Russia's Market Geopolitics

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Russia's Market Geopolitics
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• Two basic imperatives of Russias post-Soviet
  foreign policy
• the imperative of systemic transformation into
  a capitalist-type society (the market imperative)
  and the realities of her historic-geographic
  position as Eurasias core state (the
  geopolitical imperative).
• The 2 imperatives may interact in a number of
  ways.

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• They can be mutually reinforcing, making it
  possible to achieve significant foreign policy
  gains.
• They can be mutually exclusive, forcing Russias
  leaders to make hard choices between them, which
  makes policy setbacks likely.
• They can be managed through tradeoffs, which
  requires great political skills, significant and
  diverse power resources, and effective
  institutions.

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• Choices and balances between market and
  geopolitical considerations in Russias
  international behaviour.
• If the market imperative is considered decisive
• Russia can be expected to try to market its
  geopolitical assets that is, to achieve
  economic gains through a skillful use of its
  unique geopolitical position.
• If the geopolitical imperative becomes uppermost
  
• Russia may adopt mercantilist stances and use
  market interactions with other countries to
  achieve maximum possible geopolitical gains.
• Different forces within Russia favour different
  market-geopolitical balances.

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• The key role of US-Russian relations
• The 2 political transitions in 1999-2000
• 1. From Yeltsin to Putin
• The beginning of the restoration of a strong
  state.
• stabilization of the political situation
• an economic recovery
• promotion of a neoliberal economic reform agenda.
  
• reliance on a combination of capitalist economics
  and a reasserted political authoritarianism.
• In the area of foreign policy, Putin represents
  the emergence of a new pragmatic consensus
  between Western-oriented and Eurasianist-oriented
  elites.

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• 2. From Clinton to Bush
• On the one hand, a colder, more unilateralist and
  potentially more dangerous America - a serious
  challenge to Russias interests, alarmed
  reactions in Moscow.
• On the other hand, an unusual ideological
  affinity between Moscow and Washington
• commitment to laissez-faire economics,
• emphasis on geopolitics, and
• a stronger assertion of national interests (in
  the US case, as a manifestation of strength, in
  the Russian case, as a function of weakness).
• the end of the micromanagement of Russian reforms
  - the Russians feel a little more in control of
  their countrys policies

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• The Terror War, with its implications of a wider
  global conflict between the West and Islamist
  radicalism, highlights Russias vital
  geopolitical role. Russias stability, security
  and strength (both economic and military) have
  become important international concerns.
•  
• The US found is in dire need of allies in the new
  global confrontation. Russias importance
• a/successful US operations in Eurasia require
  Russias cooperation and help
• b/Russia may serve as an important alternative
  supplier of energy to the US in case of
  disruption of supplies from the Persian Gulf.

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• Putins early focus on the global threat of
  Islamist terrorism was to some extent vindicated.
  This took some international pressure off
  Russias Chechnya operations.
• The refocusing of US foreign policy on the war on
  Islamist terrorism has partly relieved the
  geopolitical pressures Moscow had felt before
  9/11
• many in Russias foreign policy elite were
  inclined to see the Western threat (NATO
  expansion, the New Great Game over Caspian oil,
  etc.) compounded by the Islamist threat to
  Russias interests in the Caucasus and Central
  Asia.
•  

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• Russia has gained a voice in NATO, an official
  status of a market economy, an upgrading of her
  status in G8, and support for her entry into WTO.
  
•  
• Russia in her new role as a key US ally has
  gained some freedom to pursue its own interests
  in other areas
•  
• The political climate for Western investments in
  Russia and for Russian business activities in the
  West improved.
•  
• The new conservative security mindset,
  characterizing the Bush Administration after
  9/11, is consonant with the political
  orientations of Russian leaders and the
  traditions of the Russian state.

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• Rearmament of Russia can now be legitimized in
  the eyes of the US and other leading powers much
  more effectively than before.
• Improvement of Russias relations with the US is
  supported by most Russian elites and a majority
  of the population, which is an important
  political asset for Putin and his coalition.
• SUMMING UP
• By joining the anti-terror coalition, Russia
  has been able to make gains across a spectrum of
  issues.
• But these gains have entailed some costs.

