Title: Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)
1T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F N E W S O U
T H W A L E S ? S Y D N E Y ? A U S
T R A L I AS C H O O L O F E L E C T R I C
A L E N G I N E E R I N G T E L E C O M
M U N I C A T I O N S S U S T A I N A B L E E N
E R G Y R E S E A R C H G R O U P
Experience with Market-based Approaches to
Climate Change Regulation in the Australian
Electricity Industry
Iain MacGill Hugh
Outhred Karel Nolles
i.macgill_at_unsw.edu.au
- Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)
- MRET requires all Australian electricity
retailers and wholesale customers to buy an
increasing amount of new renewable electricity.
It trades in Renew-able Energy Certificates
(RECs) representing 1 MWh from new renewables. - MRET has been operating for two years. Liable
parties have comfortably met the targets to date.
However, many argue that the 9500GWh/year target
for 2010 is too low, and other problems include - Public opposition to the classification of
biomass from native forests as a renewable energy
source - Baselines for some existing large-scale hydro
appear to have been set too low, They can earn
RECs without making additional investment. They
also benefit from natural annual variability,
earning RECs in years when output is above
baseline, yet not losing them when output falls
below. Some 35 of the MRET target may be met
this way.5 - Price uncertainty from only a single annual
acquittal of RECs to ORER. Also generators are
permitted to register RECs at any time after
their creation this information asymmetry
advantages large suppliers.3 - Investment uncertainty with the recent CoAG
Review recommendation to scrap the scheme. This
has damaged the prospects of numerous proposed
renewable projects.6 - The NSW Benchmarks Scheme
- This scheme sets greenhouse reductions benchmarks
for NSW electricity retailers based on imputed
per-capita electricity related emissions The
tradeable instruments are NSW Greenhouse
Abatement Certificates (NGACs) representing a
notional avoided tCO2-e emissions. - While the scheme only commenced in 2003 there are
concerns about its likely performance for reasons
including
- Summary
- Here we outline some recent developments in
market-based environmental regulation of
greenhouse emissions in the Australian
electricity industry. In particular, we consider
the objectives, design and experience to date
with - Electricity industry restructuring
- Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)
- NSW Greenhouse Benchmarks Scheme
- Government accredited Green Power
- The mixed performance of these Australian schemes
to date illustrates the need for great care in
designing such market-based approaches.
- Electricity industry restructuring
- Mitigating climate change is one of three
nationally agreed energy policy objectives.1
Restructuring of the electricity industry has,
however, been driven by economic objectives for
example, the Code for Australias National
Electricity Market (NEM) has no specific
environmental objectives. - There was, nevertheless, an expectation by at
least some government policy makers that
restructuring would also help reduce greenhouse
emissions through competition and more rational
energy investment.2 - Unfortunately, projections now suggest this will
not be achieved for reasons including low coal
generation costs, reduced energy efficiency
because of lower prices, a market design that
favours incumbents and the supply-side
orientation of reforms to date.3 - Thus, electricity competition does not, in itself
guarantee environ-mental improvements. However,
it may improve responsiveness to price signals
from market-based regulation.4 - CoAG (2002) Energy Market Review
- CoA (1997) Australias 2nd National Report to
UNFCCC - MacGill et al (2003) 26th IAEE Conference,
Prague. - IPCC (2001) Third Assessment Report
Mitigation. - 5. BCSE (2002) RECS, Baselines and Industry
Development. - 6. Outhred et al (2002) Submission to CoAG
(2002)7. www.greenpower.com.au
Greenpower Greenpower schemes allow consumers to
voluntarily pay a premium for electricity from
green sources. Because networks mix all
generation, green power cant be physically
delivered. Instead, retailers contract with
green generators to cover the volume sold to
customers.This necessary abstraction creates a
challenge in counting and certifying premium
price green power from different types of new and
existing green sources. External auditing can
increase consumer confidence in such
arrangements. Australia has a national government
backed accreditation scheme run by NSW SEDA. It
requires an increasing amount of greenpower to be
sourced from new (post 1997) generators.
Biomass generation from native forests is not
accepted. Consumer interest remains limited. Over
95 of Australian electricity consumers now have
access to accredited Greenpower, yet sales in
2002 represented only around 0.25 of total
electricity consumption.7
- Key Lessons to date
- Numerous abstractions and design choices are
required when implementing market-based tools,
and these can have a marked impact on scheme
effectiveness and efficiency - Setting appropriate baselines in baseline and
credit schemes to ensure additionality is
particularly problematic, and moral hazards arise
for policy makers during this process - The broad reach of some market-based tools
increases the potential for them to interact with
other policy measures in ways that reduce their
environmental effectiveness
- There are serious market for lemons risks with
tradable instruments that have measurement,
verification and additionality difficulties
poor quality yet low-cost projects can crowd
out more expensive yet high quality activities - Creating transparent, liquid markets for these
schemes that allow efficient price discovery and
risk management by participants can be
challenging - It is proving harder to effectively design and
implement these market based tools than many had
expected because of the complex framework
required to effectively exploit their flexibility
and efficiency
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