Preparing Leaders

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Preparing Leaders For Auftragstaktik (Mission
Command) A Historical Analysis of the German
Army 1809-1945 Donald E Vandergriff ARCIC Forward
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What is Mission Command?What is the outcome?
What did the German concept of Auftragstaktik
really look like? It seems to have been made up
of these elements Independent Decision-Making,
Freedom of Action, Initiative, operational
(Commanders) Intent, Mutual Trust, Forward
Command, and Order Techniques. Each element was
to some degree dependent on the others. Most of
these elements had been with the German army for
a long period of time Campaigning (Sept
2006) Joint Warfighting Schools p. 37
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Whereas in the United States the officer was one
cog among others in the huge machine, one member
of the vast team, in Germany the officer was
considered the switch to the machine or its whole
power source. Accordingly, the utmost care was
taken in selecting officers and no costs were too
high or challenges too great. Indeed, during
several army expansions in the history of Prussia
and Germany, it was argued correctly that it was
better to have a smaller army well led than more
manpower but a mediocre officer corps. Dr.
Jörg Muth Command Culture p. 182
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Agenda

• References
• Why the German Army?
• Baseline
• Origins of Auftragstaktik
• Selection of Officer Cadets
• Program of Instruction
• Progression
• Kriegsakademie
• Peacetime Practices
• Kriegsschule
• Wartime Practices
• Advantage of Germans aspects to Training and
  Auftragstaktik
• Summary

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References

• Briefing drawn from over 700 primary and
  secondary sources (British, Finnish, French,
  German, Israeli and US-20 years of intense
  study), experiments, interviews, but 6 books
  provide excellent insights
• Jörg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in
  the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces,
  1901-1940, in the Consequences for World War II
• Bruce I Gudmundsson, Storm Troop Tactics
  Innovation in the German Army 1914-1918
• Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command The Pursuit
  of Mission Command in the U.S., and Israeli
  Armies
• William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook
• Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power German and
  U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945
• James Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg Hans von
  Seeckt and German Military Reform
• The best and most recent reference comparing US
  and German leader development. Author of this
  brief has also discussed the thesis with each
  author over the last five years especially Dr.
  Muth and Dr. Gudmundsson as recently as
  April-August 2012

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Why the German Army?

• As a nation surrounded by several potential
  enemies, had to develop a quick win doctrine
  focused on operational and tactical excellence
• Developed Auftragstaktik (first mentioned in 1888
  manual) poorly translated to Mission Command by
  the West
• Result victories over Denmark 1864,
  Austro-Prussia 1866 and Franco-Prussia 1870,
  Eastern Front 1914-1917, Defense 1917 and spring
  offenses 1918 western front (tactical excellence,
  but operational immobility-solved in the interwar
  years) 1939-1941
• The best example of how to implement Mission
  Command, linked to education of leaders, in
  peacetime in order to succeed in war-rapid
  transition
• Both world wars inflicted 41 casualties over
  allies
• Even when greatly outnumbered, small unit leaders
  and units fought well (Normandy 1944 and Eastern
  Front 42-45)
• Only arrogance of senior leaders bribed by Hitler
  allowed severe strategic errors to undo tactical
  and operational excellence in WWII
• German strategy always boiled down to making
  enemies faster than they could kill them, felt
  that great tactics and operational art could
  overcome lack of/no strategy

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Origins of Auftragstaktik (Mission
Command)Frederick the Great

• Prussia was at the beginning a small country with
  little population
• Frederick II (later the Great) the first King who
  was drilled in the line with regular soldiers
• Started his first war age 29 with little
  knowledge of battle
• In the first Battle, Mollwitz April 8, 1741, both
  wings of the Prussian army defeated. King went
  away to gather reinforcements (best rider in the
  army). But then grizzled old field marshal von
  Schwerin orders center to attack. Prussia wins
  while sustaining heavy casualties.
• Frederick realizes two things a) never to leave
  the battlefield again b) to draw from the
  experience of his old battle wise regimental
  commanders
• Since then Frederick insists that his regimental
  commanders act on their own initiative and act
  aggressively. Unheard of concept in Early Modern
  Times when a regimental commander was only
  responsible to form a line/maintain order in
  battle/follow orders
• Frederick harsh taskmaster. Prussian army highest
  number of officer court martials (up to general
  rank). But NEVER was an officer court martialed
  because of a mistake made due to aggressiveness.
• In desperate moments the king would move forward
  into the first battle line and thus set and
  unprecedented example for all officers