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• Russias acquiescence with what looked
  unacceptable before 9/11
• NATOs massive expansion eastwards,
• Americas pullout from arms control,
• direct US security involvement across the belt of
  post-Soviet states from the Baltic to Pamir,
• Russias decision to withdraw from key Cold War
  military bases in Southeast Asia and the
  Caribbean.
• The prospect of US gaining control over the
  Persian Gulf and its energy resources.

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• At issue the price Russia has paid and the
  value it has bought.
• Has the post-9/11 deal been fair for Russia?
• Has Russia lost more than it gained by this
  acquiescence?
• Are the gains largely symbolic and/or transitory,
  while the losses are tangible and lasting?

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• WESTERNIZERS
• The new American presence in Central Eurasia
  represents Russias gain, not a loss, inasmuch as
  it strengthens Russias security in areas of
  Russias vulnerability
• To try to resist the American thrust is
  imprudently risky for Russia.
• The Americans are unlikely to stay in the
  post-Soviet South for long.
• In the new common cause between Russia and the
  West, NATOs expansion is not a cause for alarm
  indeed, it is possible to view it as a process
  leading up to Russias future membership in the
  Western alliance.

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• EURASIANISTS
• Russia cannot possibly compete with the US on
  market terms. In any kind of an open market
  relationship between the two sides, the US will
  always be the dominant partner, dictating the
  terms and reaping most benefits, while Russia
  will have to accept a subordinate, dependent,
  almost colonial status.
• Russia should use its geopolitical assets, but
  not by selling them.  
• Russia should vigorously pursue integration with
  its post-Soviet neighbours and rebuff Western
  attempts to establish permanent positions in
  post-Soviet territories. 
• America respects only strength. Russia must try
  to restore a balance of power vis-à-vis the
  United States. 
• To turn Russia into the Wests ally against China
  and the Islamic world would expose Russias
  security to great dangers. Russia should align
  with China and Islamic states in order to resist
  American hegemony.

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• What underlies the arguments of the Westernizers
  is the notion of Russian-Western
  (Euro-Atlantic) solidarity based on both market
  and geopolitical considerations.
• What underlies the Eurasianists arguments is the
  unreconstructed realist view of world politics,
  where Russia is paying dearly for its lingering
  liberal-internationalist illusions which have
  already led her to a historic geopolitical
  defeat.

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• Can the Westernizers win the debate?
• HARDLY SO
• They agree with the Eurasianists on some of the
  most important points in the latters position
• They have to argue within a geopolitical frame of
  reference, which the Eurasianists insist upon
• When they argue within a market frame of
  reference, they have to recognize the weakness of
  Russias market assets
• In a highly competitive global economy.
  Westernizers case for a market-geopolitical
  synthesis is easy to present as unrealistic,
  based on wishful thinking.
• The Eurasianist case for the unquestioned
  dominance of the geopolitical imperative which
  should determine Russias economic strategies
  often seems more fitting for the situation of the
  Terror War
•  

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• Putin seeks to integrate elements of Westernizer
  and Eurasianist approaches in a pragmatic foreign
  policy course. He tries to make the most of
  Russias unique geography.
• Reiterates that the global economy is a highly
  competitive place where Russia cannot expect any
  favours and must fight hard for a decent place
  under economic sun.
• Russias integration is portrayed as a
  hard-nosed, pragmatic choice
• unless Russia is a full-fledged participant among
  those who make rules for the global economy,
  those rules will be more detrimental to Russias
  interests.
• Russia must join in order to be able to compete
  with everybody else more successfully.
• If Gorbachev and Yeltsin borrowed money from the
  West, Putin is repaying the debts ahead of
  schedule.

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• Putins foreign policy treats Russias
  geopolitical assets primarily as commodities to
  be used to gain Russia maximum access to world
  markets.
• But, since Russia needs these assets for its
  security, as well, the real issue in the
  post-9/11 bargaining between Bush and Putin is
  whether Russia is selling or merely leasing. As
  only time will tell, of course.
• The key issue how successful Russia will be in
  marketing its geopolitics
• If it is successful, then Russia will continue on
  its Westernizing course.
• If not, it may be forced to revert to some
  variety of protectionist Eurasianism, putting
  geopolitical priorities ahead of its quest of a
  decent place under the economic sun.

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• 2 questions for discussion
• How did the Iraq war affect the balance between
  geopolitical and market considerations in Russian
  foreign policy?
• If the geopolitical imperative becomes
  predominant, is Russia likely to go totalitarian?