Highway

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Highway Motor Carrier Division Presented to
SOUTHEASTERN STATES PUPIL TRANSPORTATION
CONFERENCE and OKLAHOMA ASSOCIATION FOR PUPIL
TRANSPORTATION Sheraton Oklahoma City
Hotel Oklahoma City, Oklahoma July 11-13, 2011
Presented by Bill Arrington General
Manager, HMC
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Highway Motor Carrier Landscape
Trucking 700K trucking companies in U.S
(incl. 371K intrastate companies) 8.8M
trucks operate in the U.S. (26M Class 1-8
trucks) 51K new motor carriers annually 61K
HAZMAT truck companies 80 of U.S. communities
depend on trucks for movement of commodities
Highway Systems 46,876 miles of interstate
highways 160K miles of NHS roads 4M miles of
local roads 350 U.S. tunnels over 100 meters in
length 582,000 bridges over 20 feet of span 100M
commercial vehicles 154M automobiles 200M
Licensed Drivers 10M Licensed Commercial
Drivers 1.7M HAZMAT Drivers
Motorcoach 5.6B industry Scheduled
Charter/Tour 3,200 bus companies 30K
buses 118K jobs provided 62K full-time
employees 750M passengers annually 95 are small
operators (less than 25 buses)
School Bus Pupil Transportation Industry Largest
public fleet of vehicles in the U.S. (_at_ 500,000
school buses) 24M students transported daily
School buses travel more then 4 billion miles
annually 16,000 School Districts 2,500 private
schools
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Highway Motor Carrier Four Security Pillars
Information Sharing
HighwaySecurity Process
Security Plan
Exercises
Assessment
Training
Lessons Learned
Assistance/Compliance
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Highway Motor Carrier

• Public Law 110-53, (9/11 Implementation Act)
  requirements
• School Transportation Industry Assessment, Sec.
  1538
• Scenario-based risk assessment 64 page report.
• TxVxC Risk
• There is currently no credible actionable threat
  to the school transportation industry
• Forwarded to 46 School Transportation
  Representatives
• Available upon request at highwaysecurity_at_dhs.go
  v
• Regulation requiring Over-the-Road Bus Security
  Assessments and Plans, Sec. 1531 This will
  require operator-level vulnerability assessments

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Highway Motor Carrier

• School Transportation Industry Assessment
• Findings
• School Buses are relatively easily obtained for
  use as a potential weapon.
• As weapons, school buses provide a large capacity
  for explosives or other weapons and enjoy
  special, often unchallenged, access.
• As targets, school buses are highly vulnerable
  and if attacked could have significant
  consequences and psychological damage.
• Insider threat is a significant vulnerability
  (school bus drivers and/or maintenance workers).
• A coordinated, national campaign of attacks could
  cause wide-spread secondary effects. Reduced
  school attendance as well as a negative resulting
  economic impact could occur.
• School buses are often used as conveyances for
  persons other than students at major events and
  gatherings, which extend the security problem
  beyond just pupil transportation.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• School Transportation Industry Assessment
• Recommendations
• Vetting school transportation employees or
  contractors.
• School districts should develop and implement a
  security planning process to include assessments,
  standards/guidelines, training and periodic
  exercises.
• School transportation security planning and
  emergency planning efforts should include the
  entire pupil transportation system. Most school
  emergency plans stop at the schools door.
• School buses are used to transport passengers to
  many potentially sensitive targets. They are
  often afforded unchallenged access. Venues
  should be reminded to respectfully challenge a
  school buss legitimacy and presence to determine
  if they pose a security risk.
• TSA should participate in identifying and
  developing a mechanism to facilitate the sharing
  of appropriate intelligence information with
  school officials and should compliment any threat
  information.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Assessments
• HMC Corporate Security Review (CSR) Program
  designed specifically for the School
  Transportation industry
• Total School Transportation CSRs 42
• State Departments of Education CSRs 5
• Assessment Tools Currently Available
• Motorcoach Security and Emergency Preparedness
  Plan (SEPP) Self-Assessment, 2005 and the 2003
  Volpe Study
• Surface Transportation Vulnerability Assessment,
  US DOT, Volpe Center, October 25, 2001