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Origins of Auftragstaktik (Mission
Command)Napoleonic Wars and Prussian Reform

• Fredrick leaves no capable successor. As he was
  king as well as battle leader the army- but
  especially the officer corps - slowly withers
  away
• The Battle of Jena and Auerstaedt, 1806,
  stretched over more than 20 miles with three
  different points of gravity. Prussian soldiers
  show themselves to be far superior to French, but
  Prussian command and control is horribly top down
  and centralized thus the double-battle ends in a
  humiliating defeat (officers extremely brave, but
  will not make decisions without higher
  permission-cannot adapt to changing battle)
• Prussian army reformers study again Frederick the
  Greats numerous writings on leadership and
  initiative and re-emphasize the independence of
  the commander on the spot during Prussian army
  reform
• Reform movement begins in 1801 with Gehard
  Schnarhorst forming an intellectual group to
  write papers and debate regardless of rank
• First Reforms occur in the Act of 1809
  emphasizing leader development, restructure of
  corps and divisions and first application of
  general staff specialist to advise commander
  (follow on focus on training of soldiers)

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Origins of Auftragstaktik (Mission
Command)Helmuth von Moltke (the elder)

• Moltke student of Fredericks writings
• Pupil of Carl von Clausewitz
• In the age of mass armies and rapid
  transportation of an entire corps by railroad
  independence in command more important than ever
• Moltke the first to formulate the concept of
  Auftragstaktik as critic of maneuvers in 1858
  when not yet Chief of Staff
• Appalled by the sluggishness of the chain of
  command and the lack of initiative shown and
  states that as a rule an order should contain
  only what the subordinate for the achievement of
  his goals cannot determine on his own
• Everything else was to be left to the commander
  on the spot
• After becoming Chief of Staff, he and his pupils
  relentlessly championed the introduction of
  Auftragstaktik as a new command system.
• Heavily embattled within the German army
• The 120 American officers who visited Europe and
  Prussia during the 19th century completely
  (1870-1890s) miss out on discussion of
  Auftragstaktik (contribute German military
  culture to efficiency and business models)

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Baseline

• German public education was considered one of the
  finest in the world
• Officer aspirant had to possess an Abitur degree
  (general qualification for university entrance)
• Discipline was already established in a highly
  authoritarian society, ironically, the Army put
  cadets through one of the most advanced and
  liberal educations in the world
• 50 of officers came from Kadettenshulen and 50
  from the ranks during expansion (NCOs corps
  maintained high standards as well focused on
  combat leadership)
• Will focus on Kadettenschulen (Cadet Schools)-all
  were Voranstalten (preparatory academies)
• Admitted as early as 10 yrs but normally 14 yrs
  (Hauptkadettenanstalt (HKA) in Berlin) until as
  late as 19 yrs
• After a difficult exam, ensigns would be sent to
  the Kriegsschule (War School) for 8 mos to 1.5
  years (last formal school overseen by General
  Staff at Army level)
• Schools focused on combat leadership, and the
  training of subordinates for combat-art of
  decision making

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Selection of Officer Cadets

• Stepping into a regiment as Fahnenjunker age 16
  to 19
• Entering a cadet preparatory school (Voranstalt)
  age 10 to 15
• Entering the Main Cadet Institution
  (Hauptkadettenanstalt) age 15 to 17
• Example Voranstalt and Hauptkadettenschule
• Curriculum of a civilian school with added
  military drill and a large portion of athletics
  including bayonet fighting
• With the introduction of Auftragstaktik (1860s)
  hazing was banned from all schools. Hazing is
  detrimental to developing self-confident,
  innovative, honest and quick-thinking leaders.
• Measures against hazing
• Upperclassman directly responsible for protecting
  younger cadets. They would lose rank if they
  failed. No Beast barracks at German schools.
• Officers present at all times and role-models in
  treating the young cadets
• Newcomers got an upperclassmen as helper to
  introduce him to the system
• One upperclassmen responsible for one room of
  young cadets (room elder). He would be judged by
  their performance. Thus every room elder would
  automatically be motivated to protect his flock.

