW),?????????CET????
• ?????????????????CET????????(empowerment)????

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CET?????

• Melendez(1996) ??CET?????????????????????????????,
  
• ???????????????????
• CET?????????????????????

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  ???????,??????????????????????????,?????????

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Lecture 11 ALMPs and Workfare

• Instructor Dr. Wong Hung

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Replication of CET

• analysis of implementation experiences at the
  twelve replication sites focused on four
  distinctive elements of the CET model
• employment and training services designed to
  mirror the workplace,
• intensive participation in such services,
• the close involvement of industry in the design
  and operation of the program, and
• organizational capacity and stability.

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 Summary

• most replication sites successfully implemented
  most elements of the CET model, but several sites
  had difficulty sustaining their programs for the
  full demonstration period.
• CET model proved challenging to implement in its
  entirety, but many of its features appear
  adaptable to mainstream employment and training
  programs serving out-of-school youth.

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Result 1 possible replication

• A majority of the 12 replication sites
  successfully provided a work-like training
  environment, involved industry in the design and
  operations of their services, and offered
  training programs that concentrated participation
  over a relatively short period of time.
• these aspects of the CET model appear to face no
  inherent obstacles to their implementation, given
  sufficient commitment from policymakers, funders,
  and program operators.

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 Result 2 Difficult to sustain

• The greatest challenge for sites was not
  implementing the CET model, but sustaining it.
• While most sites implemented programs consistent
  with the major features of the CET model, several
  of these programs could not be sustained. Four of
  the twelve replication sites shut their doors
  before the demonstration had ended, and three
  others faced serious difficulties in maintaining
  program operations.

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Result 3 Crucial Factor organizational stability

• Future attempts to replicate the CET model should
  consider organizational stability as a critical
  factor affecting program sustainability.
•  CET-San Jose has taken more than 30 years to
  establish and refine its own program of
  employment and training services, yet replication
  sites sought to develop a similar model in as few
  as three years.

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Result 3 Crucial Factor organizational stability

• Sites that were most successful in sustaining
  these programs had operated employment and
  training programs for many years, and had
  weathered numerous previous challenges. These
  sites had close connections to their communities
  and to local funders, and could rely on these
  connections to gain support for innovative
  programs.
• Sites operated by less experienced organizations
  faced greater difficulties in implementing the
  CET model, and were more likely to fail in this
  attempt.

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Result 4 New approaches

• Replicating the CET model on a larger scale than
  that attempted in this demonstration may require
  new approaches.
• Potential funders are often reluctant to support
  innovation, finding it safer to maintain existing
  program models than to attempt new ones.
• New approaches, such as multi-year funding or
  incentives for local funders to support these
  programs, may be necessary to replicate the CET
  model on a larger scale.

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The 30 months report ( Miller, et al. 2003)

• Key Findings
• The fidelity of program services to the original
  CET model varied greatly across the sites,
  affecting both implementation and impacts.
• Four study sites (all older, CET-operated
  programs) implemented the model with high
  fidelity six sites operated programs with medium
  fidelity and two sites implemented the model
  with low fidelity.
• Intensive participation in training and strong
  organizational stability were the two aspects of
  the CET model that were most difficult to achieve
  in the replication sites.

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high-fidelity sites, stronger impacts

• access to the program increased youths
  participation in training activities
  substantially above the level for the control
  group
• increased the percentage of youths completing a
  training certificate. In the medium- and
  low-fidelity sites, impacts on service receipt
  and completion were smaller.

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Positive on female but not male

• In the high-fidelity sites, access to the program
  produced substantial positive impacts across a
  range of employment-related outcomes for young
  women,
• the percentage of young women ever working,
  employment rates at the follow-up survey, and
  (quite probably) earnings though the small
  sample prevents a statistically significant
  finding.

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Less impacts on men

• For young men, the results in high-fidelity
  sites were either negative or negligible.
• The earnings of the program group were less than
  those of the control group a result driven by
  declines in employment and hours worked, probably
  related to shifts in participants industry and
  occupation of employment.

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medium- and low-fidelity sites, negative or
negligible impacts

• Program group youth in the lower-fidelity sites
  had lower employment and earnings impacts were
  especially disappointing for those without a high
  school credential and those who were teenagers
  when they entered the sample.
• Longer-term follow-up may produce more
  encouraging findings for men and for the low- and
  medium-fidelity sites.

