RAL Template

1
Hydrogen system status
Yury Ivanyushenkov for Elwyn Baynham, Tom
Bradshaw, Mike Courthold, Matthew Hills and Tony
Jones
2
Scope

• Implementation of RD system HAZOP
  recommendations
• Hydrogen zones classification in MICE hall
• RD facility location
• Hydride bed test by the manufacturer
• Hardware procurement
• Plans

3
MICE Hydrogen system HAZOP
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MICE Hydrogen RD System
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HAZOP Nodes
1. Metal Hydride Storage Unit (Including
Heater/Chiller Unit) 2. Hydrogen Bottle and line
to Buffer Volume (Including lines through
HA-PV05, HA-RV06 HA-PV07) 3. Purge/Fill Helium
Cylinder and line through HA-PV18 4. Buffer
Tank (Including lines through HA-PV08, HA-BD09
HA-RV10 to Vent) 5. Lines from Buffer Tank to
Cryostat 6. Absorber Volume and Condensing
Pot 7. Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port
to Vent and exhaust Vent (Including coolant
lines) 8. Nitrogen System - Jacket and
Ventilation Purge (Including nitrogen cylinder
and lines through HA-PV11, HA-BD12
HA-PV13)) 9. Gas Panel
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Hydrogen RD System Nodes for HAZOP
Node 8
Node 3
Node 1
Node 5
Node 4
Node 7
Node 6
Node 6
Node 9
Node 2
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HAZOP Recommendations
HAZOP Recommendations Node 1 (Metal Hydride
Storage Unit) 1. Look at pressure of hydride bed
"on a hot day" i.e. high ambient
temperature MC (Failure of heater/chiller pump
-gt Increase of pressure in system) 2. Consider a
chiller pump failure alarm for the hydride bed
unit MC (As above) 3. Review consequences of
a glycol release (leak) onto plant items from the
chiller AJ (Leak in pipework -gt Ehylene glycol
dripping onto plant/equipment) 4. Review
appropriate methods of crane operating areas to
reduce risk of damage to plant from
impact/dropped loads AJ (Dropped load from
crane -gt Damage to plant/equipment e.g. ruptured
pipework) 5. Consider linking temperature
monitor with heater chiller operation to
avoid overheating in the event of thermostat
failure MC (Failure of thermostat in heating
unit -gt Temperature gt30C causing rise in
pressure) 6. Consider automation of hydride bed
hand valve MC (As above) 7. Assess ignition
sources around the hydrogen generation unit to
reduce possibility of fire in the MICE
hall CN (External fire in the MICE hall -gt
Possible flame impingement on metal hydride
unit) 8. Review hydride bed operational
sequencing for inappropriate actions
MC (Failure of thermostat in cooling unit -gt
Lower temperature)
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HAZOP Recommendations (2)
Node 2 (Hydrogen Bottle and Line to the Buffer
Volume) 9. Review process for filling hydrogen
bed for indication that the bed is full
(including the location of bottles during storage
and filling) MC (Excessive hydrogen delivered
to hydride bed -gt Higher pressure) 10. Consider
back streaming with He during connection to avoid
contamination with air during bottle
changes MC (Failure to purge hydrogen
filling line -gt Lower pressure) 11. Review
access to roof to avoid exposure to vented
hydrogen CN (Emergency venting of hydrogen -gt
Potential explosive atmosphere at roof
level) Node 4 (Buffer Tank) 12. Consider test
mechanism to validate (RV10) seal after discharge
of cold Hydrogen MC/MH (RV10 operates and
discharges cold hydrogen -gt Potential to result
in failure to reseal) 13. Confirm that control
software system conforms with IEC61508
MC (Operator accidentally opens PV08 via control
system -gt Air ingress to system) Node 5 (Lines
from Buffer Tank to Cryostat) 14. Identify
appropriate procedure in the event of blockage
due to condensation of impurities in buffer
tank/cryostat line MC/TB (Condensation of
impurities -gt Pressure rise in the absorber
volume)
9
HAZOP Recommendations (3)
Node 6 (Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot) 15.
Ensure hydrogen sensors on UPS in case of loss of
power MC (Loss of power -gt Inability to
monitor state of system) 16. Consider the
benefits of having all control system on UPS in
the case of loss of power to prove state of
system information MC (As above) 17. Ensure
that software intervenes when discrepancies are
detected with provision for limited operator
intervention MC (Operator makes wrong
decision -gt Cryostat fills with air if, for
example, PV25 opened) 18. Consider installation
of mass spectrometer (RGA) on PV25 to monitor
potential embrittlement issues MC (Hydrogen
embrittlement issues -gt Leak of hydrogen) 19.
Assess ignition sources around the cryostat unit
(as for Recommendation 7) CN (External fire on
the MICE hall -gt Possible flame impingement on
cryostat and affect internals)
10
HAZOP Recommendations (4)
Node 7 (Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port
to Vent and Exhaust Vent) 20. Review capability
of bursting disc to withstand scenario of RV10 or
RV23 pressure surge MH (Activation of RV10
(from buffer volume) or RV23 (hydride bed) -gt
Disc bursts and hydrogen ingress into
cryostat) 21. Confirm whether bursting disc
would create ignition source on activation
MH (As above) 22. Consider the inclusion of a
non-return valve downstream of the burst disc
to avoid pressure surge from RV10 or RV23
activation MH (As above) Node 8 (Nitrogen
System Jacket and Vent Purge) 23. Consider
installation of flow meter(s) / indication device
to alert low/ no flow from nitrogen bottle around
nitrogen jacket circuit MH (Empty gas bottle
-gt Air in ventilation line and cryostat
jacket) 24. Consider fitting non-return valve to
prevent hydrogen flow into nitrogen system on
activation of RV10 or RV23 MH (Discharge
through RV10 or RV23 -gt Hydrogen into nitrogen
line) 25. Review need for protection/location of
gas bottles to prevent vehicle (or
other) Impacts AJ (Vehicle impact with
cylinder bottle storage -gt Potential rupture of
cylinder) Node 9 (Gas Panel) 26. Review methods
to minimise condensation on hydrogen pipework
AJ (High moisture content -gt Condensation on
hydrogen pipework leading to pools of water on
floor)
11
Hydrogen RD System updated PID
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After-HAZOP steps

