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Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)

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Title: Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)


1
T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F N E W S O U
T H W A L E S ? S Y D N E Y ? A U S
T R A L I AS C H O O L O F E L E C T R I C
A L E N G I N E E R I N G T E L E C O M
M U N I C A T I O N S S U S T A I N A B L E E N
E R G Y R E S E A R C H G R O U P
Experience with Market-based Approaches to
Climate Change Regulation in the Australian
Electricity Industry
Iain MacGill Hugh
Outhred Karel Nolles
i.macgill_at_unsw.edu.au
  • Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)
  • MRET requires all Australian electricity
    retailers and wholesale customers to buy an
    increasing amount of new renewable electricity.
    It trades in Renew-able Energy Certificates
    (RECs) representing 1 MWh from new renewables.
  • MRET has been operating for two years. Liable
    parties have comfortably met the targets to date.
    However, many argue that the 9500GWh/year target
    for 2010 is too low, and other problems include
  • Public opposition to the classification of
    biomass from native forests as a renewable energy
    source
  • Baselines for some existing large-scale hydro
    appear to have been set too low, They can earn
    RECs without making additional investment. They
    also benefit from natural annual variability,
    earning RECs in years when output is above
    baseline, yet not losing them when output falls
    below. Some 35 of the MRET target may be met
    this way.5
  • Price uncertainty from only a single annual
    acquittal of RECs to ORER. Also generators are
    permitted to register RECs at any time after
    their creation this information asymmetry
    advantages large suppliers.3
  • Investment uncertainty with the recent CoAG
    Review recommendation to scrap the scheme. This
    has damaged the prospects of numerous proposed
    renewable projects.6
  • The NSW Benchmarks Scheme
  • This scheme sets greenhouse reductions benchmarks
    for NSW electricity retailers based on imputed
    per-capita electricity related emissions The
    tradeable instruments are NSW Greenhouse
    Abatement Certificates (NGACs) representing a
    notional avoided tCO2-e emissions.
  • While the scheme only commenced in 2003 there are
    concerns about its likely performance for reasons
    including
  • Summary
  • Here we outline some recent developments in
    market-based environmental regulation of
    greenhouse emissions in the Australian
    electricity industry. In particular, we consider
    the objectives, design and experience to date
    with
  • Electricity industry restructuring
  • Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)
  • NSW Greenhouse Benchmarks Scheme
  • Government accredited Green Power
  • The mixed performance of these Australian schemes
    to date illustrates the need for great care in
    designing such market-based approaches.
  • Electricity industry restructuring
  • Mitigating climate change is one of three
    nationally agreed energy policy objectives.1
    Restructuring of the electricity industry has,
    however, been driven by economic objectives for
    example, the Code for Australias National
    Electricity Market (NEM) has no specific
    environmental objectives.
  • There was, nevertheless, an expectation by at
    least some government policy makers that
    restructuring would also help reduce greenhouse
    emissions through competition and more rational
    energy investment.2
  • Unfortunately, projections now suggest this will
    not be achieved for reasons including low coal
    generation costs, reduced energy efficiency
    because of lower prices, a market design that
    favours incumbents and the supply-side
    orientation of reforms to date.3
  • Thus, electricity competition does not, in itself
    guarantee environ-mental improvements. However,
    it may improve responsiveness to price signals
    from market-based regulation.4
  • CoAG (2002) Energy Market Review
  • CoA (1997) Australias 2nd National Report to
    UNFCCC
  • MacGill et al (2003) 26th IAEE Conference,
    Prague.
  • IPCC (2001) Third Assessment Report
    Mitigation.
  • 5. BCSE (2002) RECS, Baselines and Industry
    Development.
  • 6. Outhred et al (2002) Submission to CoAG
    (2002)7. www.greenpower.com.au

Greenpower Greenpower schemes allow consumers to
voluntarily pay a premium for electricity from
green sources. Because networks mix all
generation, green power cant be physically
delivered. Instead, retailers contract with
green generators to cover the volume sold to
customers.This necessary abstraction creates a
challenge in counting and certifying premium
price green power from different types of new and
existing green sources. External auditing can
increase consumer confidence in such
arrangements. Australia has a national government
backed accreditation scheme run by NSW SEDA. It
requires an increasing amount of greenpower to be
sourced from new (post 1997) generators.
Biomass generation from native forests is not
accepted. Consumer interest remains limited. Over
95 of Australian electricity consumers now have
access to accredited Greenpower, yet sales in
2002 represented only around 0.25 of total
electricity consumption.7
  • Key Lessons to date
  • Numerous abstractions and design choices are
    required when implementing market-based tools,
    and these can have a marked impact on scheme
    effectiveness and efficiency
  • Setting appropriate baselines in baseline and
    credit schemes to ensure additionality is
    particularly problematic, and moral hazards arise
    for policy makers during this process
  • The broad reach of some market-based tools
    increases the potential for them to interact with
    other policy measures in ways that reduce their
    environmental effectiveness
  • There are serious market for lemons risks with
    tradable instruments that have measurement,
    verification and additionality difficulties
    poor quality yet low-cost projects can crowd
    out more expensive yet high quality activities
  • Creating transparent, liquid markets for these
    schemes that allow efficient price discovery and
    risk management by participants can be
    challenging
  • It is proving harder to effectively design and
    implement these market based tools than many had
    expected because of the complex framework
    required to effectively exploit their flexibility
    and efficiency

U N S W S U S T A I N A B L E E N E R G Y
R E S E A R C H G R O U P _at_ w w w . s e r
g o . e e . u n s w . e d u . a u
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