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The economy

• The strong economy during the follow-up period
  for this report allowed youth with low skills to
  find jobs, possibly lessening the impact of the
  CET program.
• The longer follow-up period now under way extends
  into the recent economic slowdown and provides an
  opportunity to see whether the enhanced skills
  produced by CET have positioned the program group
  members to better withstand a weaker job market.

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Active Labor Market Policies ALMPs

• Public spending on labour market programmes
  absorbs significant shares of national resources
  in many OECD countries, these policies being
  expected to achieve a variety of economic and
  social objectives.
• For analytical and policy purposes, the OECD
  splits this spending into so-called active and
  passive measures
• Active comprise a wide range of policies aimed
  at improving the access of the unemployed to the
  labour market and jobs, job-related skills and
  the functioning of the labour market
• Passive relate to spending on income transfers

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Five Areas of ALMPs

• Public employment services and administration.
• Labour market training
• Youth measures.
• Subsidised employment
• Measures for the disabled

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Public employment services and administration

• job placement,
• administering unemployment benefits
• referring jobseekers to available slots on labour
  market programmes.

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Labour market training

• spending on vocational and remedial training for
  the unemployed
• training for employed adults for labour market
  reasons.

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Youth measures

• training and employment programmes targeted to
  the young unemployed
• apprenticeship training, which is mainly for
  school leavers, not the unemployed.

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Subsidised employment

• hiring subsidies, i.e. subsidies paid to
  private-sector employers to encourage them to
  hire unemployed workers
• assistance to unemployed persons who wish to
  start their own business
• direct job creation for the unemployed in the
  public or nonprofit sectors.

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Measures for the disabled

• vocational rehabilitation training and related
  measures to make the disabled more employable
• Sheltered work programmes which directly employ
  disabled people.

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WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT-economic policy

• Since one of the main objectives of active
  measures is to assist the unemployed to get back
  into work,
• require a reasonably buoyant supply of job
  vacancies in order to be effective.
• If an economy is generating few vacancies, one
  should not be surprised if active measures prove
  to be relatively ineffective.
• Aggregate demand matters too. As The OECD Jobs
  Study has stressed, more effective active
  policies are only one element in a comprehensive
  strategy of macroeconomic and microeconomic
  measures required to cut unemployment
  significantly.

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Formal classroom training

• Help Women re-entrants
• Dont help Prime-age men and older workers with
  low initial education
• Lessons
• Important that courses signal strong labour
  market initial relevance,
• signal high quality to employers.
• Keep programmes relatively small in scale.

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On-the-Job-Training

• Help Women re-entrants, single mothers
• Dont help Prime-age men
• Lessons
• Must directly meet labour market needs.
• Hence, need establish strong links with local
  employers,
• but this increases the risk of displacement

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Job Search Assistance (Job Clubs, individual
counselling)

• Help Most unemployed but in particular women and
  sole parents
• Dont help
• Lessons
• Must be combined with increased monitoring of the
  job-search behaviour of the unemployed and
  enforcement of work tests.

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Re-employment Bonus

• Help Most adult unemployed
• Dont help
• Lessons
• Requires careful monitoring and controls on both
  recipients and their former employers.

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Special youth measures

• training, employment and subsidies, direct job
  creation measures
• Help Disadvantaged youths
• Dont help
• Lessons
• Effective programmes need to combine an
  appropriate integrated mix of education,
  occupational skills, work-based learning and
  supportive services to young people and their
  families.
• Early and sustained interventions are likely to
  be most effective.
• Need to deal with inappropriate attitudes to work
  on the part of youths. Adult mentors can help.

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Subsidies to employment

• Help Long-term unemployed and women re-entrants
• Dont help
• Lessons
• Require careful targeting and adequate controls
  to maximise net employment gains, but there is a
  tradeoff with employer take-up.

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Aid to unemployed starting enterprises

• Help
• Men (below 40, relatively better educated)
• Dont help
• Lessons
• Only works for a small subset of the population.

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Direct Job Creation

• Help Severely disadvantaged labour market groups
  (?)
• Dont help Most adult unemployed
• Lessons
• Typically provides few long-run benefits and
  principle of additionality usually implies low
  marginal-product jobs.

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Recommendations on ALMPs

• to maximise ALMPs effectiveness
• (1) rely as much as possible on in-depth
  counselling, job-finding incentives (e.g.
  re-employment bonuses) and job-search assistance
  programmes.
• combined with increased monitoring of the
  jobsearch activity of the unemployed and
  enforcement of the work test.
• (2) keep public training programmes small in
  scale and well targeted to the specific needs of
  both job seekers and local employers.