• Whats next
• Final report from Serco received
• HAZOP recommendations being examined and
  implemented
• Decide whether another session of HAZOP is
  required
• - Not for RD system

13
Hydrogen Zones in MICE Hall
A Safety Officer approach Follow RAL Safety
Code 1(Hydrogen and Deuterium) and BS EN
60079-10 to define hydrogen zones Zones
according RAL Safety Code 1 Zone 0 An area or
enclosed space within which any flammable or
explosive substance, whether gas, vapour, or
volatile liquid, is continuously present in
concentrations within the lower and upper limits
of flammability. Zone 1 An area within which any
flammable or explosive substance, whether gas,
vapour, or volatile liquid is processed, handled
or stored and where during normal operations an
explosive or ignitable concentration is likely to
occur in sufficient quantity to produce a
hazard. Zone 2 An area within which any
flammable or explosive substance whether gas,
vapour or volatile liquid, although processed or
stored, is so well under conditions of control
that the production (or release) of an explosive
or ignitable concentration in sufficient quantity
to constitute a hazard is only likely under
abnormal conditions. Area classification
procedure is defined in BS EN 60079-10.The
procedure calculates the volume and time of
persistence of hydrogen cloud for a given
hydrogen release rate and then assigns the zone
type (0,1,2 or non-hazardous))
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Hydrogen Zones in MICE Hall (2)
MICE approach - the experiment can not afford
MICE hall to be Zone 2 -gt Engineering of MICE
hydrogen system should be done in a way that MICE
hall is not Zone 2 ! - Achieved for the
hydrogen RD system (gas panel is under venting
hood, jacketing of the test cryostat and of
hydrogen lines is implemented) - Can this
approach be reliably extended to MICE hydrogen
delivery system and AFC modules ?
15
Hydrogen RD facility site

• Hydrogen RD facility was originally sited in the
  MICE hall
• Pros
• The RD system later becomes the first (out of 3)
  MICE hydrogen system
• Cons
• The work on hydrogen RD interferes with civil
  work in the MICE hall
• Time schedule is defined by the Phase I
  preparation time table and puts the hydrogen RD
  programme into the background mode (? risk of
  failure).
• That is why it has been suggested to search for a
  dedicated site for hydrogen RD facility outside
  MICE hall.
• Pros
• - Eliminates the Cons above, i.e. decouples Phase
  I programme from the hydrogen R_at_D programme
• Cons
• Will require extra work on new facility layout
  and new safety case preparation, hence extra
  cost
• Will later require re-location of hydrogen test
  system into MICE hall, hence extra cost.

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Hydrogen RD facility site (2)
Cryogenics Group Lab
MICE Hall
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New hydrogen RD facility Plan

• New Hydrogen RD facility
• Facility layout
• Safety case
• -gt should get OK by RAL Safety
• Detailed layout
• Site modification ( build a partition, install
  venting system, modify electrics etc.)
• Hardware installation

Note limited man power -gt delays
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Hydride Bed

• Metal hydride storage tank is arrived to RAL.
• It has been tested by the manufacturer
• - Hydride bed was initially charged
• at 30 bar with 32000 NL
  of hydrogen
• - then discharged
• 30500 NL of hydrogen removed
  from the tank at a flow rate of 50 NL/min and
• at the heating temperature
  of about 65-70 C
• - and then charged at low pressure
• tank filled with 24895
  NL of hydrogen at 1.6 bar abs, temperature of
  about
• -10 C with flow rate of
  50 NL/min (-gt 24000 NL/8 hours)
• Test results the hydride bed fulfills the spec
• Test recommendations for a heater/chiller unit
• Heating/ cooling power 3kW
• Temperature range -30 C - 70 C .

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Heating/chilling unit for hydride bed
LH50 PRESTO Temperature Control System by JULABO
LH50 model water cooled LH47 model air
cooled (reduced cooling/heating power)
20
Plans

• Whats next
• Assess Cryogenics Group Lab as a Hydrogen RD
  facility site
• Continue hardware procurement heating/chilling
  unit, test cryostat and gas panel
• Finish implementations of HAZOP and Internal
  Review recommendations
• Complete response to the Internal Review and
  submit it to Technical Board