Dual Use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity

1
Dual Use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity

• Iris Hunger
• Research Group for Biological Arms Control
• Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science
  and Peace Research
• University of Hamburg, Germany
• International Forum on Biosecurity, Amman, 27-29
  October 2008

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Dual Use

• Technology, equipment, material, or knowledge
  that can be used for
• Peaceful or hostile
• Legitimate or illegitimate
• Beneficial or destructive
• purposes without, or only minor, modification.

3
Dual Use Activities of Concern

• Dual use activities whose misuse would result in
  particularly grave consequences.
• Two approaches
• Based on the agents involved.
• Based on the results planned or achieved.

4
Dual Use Activities of ConcernAgent Based

• Anthrax, hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola etc.), plague,
  smallpox, tularemia.
• 1918 influenza?
• SARS?
• Genetically enhanced measles?

5
Dual Use Activities of ConcernResult Based

• Rendering a vaccine ineffective
• Creating resistance to therapeutics
• Enhancing the virulence of a pathogen
• Rendering a nonpathogen virulent
• Increasing transmissibility of a pathogen
• Altering the host range of a pathogen
• Enabling the evasion of diagnosis/detection
• Enabling the weaponization of a biological agent
  or toxin
• Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism,
  U.S. National Research Council, 2004.

6
Dual Use Activities of Concernin Biodefence
Programmes

• Creating agents with improved bioweapons
  characteristics
• Engineering anthrax to be vaccine resistant
• Increasing the lethality of pox viruses
• Creating people knowledgable about bioweapons
  relevant agents
• Giving rise to suspicions of bioweapons
  development

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Dual Use Activities of ConcernGovernance

• Thorough risk assessment before work is started
• Maximum transparency including full publication
• Should not be carried out in the framework of
  biodefence/biosecurity