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Recommendations on ALMPs

• (3) early interventions, reaching back to
  pre-school, can pay dividends for disadvantaged
  youths, but they must be sustained.
• reduce early school-leaving targeted on at-risk
  students combined with policies to ensure that
  they leave the schooling system equipped with
  basic skills and competencies that are recognised
  and valued by employers.
• improve poor attitudes to work on the part of
  such young people and adult mentors can help in
  this regard.

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  Recommendations on ALMPs

• (4) as the duration of unemployment spells
  lengthens, various forms of employment subsidies
  may serve to maintain workers attachment to the
  labor force.
• However, employment subsidies should be of short
  duration, targeted and closely monitored.
• (5) use subsidised business start-ups for the
  minority among the unemployed who have
  entrepreneurial skills and the motivation to
  survive in a competitive environment.

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Curb unemployment traps

•  The most direct step to curb the unemployment
  trap is to cut replacement rates.
• However, where actions were taken to cut
  replacement rates, they were usually motivated by
  budget considerations rather than out of concern
  about the possible emergence of benefit
  dependency or work disincentives.

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Actions Taken

• political difficulties make only marginal cuts
  in the generosity of benefit entitlements, but to
  tighten up on eligibility conditions for receipt
  of benefits and to develop activation
  strategies for the unemployed.
•  The aim of activation strategies is to encourage
  the unemployed to be more active in job search
  and keep more in touch with the labour market.

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Different Strategies

• Such strategies range from attempts to provide
  more effective job-search assistance to the
  unemployed and monitoring their search activity
  at one end of the spectrum
• to making it obligatory on the unemployed to
  satisfy work tests or participate in active
  programmes
• or in education and training if they are to
  continue to draw benefits.
• Such activation strategies are becoming quite
  common for young people in OECD countries
• (e.g. Australia, Denmark, Ireland, United
  Kingdom), and they are even being
• extended to other groups of the unemployed in
  some countries.

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Workfare

• The recent US welfare reform, with its emphasis
  on work requirements, time limits for benefits
  and sanctions for non-compliance, can be viewed
  as an extreme example of this approach, also
  known as workfare.
• The role of active labour market policies changes
  subtly in the context of an activation strategy.
• They can then be viewed as a vehicle for
  enforcing a work test on the unemployed,
  especially in cases where the supply of job
  vacancies is low.

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conditional

• In such cases, continued receipt of unemployment
  benefits becomes conditional on programme
  participation, as is the case in Denmark or
  Switzerland, and/or by offering a sufficiently
  wide range of programmes so that a maximum number
  of the unemployed will choose to enter them
  voluntarily.
• In a related manner, there is a growing interest
  in many countries in the potential role which the
  rules used to control job-search behaviour and
  curb benefit abuse by claimants of unemployment
  benefits can play as part of an effective
  activation strategy.

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Income Support in UK

• Similar system as CSSA in HK
• Eligibility be 18 or over and under 60 A person
  does not have to be available for work -
• bringing up or caring for a child under 16 on
  her/his own.
• support caring for a seriously disabled or ill
  person
• ill health or disability

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Passport

• Other than basic income support it acts as a
  passport to certain other help.
• free school meals
• free prescriptions
• free dental care
• vouchers for spectacles
• free milk and vitamins for expectant mothers and
  children under 5, free vitamins for nursing
  mothers
• maximum housing benefit
• maximum council tax benefit.

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Jobseekers allowance (JSA)

• a benefit for unemployed people who are capable
  of work.
• Contribution-based JSA
• Income-based JSA

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Contribution-based JSA

• depend on her/his National Insurance
  contributions (NICs).
• in one of the last two complete tax years before
  the benefit year in which s/he claims JSA.
• have contributions or credits for both these
  years.
• paid for a maximum of six months.
• lower rate for 18-24 year olds, although they
  have to meet the same contribution conditions.
• No dependants additions are paid with
  contribution-based JSA.

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Income-based JSA

• for unemployed people who have not paid enough
  NICs to receive contribution-based JSA or
• contribution-based JSA would not be enough to
  live on, for example, they have dependants
• Entitlement to income-based JSA depends on a
  persons income and capital (savings or
  property). The income and capital rules are the
  same as for income support, except for the
  treatment of part-time earnings.

