GMD and Spare Equipment Database: Perspectives and Status

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GMD and Spare Equipment DatabasePerspectives
and Status
Eric Rollison Engineer of Reliability Assessments
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About NERC Mission
To ensure the reliability of the North American
bulk power system

• Develop and enforce reliability standards
• Assess current and future reliability
• Analyze system events and recommend improved
  practices
• Encourage active participation by all
  stakeholders
• Pursue mandatory standards in all areas of the
  interconnection

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NERC Reliability Assessments

• Peak Demand Forecasts
• Resource Adequacy
• Transmission Adequacy
• Key Issues Emerging Trends Impacting
  
  Reliability
• Regional Self-Assessment
• Ad-hoc Special
  Assessments

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High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) Risks

• Black Swan events
• Occur very infrequently, or, in some cases, have
  never occurred
• Little real-world operational experience with
  addressing these risks
• Generally have the potential to impact many
  assets at once
• Catastrophic impacts on the bulk power system and
  society-at-large

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HILF Report

• Created a common understanding of three HILF
  risks
• Coordinated Cyber/Physical Attacks
• EMP/GMD
• Pandemics
• Lays the groundwork for the development of an
  action plan
• 19 Proposals for Action suggested by workshop
  participants

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Critical Infrastructure StrategicCoordinated
Action Plan
NERC Technical Committee Leadership Planning Ope
rating Critical Infrastructure Protection
Resources and Expertise Electricity
entities Vendors Suppliers Government partners
Scope Approved Dec 2010
Scope Approved Sep 2010
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GMD Background

• Geomagnetic Disturbances is on the NERC
  Presidents Top Priority issues for Bulk Power
  System Reliability MRC, January 2011
• Geomagnetic storms emanating from the sun can
  produce an impulsive disturbance to earths
  geomagnetic field over wide geographic regions.
• This field disturbance causes induced ground
  currents (geomagnetically induced currents or
  GIC)
• These GIC can saturate and severely damage bulk
  power system equipment that may be difficult to
  replace, such as high voltage transformers.

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SWPC product distribution
WECC Reliability Coordinator, Vancouver
Midwest ISO, St. Paul
NYISO
WECC Loveland, CO
SWPC G2 Alerts and Warning dissemination
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GMD Task Force Scope - Deliverables

• Purpose of GMD TF will investigate bulk power
  system reliability implications and develop
  solutions to help mitigate this risk.
• Deliverables consider changes to current
  planning and operating criteria evaluate and
  prioritize mitigation and restoration options
  improve sector-wide spare equipment sharing
  programs develop industry guidance, and provide
  input into NERCs reliability Standards process.

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GMDTF Status

• Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed
• Chair Donald Watkins Bonneville Power
  Administration
• Vice Chair Frank Koza PJM Interconnection
• Task Group Membership spans Electric Industry, US
  and Canadian Government Agencies, and Transformer
  and Relay Manufacturers
• Manufacturers ABB, Siemens, GE Prolec, Efacec,
  Schweitzer Relays
• Governmental US (DOE, DHS, State, and NOAA) and
  Canada (NR Can, DPS)

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GMDTF Deliverables
2011 Deliverables
1st Quarter Whitepaper outlining the current industry experience and capability and identifies opportunities, options and alternatives to enhanced how the industry manages GMD risks.
2nd Quarter Whitepaper on current warning limitations, the ability of operators to take mitigating action, and areas for improvement.
3rd Quarter Whitepaper on restoration abilities and areas for improvement.
4th Quarter (Dependencies) Whitepaper that reviews industry prevention approaches to GMD events. Complete a final report incorporating the findings of the whitepapers and simulations with suggested recommendations and follow-on actions.
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Critical Priorities

• Transformer Vulnerability
• ID vulnerability, prioritize, establish
  characteristics (GIC vs Time)
• This is the primary reason for concern with GMD
• What is your Live to fight the next day. plan
  in an extreme storm?
• Reference Event given a locational 1100y
• How should we establish performance requirements?
  
• Each system should be able to withstand the
  reference storm, or
• Should each do what is prudent in their own
  estimation
• Should it be a reference worse credible case with
  each entity deciding how to protect their system?
  (This is where we are headed)

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NERC Advisory

• NERC released an advisory to industry that
  covered immediate operational planning, operating
  and long-term planning recommendations to address
  GMD.
• The Advisory was developed in partnership with
  NERC management, NERCs technical committees
  (OC/PC/CIPC), North American Transmission Forum,
  and U.S. government (FERC)
• Released to industry on May 10, 2011.