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Selection of Officer Cadets

• Leadership performance determined advancement and
  promotion and not scholarly capabilities. In
  exceptional cases cadets who had failed many
  courses but showed themselves to be exceptional
  leaders were still advanced
• All cadets, no matter their seniority, divided
  into 5 moral classes. Promotion based on standing
  in moral classes not seniority
• Showing exceptional performance younger cadets
  could be promoted over the heads of older cadets.
• Several examinations also determined advancement.
  With each successful completion the uniform of
  the cadet changed slightly
• Hauptkadettenanstalt
• After successfully finishing all ensign
  examinations cadets could stay on and get their
  Abitur degree (general entry to university)
• Of those a few were selected for an advanced
  class (a cadet version of SAMS)
• Of this class only a handful had the chance to be
  commissioned as Lieutenants
• All others moved to their assigned regiments
  WITHOUT being commissioned yet
• Several months at the regiment, some more at a
  Kriegsschule and after that a council of the
  regiments officers would decide if the officer
  candidate would become a Lieutenant.

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• Civil War hero and military reformer General
  Emory Upton, USMA 1861, noted after his tour
  through Europe that the entire mathematics
  curriculum of the Hauptkadettenanstalt military
  academy would be taught at the United States
  Military Academy in one year. This observation
  shows remarkably well the narrow focus of a
  former West Pointer and the misunderstandings
  about an officer education.
• Dr. Jörg Muth
• Command Culture
• P. 107

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Program of Instruction (POI)

• The best of the best were selected as cadre for
  duty at formal schools (American officers were
  fascinated by German officer teaching
  abilities)
• Leadership and Faculty took active debate in
  evolving curriculum based on latest learning
  methods (no centralized driven POI apart from
  outcomes)
• Free time or time off was part of leader
  evaluation, and was handed out quite liberally
  compared to US Military Academy of the same
  period (another way to look at character and
  self-discipline)
• Element of Surprise was common in German leader
  development
• Graduating and Grading system was complicated.
  Cadets were evaluated equally for character and
  scholarly abilities. One could out perform others
  with higher academic standing due to their own
  leadership abilities
• No expense held back, cadets trained on the
  latest weapons and equipment
• Curriculum consisted of little lecture, more
  mapexes, wargames, tactical decision games, as
  well as a liberal education
• Technical fields such as engineering, signal
  and medicine were the only ones focused on
  math/science intensive fields

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Progression

• ALL 1st Lieutenants (Oberleutnant) with five to
  years eight years of service had to take defense
  district examination (Wehrkreis-Prüfung). Had
  been voluntary but was mandatory after 1870. Took
  the examination when regimental commander deemed
  them ready. Preparation took over a year.
• Examination took five to 7 days
• Applied tactics (command a reinforced regiment
  in two cases)
• Map problem
• History essay
• Constitutional law essay
• What do you think question? (Is the new armored
  car of the cavalry also suitable for the
  artillery? What kind of modifications would you
  recommend?)
• Translation (German officers needed to prove 2 x
  language skills)
• Athletic test
• Between 15 and 30 percent allowed to enter the
  Kriegsakademie. Character assessment of
  regimental commander counted as much as
  examinations results.

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Kriegsakademie

• Three years, class size 12 to 15
• Not a General Staff School but a military
  university to advance the level of military
  knowledge within the army
• One main teacher (Hörsaalleiter) only slightly
  more senior than students, usually teaching
  military history and tactics. Had to earn respect
  of students by performance. Other instructors for
  different topics. Hörsaalleiter would write
  character assessment for each student
• Only one stint in a row allowed for
  Hörsaalleiter. Had to be rotated back to his unit
  because of fear to become truppenfremd (alienated
  to troops)
• Teacher position not a dead end but highly
  respected. Was selected after teacher journey and
  trial lecture where instructor was assessed by
  officers from the high command
• Completely free in his teaching and not doctrine
  bound

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Kriegsakademie (cont.)

• Rotation to different branches for six months
  infantry officers would serve in artillery units
  etc.
• Emphasis on no school solution during all
  exercises
• Students freely criticize instructors solution
  and vice versa
• War games freewheeling and not scripted. Often
  lasting several days and situation altered
  depending on which solution adapted at the end of
  the day. Often students solution solved the
  wargame problem
• Element of surprise during every war game
• Führerausfall leader fatality. Pre-set
  positions for all members of war games were
  instantly rotated
• Written character assessment for each student
  after three years
• Only 15 to 30 percent selected for general staff
  classes after finishing Kriegsakademie
• Further weeding out during those classes. Only a
  fraction made it to the Great General Staff