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Who can claim JSA

• An unemployed person can claim JSA if s/he is-
• aged 18 or over and
• capable of work.
• not in work for which s/he receive wages.
  However, some part-time workers may be able to
  claim JSA
• And under pensionable age (60 for women and 65
  for men) and

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Who can claim JSA

• available for work
• actively seeking work
• currently holding a jobseekers agreement which
  has been agreed with an Employment Service
  officer
• not in education in school or at a similar level.
  
• resident in the United Kingdom, not subject to
  immigration control, and passes the habitual
  residence test

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Available for work

• able to take up employment immediately.
• has caring responsibilities, s/he has 48 hours in
  which to take up employment.
• a volunteer, s/he has seven days in which to
  take up employment, as long as s/he is available
  for interview within 48 hours notice.
• Some people, for example, people with medical
  conditions, may also be able to restrict their
  availability.
• If a person cannot make her/himself available for
  work, s/he may be able to claim income support.

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Actively seeking work

• prove that s/he has applied for jobs, read
  advertisements, registered with employment
  agencies.
• keep a record of all the steps s/he takes to find
  work, as well as copies of advertisements, and of
  letters s/he writes and receives about jobs.
• have to attend the job centre regularly to show
  that s/he is still seeking work (see above). If a
  person is unable to show that s/he is actively
  seeking work, s/he may be able to claim income
  support.

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Ill when claiming JSA

• An unemployed person is allowed to be ill for up
  to two weeks when claiming JSA.
• S/he may be ill twice in any period of six months
  of claiming JSA.
• If s/he is ill for longer or more frequently than
  this s/he will be refused JSA and will have to
  claim a benefit for sickness or disability.

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Jobseekers agreement

• have to sign a jobseekers agreement.
• a document which sets out what the unemployed
  person has agreed to do to find work.
• These will be steps which s/he has agreed with an
  Employment Service officer at the job centre.

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Jobseekers direction

• The claimant may be given suggestions by an
  Employment Service officer about steps s/he can
  take to find work. If s/he unreasonably refuses
  to take these steps, s/he may be given a
  jobseekers direction.
• This is an instruction to take certain action to
  help her/him find work, for example, attending a
  particular course, registering with an employment
  agency, or responding to a particular
  advertisement.

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Jobseekers direction

• If the claimant refuses to follow the jobseekers
  direction and s/he does not have a good reason
  for this refusal, s/he will not receive any JSA
  for two weeks.
• If s/he unreasonably refuses a second time, s/he
  will not receive JSA for a further four weeks.
• A person in this position may be able to claim a
  hardship payment, which is a reduced amount of
  JSA.

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Attending the job centre

• A JSA claimant will have to attend the job centre
  regularly to show that s/he is still available
  for and actively seeking work
• her/his jobseekers agreement is still relevant.
• Most claimants have to sign a declaration that
  they still meet the entitlement conditions every
  two weeks.
• Some claimants have to sign on more frequently.

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Sanctions

• A claimant will also be asked to attend advisory
  interviews during her/his JSA claim, when s/he
  may be referred to a scheme for unemployed
  people, or told to apply for certain vacancies.
• If s/he fails to do this, s/he may be sanctioned
  A claimant can be asked to attend the job centre
  at any time and her/his benefit may be stopped
  completely if s/he fails to do so without good
  cause.

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Sanctions

• A claimant can be sanctioned, which means that
  s/he will not receive any JSA The sanction can be
  for between one and twenty six weeks. A claimant
  will be sanctioned if s/he-
• does not apply for a job which has been brought
  to her/his attention or
• refuses to accept a job s/he has been offered or
• fails to take up the job when s/he is supposed to
  start or
• fails to carry out a jobseekers direction or
• has lost her/his job through misconduct or left
  it voluntarily.

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Sanctions

• Sanctions can apply to training schemes and
  employment programmes as well as jobs.
• For example, if a claimant does not take up one
  of the options under the New Deal, s/he will be
  sanctioned and will not receive any JSA.

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Income Support
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Contribution-based jobseekers allowance (JSA)
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Negative Income Tax ( Child Tax Credit and
Working Tax Credit)

• Child Tax Credit is a means-tested allowance that
  is paid to parents and carers of children or some
  young people who are still in education.
• If you or your family have gross income of less
  than 50,000 a year and meet the other qualifying
  conditions, you will be eligible for some award.
• In some circumstances, people with income over
  50,000 may also be entitled to some award.

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Working Tax Credit

• is a means-tested allowance for people who are in
  paid employment and who meet certain other
  conditions, based on income and circumstances.
• If you are a member of a couple you will need to
  make a joint claim with your partner. If you and
  your partner have income below a certain level
  and meet certain other conditions, you may be
  entitled to Child Tax Credit and/or Working Tax
  Credit.