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SEDTF Members

• Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed
• Chair Dale Burmester American Transmission
  Company
• Vice Chair Mark Westendorf Midwest ISO
• Task Group Membership (43) includes experts from
  across the North American Electric Industry, US
  Government Agencies, and Transformer
  Manufacturers
• Content and Function Subgroups initiated to focus
  on SED efforts and scope milestones/activities.

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Question Answer
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Background Slides
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Reliability Risk Management Concepts
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Monitoring Progress The Big Picture
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Advisory Actions to Consider

• Increase attention to Situation Awareness and
  coordinate all actions with Reliability
  Coordinator.
• Discontinue maintenance work and restore
  out-of-service transmission lines, wherever
  possible.
• Increase real and reactive reserves to preserve
  system integrity during a strong GMD event
  Real-Time Operations
• Consider bringing equipment online to provide
  additional reactive power reserves.
• Decrease loading on susceptible transformers
  through transmission reconfiguration and
  generation redispatch

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Defined Scope for Each Task Force
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Inter-Task Force Coordination
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(No Transcript)
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Sunspot History
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Status of Current Solar Cycle

• Solar minimum in December 2008
• Solar Cycle 24 now well underway
• Cycle 24 maximum forecast - May 2013

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Impacts on Electric Power Grid

• CME impacts Earths magnetic field
• Fluctuations generate electric fields on
• Earth. These geomagnetically induced
• currents (GIC) can flow into power lines and
• transformers
• Leads to transformer saturation and
• over-heating, voltage drops, harmonic
  generation, transformer
• damage, grid collapse

Information Notice No. 90-42 FAILURE OF
ELECTRICAL POWER EQUIPMENT DUE TO SOLAR
MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES Specific events occurred
at the Three Mile Island, Unit 1, Hope Creek
Unit 1, and Salem Unit 1 nuclear power plants.
inspection of the generator step-up
transformer severe overheating, melted low
-voltage service connections in phases A and C,
and insulation discoloration in phase B. On
September 19, at Salem Unit 2 nuclear power
plant, a second solar storm damaged the
generator step-up transformer. Sep 1990
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Areas vulnerable to GMD Impacts
Power systems in areas of igneous rock (gray) are
the most vulnerable to the effects of intense
geomagnetic activity because the high resistance
of the igneous rock encourages geomagnetically
induced currents (GICs) to flow in the power
transmission lines situated above the rock. Shown
in cross-hatching are the auroral zone and the
extremes that the aurora can reach during severe
disturbances such as March 13, 1989. Credit
American Geophysical Union
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Impacts in the SERC RegionStorm Centered 50
Latitude
From FERC ORNL Meta-R-319 report Page 3-26
http//www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Met
a-R-319.pdf
Greater than a 10x 1989 Storm (gt5000 nT/Minute)
will introduce significant GIC into the
Southeastern US and may have BPS impacts
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Impacts in the SERC RegionStorm Centered 45
Latitude
From FERC ORNL Meta-R-319 report Page 3-26
http//www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Met
a-R-319.pdf
NOAA East Coast GIC Measurement Station is
located at Fredericksburg, VA
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Status Coordinated Action PlanNERC Priority
Initiatives
2010
2011
Q4
Q3
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q4

• DHS bi-directional info sharing

Other Initiatives

• NERC crisis/communications plan

• Policy-level severe
• impact scenario

• Milestone deliverables

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SEDTF Scope - Deliverables

• Purpose of SEDTF provide recommendations for
  enhancing resilience to High Impact Low Frequency
  events through improved access to critical
  spares, and potentially other long-lead time
  electric transmission system equipment.
• Deliverables recommend a uniform approach to
  collecting, storing, and distributing information
  on CONFIDENTIAL long-lead time spare equipment.

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SEDTF Deliverables
2011 Deliverables
1st Quarter Whitepaper (draft) defining SED objectives and assessing options/alternatives for a centralized database including specification of what that database might contain, criteria for participation and identification of communication features that might be incorporated. Complete Whitepaper in Q4.
2nd Quarter Expand Whitepaper to discuss SED confidentiality, definitions for long-lead time and spare definitions, state/provincial and federal support possibilities, and appropriate streamlined processes to access SED equipment information and communication same among entities responding to HILF events.
3rd Quarter Expand Whitepaper to define a process for evaluating the performance and readiness to implement the SED program.
4th Quarter Complete final whitepaper/report incorporating the findings of the whitepapers. SED will provide recommendations, but not build or implement technology solutions.