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Security Plan
• Security Plan Guidance
• National Congress on School Transportation
  School Transportation Best Practices (Adopted May
  2010)
• Industry Associations and Common Industry
  Practices NSTA Top 25 Security Program Action
  Items for School Bus Operations (2003)
• TSA Security Action Items (SAIs) for School
  Transportation
• TSA is working to produce this guidance document
  in 2011.
• Categories General Security Personnel Security
  Physical Security En-Route Security and
  Training and Exercises.
• Planning Implementation
• Company or organization implementing their
  security plan with the ability to conduct
  exercises or drills to test the plan

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Training
• First Observer www.Firstobserver.com (replaces
  the old Domain Awareness, Call Center and ISAC
  programs) 1-888-217-5902
• School Transportation Module over 80,000
  officials trained
• Current HMC Training Initiatives Available
• TSA Counterterrorism Guidebook Flipcharts for
  School Bus Operations Available to order from
  www.tsa.gov/highway
• School Transportation Security Awareness (STSA)
  DVD on www.tsa.gov/highway
• HMC School Transportation Awareness Brochures and
  Driver Tip Cards (www.tsa.gov/highway - documents
  and reports tab)

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• TSA HMC conducts exercises using the Intermodal
  Security Training Exercise Program (I-STEP)
  (Truck, Motorcoach, School Bus Infrastructure)
• 5 exercises conducted (over 50 school districts
  some private carriers)
• Nine Highway total exercises completed in
  calendar year 2009. Including the following two
  School Transportation exercises
• June 2009, Columbus, Ohio
• July 2009, Greensboro, North Carolina
• Conducted or planning ten total exercises for
  2010 in the Highway modes. Including the
  following three School Transportation exercises
• March 2010 in Albany, NY
• May 2010 in Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles Unified
  School District
• July 2010 in St. Louis, MO
• Looking to conduct four School Transportation
  ISTEP exercise in 2011. Please contact TSA as
  soon as possible if you are interested.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• TSA HMC I-STEP Results
• Best Practices
• The use of Fusion Centers is helpful for
  disseminating information.
• Secondary Emergency (24/7) contact lists are
  critical for communicating information.
• Annual security training customized for each
  position in a transportation agency is common.
• There are often established relationships and
  clear communication chains between local
  districts and local law enforcement agencies.
• There are a complex web of alternative means of
  sharing information (Regional Fusion Centers,
  First Observer, Association networks, etc).
• State sponsored Alert Networks are a good tool
  for disseminating information to the school
  districts.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• TSA HMC Lessons Learned from School Bus ISTEP
  exercises
• We looked at school districts both large, medium
  and small some similarities and some
  differences.
• 33 identified lessons learned included in our
  summary report. The following are some of the
  highlights
• Limited communication capabilities with bus
  drivers and they lack a reliable method for
  reporting activities up the chain.
• No clear standard mechanism to successfully share
  information from federal level to local schools.
• There should be an established process for
  communicating en-route security information,
  without alarming students.
• There should be an established timeline or
  criteria to provide guidance on school district
  notification to law enforcement.
• States should look at establishing Memorandum of
  Understandings (MOUs) and process to use the
  Video Messaging Service (VMS) for school bus
  transportation security incidents.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• Lessons learned highlights (continued)
• There needs to be more awareness of Fusion Center
  capabilities and authorization process.
• There is limited communication between State
  Departments of Education and local law
  enforcement with the private schools.
• Districts should be more proactive in passing
  information up to the State Departments of
  Education.
• There should be better methods of information
  flow between school districts and school bus
  contractors. (formal government methods and
  potential informal commercial methods such as a
  transportation network (e.g. Linked In and
  Facebook) accessed through cell phones, I
  Phones, etc.)
• There is a lack of communication procedures and
  working relationships with all venues to which
  students go on field trips.
• There is limited communication between modes
  (i.e. motorcoach, school bus, mass transit).
• The classification and filtering of information
  makes it difficult to compile a picture of the
  common threat.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• Lessons learned highlights (continued)
• Formalize a process for law enforcement and
  fusion centers to pass higher level threat
  information against schools and school
  transportation to proper school districts.
• There is a need to improve the communications
  between state governments, county and local
  districts.
• There are inconsistent communications processes
  and procedures from the district level down to
  the schools.
• There are no formal procedures for communicating
  information between adjacent districts.
• Some districts have multiple law enforcement,
  municipal, or county jurisdictions to deal with
  which are difficult to manage.
• Many school districts and school bus contractors
  need to strengthen relationships with local law
  enforcement (LE) so they may easily discuss and
  improve current school bus safety plans.
• Schools are hesitant to report incidents that may
  reflect poorly upon the school district,
  preventing local LE from supporting school
  districts during incidents.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• Lessons learned highlights (continued)
• There is a limited capability and no
  standardization of school bus security on
  property.
• There is a lack of standardization of school bus
  tracking and identification systems.
• School districts need to apply for Department of
  Homeland Security (DHS) grants that would enable
  them to upgrade physical security measures on
  school bus lots, thereby increasing the security
  of school buses while unattended.
• TSA should better inform school districts about
  the First Observer program and the training
  benefits it offers so that school bus security
  protocols can be improved upon and made more
  effective.
• Each school district should require National
  Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and Incident
  Command System (ICS) training for employees
  filling school administrative and school bus
  operator roles so that they are more effective
  working within an ICS structure during an
  incident.
• Each school district should create an ICS plan
  based upon NIMS and ICS principles to increase
  their ability to secure and control critical
  systems, infrastructures and facilities during an
  incident.