89
Eligibility Low Income, Saving not count

• The amount you receive depends on how much money
  you have coming into your household each year.
• If you have any savings, they will not affect
  your claim. However, if you receive interest from
  your savings this will be counted as income and
  may affect the amount you receive.
• paid by the government but are processed by the
  Inland Revenue.

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Who can get Child Tax Credit?

• are aged 16 or over and are responsible for at
  least one child.
• child aged under 16 or a qualifying young
  person up to the age of 19 who is in full-time
  education, or aged under 18 and finished full
  time education in the last 20 weeks and who has
  registered with the Careers service and
• have gross income below 50,000 a year.

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Who can get Working Tax Credit?

• aged 16 or over, working 16 hours or more a week
  and
• are responsible for a child or qualifying young
  person (If you are a woman on maternity leave and
  would normally work 16 hours or more a week, you
  can still claim Working Tax Credit) or

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Who can get Working Tax Credit?   

• are aged 16 or over, working 16 hours or more a
  week and have a disability for which your are
  receiving a qualifying benefit or
• are aged 50 or over, working 16 hours or more a
  week and have started work up to three months
  before you make a claim and, for the six months
  before starting that work have been receiving one
  of certain benefits or
• are aged 25 or over and working 30 hours or more
  a week.

93
How much Child Tax Credit will you get   

• There is a maximum amount of Child Tax Credit you
  can get.
• The amount is made up of different elements which
  are-
• a family element which is paid to any family
  with responsibility for one or more children
• a child element which is paid for each child or
  qualifying young person in the family.

94
Results of workfare

• the evaluation literature suggests that these
  rules, if used intelligently and supported by
  effective sanctions, can help stimulate job
  search and serve to keep benefit claimants in
  touch with the labour market.
• It is impossible at this stage to draw any
  definitive conclusions since most of the
  initiatives taken by countries are relatively
  recent and there are almost no rigorous
  evaluations of them available yet.

95
some scattered evidence UK

• combining elements of carrots and sticks, can
  work in terms of producing better labour market
  outcomes for the unemployed.
• The UK Restart programme, which was started in
  1987, can be viewed as a prototype for such
  strategies.
• Under this programme, all persons unemployed for
  six months were obliged to attend a Restart
  interview at the PES. The interview assessed the
  individuals job-search behaviour and motivation
  and assisted them with availing of other services
  and programmes to help them find a job.

96
Workfare in UK

• A rigorous evaluation indicated that Restart did
  work and, as a result, the periodicity of Restart
  interviews was increased during the 1990s.
• The recent steps taken in Denmark to introduce
  activation strategies have been evaluated by the
  Danish authorities. Madsen (1998) argues that the
  preliminary evidence from the evaluations
  suggests that the activation strategies have
• been successful in terms of improving employment
  prospects for the unemployed, especially for the
  young unemployed.

97
Workfare in USA 

• many workfare experiments were designed and
  operated by individuals US states in the 1980s
  and 1990s in advance of the 1996 welfare reform.
• Solow (1998) reviews the rigorous evaluation
  evidence on the effectiveness of these workfare
• initiatives and concludes that they did have
  statistically significant effects in raising the
  employment and earnings prospects of welfare
  recipients, but the effects were not large.

98
Workfare in USA

• Of course, as Solow recognises, one cannot
  generalise from the results of these individual
  workfare experiments to draw conclusions about
  the likely effects of the 1996 welfare reform.
• There has been a sharp drop in welfare rolls
  since the reform, but there is an on-going debate
  as to how much of this decline is due to the
  booming US economy and how much to the policy
  changes.

99
Workfare in USA

• Research by the Administration, summarised in
  OECD (1999c), suggests that almost one-third of
  the decline in welfare rolls since 1996 can be
  attributed to the reform, with most of the
  policy-induced effect being the result of
  sanctions for non-compliance.
• In sum, while it is too early to judge the
  effectiveness of the range of activation
  strategies that have been introduced by some OECD
  countries in recent years, the early signs are
  quite promising.

100
Workfare in USA

• It seems that a mix of carrot-and-stick elements
  in such strategies, combining use of active
  labour market policies and benefit sanctions in
  case of non-compliance, may well contribute to
  better labour market outcomes for benefit
  recipients.
• However, other argues that the workfare just
  induce migration of unemployed from one state to
  another.
•