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• By 1941 the Americans had recognized the
  advantage of the German practice of command and
  based the new FSRs Field Service Regulations
  (doctrinal manuals) on the German 1933-1934
  Leadership of Troops. Nevertheless, the Americans
  failed to capture the essence of the German
  approach, centered as it was on friction and
  chance and considering war a free creative
  activity. The American approach was influenced by
  Frederick Taylors principles of scientific
  management. They sought to control war through
  efficient planning and execution processes. Thus,
  for example, the regulations emphasized loyalty
  as opposed to independent action.
• Dr. Eitan Shamir
• Transforming Command
• p. 62

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Peacetime Practices

• There was no TRADOC, no centralized control,
  except General Staff guidance, which was minimal
  (one page directives outlining outcomes reference
  to training, and what war plans specified
• Except for mobilizations plans, which were
  strictly enforced and allowed for no Mission
  Command
• Promotions in peacetime were decentralized to
  regiment and divisions up to LTC, while COLs and
  GOs were centralized. Overhead of field grade
  and GOs very low. Overall officer ratio to
  enlisted 3-5
• Commanders were responsible for the development
  of their subordinates and the training of their
  units
• Formal schooling ended at the 1st LT and CPT
  level (if chosen to attend the Kriegsakademie)
• Formal schooling for all officers were the cadet
  schools and the war school (5-18 months)
• Independence of commanders was valued over
  everything else. Wide latitude within the
  framework of Commanders intent was given in
  training of units based on outcomes
• Commanders and their units were evaluated on the
  results of yearly free play force on force
  exercises and in division, corps and army level
  wargames.
• Divisions were responsible to integrating the
  latest lessons learned from General Staff
  officers sent to observe the most recent
  conflicts-forming courses on a need basis
• Debates through professional journals and papers
  highly encouraged

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Kriegsschule

• 5 to 18 months based on ability of individual to
  progress based on results of free play force on
  force wargames (exams)
• Platoon and company tactics (students were still
  ensigns)
• Tactical Decision Games
• Wargames
• Discussions on student solutions to problems
• Military history
• Weapons training
• Ensigns put together in classes regarding their
  individual knowledge and learning speed
• In all courses, not just the Kriegschule, the
  Germans sought clarity and brevity in their
  orders, one page was the standard
• Free time and social events to assess character
  off duty

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Wartime Practices

• Manualscultureencouraged independence,
  initiative, decisiveness and innovation over
  conformity, loyalty to process and regulations,
  loyalty to chain of command vice outcome (until
  1942 Hitler took over all major decisions that
  eventually filtered down to the tactical level by
  1944)
• Wars of Unification1864, 1866 and 1870officers
  were encouraged not to obey out of date orders if
  they felt the situation demanded it
• World War I first war where NCOs, squad leaders
  given the authority in the attack to change
  avenues if it avoided enemy strengths
• World War I defense, battalion commander in
  contact could decide where reinforcements would
  counterattack even if the reinforcing commander
  outranked them
• German officers of all ranks, even field marshal
  felt an obligation to lead by example if they had
  too
• Almost at all costs, unit cohesion was maintained
  (until 1944)
• Divisions were pulled off line, where they took
  in new replacements, from same regions and
  integrated lessons learned in division ran
  schools
• Divisions could be destroyed in previous battle,
  but rotated back with core of veterans and return
  later more effective

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Advantages of German aspects of training and
Auftragstaktik

• Quicker decision making and command
• Allows for unusual non-doctrine solutions and
  thus keeps the enemy guessing and off-balance
• More flexibility during the fight
• Enhancement of fighting power
• A better command climate because based on trust
• Tougher selection
• Less officers needed (3-5 of total force
  officers)
• Cleansing effect Easier to weed out unsuitable
  officers because requires command where the
  bullets fly, and based on results of free play
  force on force exercises

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In Summary

• Must remember, different times and conditions
• Other than the Israelis (1948-73) , Finnish and
  exceptional units in other armies (US Army 4th
  AD, 82nd 101st (ABN) and 87 ID) , Germans
  provide the best example
• There are aspects of their PME and personnel/unit
  management we can emulate in regards to
  professionalism (decentralization /trust)
• All leader accessions, education and training led
  back to the support of Auftragstaktik
• Development of adaptability, innovation,
  decisiveness, focus on strength of character
  began at the very beginning of a leaders career,
  not later
• Great tactics and operational art is not a
  substitute for lack of or bad strategy
• German strategy boiled down to making enemies
  faster than they could kill them
• Must watch for arrogance as a substitute for
  professionalism (as Germans (WWII Eastern front)
  and Israelis (1973 2006) learnednever under
  rate your opponents)