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Exercises
• Lessons learned highlights (continued)
• A threat level chart with Force Protection
  measures should be developed specific to school
  bus transportation.
• All state and federal agencies should provide
  more recommendations on prevention/protection
  activities when disseminating intelligence in
  order to guide further district actions.
• There is a lack of driver training for
  identifying, recording and reporting suspicious
  activity.
• There is a lack of standard communications
  procedures for drivers to report progress.
• There is a lack of transit agency representation
  in the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and/or
  Incident Command Post (ICP).
• There is a lack of clarity on authority to
  designate evacuation resources.
• The procedures for communicating emergency
  information from government officials and
  emergency managers to bus operators lack
  efficiency.
• HMC has completed a 2009-2010 Summary Report for
  School Transportation exercises. Available upon
  request at highwaysecurity_at_dhs.gov

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Highway Motor Carrier

• Information Sharing
• Government Coordinating Council (GCC)
  Government Entities
• Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) Private
  Industry
• Work on Policy, Planning Programs using GCC/SCC
  Joint Working Groups
• Quarterly Critical Infrastructure Partnership
  Advisory Council (CIPAC) meetings
• School Transportation officials sit on both the
  GCC (NASDPTS) and SCC (NSTA)
• Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) HMC
  Portal
• HMC Tele-Conference Calls Quarterly with each
  sub-mode
• HMC webpage www.tsa.gov/highway
• HMC Email highwaysecurity_at_dhs.gov

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Highway Motor Carrier POCs

• Bill Arrington, General Manager
• Highway Motor Carrier Security Division
• Office [phone]
• Cell 202-253-9239
• Email william.arrington_at_dhs.gov

• Ray Cotton, Assistant General Manager
• Highway Motor Carrier Security Division
• Office [phone]
• Email ray.cotton_at_dhs.gov

• Phil Forjan, Branch Chief
• Enforcement and Compliance Branch
• Office [phone]
• Email phil.forjan_at_dhs.gov

• Steve Sprague, Branch Chief
• Programs and Initiatives Branch
• Office [phone]
• Email steve.sprague_at_dhs.gov

• Paul Pitzer, Branch Chief
• Policy and Planning Branch
• Office 571-227-1233
• Email paul.pitzer_at_dhs.gov

• David Cooper, Branch Chief
• Assessments and Measures Branch
• Office 571-227-2609
• Email david.cooper1_at_dhs.gov

Website http//www.tsa.gov/highway Email
highwaysecurity_at_dhs.gov