Cuban Missile Crisis

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Cuban Missile Crisis
By Philip Brenner
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(No Transcript)
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CIA Briefing Map Meeting of the ExComm October
16, 1962
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U-2 Photo of Missile Site, October 14, 1962
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Missile Warhead
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ExComm Deliberation During the Crisis
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(No Transcript)
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Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to John F.
Kennedy,October 26, 1962
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Black Saturday Second Letter
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Black Saturday
Low-level reconnaissance of Cuban anti-aircraft
sites
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U.S. Lessons

• Crises can be managed
• - Secrecy
• - Small group with open discussion
• - Exclude and misinform Congress and public
• Steel Will (Eyeball to Eyeball)
• - Toughness
• - Resolve
• Superior Strength
• - Build up Military
• - Exercise Coercive Diplomacy

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Problems with US Lessons - First Cut

• Crises cannot be managed
• Flexibility, not steel will, saved us
• Force or threat of force precipitated the crisis,
  made it more dangerous

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US Misconstrues Soviet Motives
Summit in Vienna Austria, June 1961
Berlin Wall Erected, August 1961
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Jan. 3, 1961
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(No Transcript)
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Bay of Pigs

• The next day, 1,500 U.S. trained Cuban exiles
  landed on Cuba with weapons supplied by the
  United States.

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Richard Goodwin Meets Ché Guevara
? ? ?
? ? ?
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Memorandum from Gen. Lansdale to Special Group
(Augmented) -- Pg 1
Operation Mongoose
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Gen. Lansdale Memorandum (Continued) -- Pg 2
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(No Transcript)
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Operation Anadyr

• In July 1962 the Soviet Union began to send
  ballistic missiles, other weapons and soldiers to
  Cuba. The build-up troubles US military planners,
  even as they conclude
• that ballistic
• missiles are
• not being
• installed.

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New York TimesOctober 23, 1961
. . .
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Soviet Union responds by exploding a 50-megaton
hydrogen bomb in the atmosphere, Oct 30, 1961
White House Statement
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Problems with US Lessons - Second Cut

• Crisis management Groupthink and exclusion
  of information
• Steel will inflexibility and no negotiations
  force becomes only alternative
• Coercive diplomacy military build-up
  ignores factors such as patriotism

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Soviet Lessons

• Crises cannot be managed
• Crises must be prevented
• Improve communications with the other superpower
• Achieve parity (equal military force) with US

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(No Transcript)
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President Kennedys American University
Speech June 10, 1963
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Cuban Lessons

• Neither superpower can be trusted
• Cuba must defend itself with asymmetric warfare
• Support revolution in Third World
• Strengthen military forces
• Intensify internal security

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Castros Five Demands

• Cessation of the US economic embargo and US
  pressure on other countries to cut commercial
  links to Cuba
• End US subversive activities against Cuba,
  including the organization of invasions by
  mercenaries and infiltration of spies and
  saboteurs
• Cease piratical attacks from bases in the
• United States and Puerto Rico
• End violations of Cuban airspace
• US withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base

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Anastas Mikoyan Arrives in Cuba
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IL-28 Bomber (Bulgarian model in Cuba)
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How Castro Remembered Mikoyans Visit
-- From James Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and
Luminous Days
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OSPAAL Organization of Solidarity of the
Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America
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Cuban Missile Caribbean October
Crisis