A semantic conception of scientific models for didactics of science

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A semantic conception of scientific models for didactics of science

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A semantic conception of scientific models for didactics of science Agust n Ad riz-Bravo Universidad de Buenos Aires Argentina The modelistic turn in science ... –

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Title: A semantic conception of scientific models for didactics of science


1
A semantic conceptionof scientific modelsfor
didactics of science
  • Agustín Adúriz-Bravo
  • Universidad de Buenos Aires
  • Argentina

2
The modelistic turnin science education
  • Scientific models and modelling have been present
    in an implicit way in science curricula.
  • In science classes, it has been usual to work
    with the idea that science models the world
    using abstract representations.
  • In the last 10 years science education
    researchers, science curriculum developers, and
    science teachers have advocatet for an explicit
    treatment of this construct in the classroom.
  • A new requirement emerges there should be
    discussion around the role of models when talking
    about the nature of science.

3
The modelistic turnin didactics of science
  • There is a need to make theoretical decisions on
    which views on models of the many available from
    philosophy of science can valuable for research,
    teaching, and teacher education.
  • I will argue in favour of a semantic conception
    of scientific models.

4
Semantic views on models
  • Any one of a number of recent characterisations
    of the concept of model proposed by a range of
    philosophers that can be situated in the
    semantic conception of scientific theories,
    opposed to the received view in the philosophy
    of science.
  • Within such school, several versions can be
    identified from meta-theoretical structuralism
    to the more recent model-based approaches by Fred
    Suppe, Bas van Fraassen and Ron Giere, going
    through several other proposals.

5
Characterisationof the semantic conception
  • The focus of meta-theoretical analysis is put in
    how scientific theories give meaning to the world
    and make sense to their users.
  • A scientific theory can be fruitfully
    characterised as a family or class of models.
  • The theory is constituted not only of a class of
    models, but also of a set of empirical systems
    that such theory intends to account for.
  • The theory states that there is substantive
    relationship between its models and its systems
    it empirically asserts that some phenomena are
    adequately accounted for by the models.

6
Outline
  • Higlighting the merits of a semantic conception
    of models for science education and didactics of
    science
  • requires
  • a characterisation of how models have been
    conceptualised by different philosophical schools
    in the 20th century
  • which in turn requires
  • facing the obstacle that the term model is used
    in the natural language, in science and
    technology, and in the philosophy of science with
    a range of different meanings.

7
Models in natural language
  • P1 Mona Lisa Gherardini del Giocondo posed as a
    model for Leonardo da
  • Vinci.
  • P2 This toy car is an accurate model of a
    Formula 1 car.

8
Models in everyday life
reality
representation
9
Models in everyday life
input
output
10
Models in everyday life
input
output
11
Models in everyday life
model-for
model-from
12
Four kinds of models
  • A model-input can be a model-for when it is a
    paradigm an archetype or exemplar for something,
    a canon that should be followed, imitated, or
    copied.
  • Mother Teresa of Calcutta is a model of
    humanitarianism.

13
Four kinds of models
  • A model-input can also be a model-from, when it
    is an instance a case, realisation or embodiment
    of something, a representative example of a
    general or abstract situation or of a set of
    principles.
  • Amsterdam is a model sustainable city.

14
Four kinds of models
  • A model-output can be a model-from when it is a
    copy a simplified version, replica, sketch,
    imitation or simulation of something. In this
    case, the model only captures some central and
    characteristic elements of what is being copied
    chosen according to an intentional view.
  • Students participated in a model of the United
    Nations.

15
Four kinds of models
  • A model-output can also be a model-for when it is
    a design a plan, project, scheme, prototype,
    blueprint or scale model of something that does
    not materially exist so far.
  • The exhibition features a model of the
    underwater tunnel.

16
Model-input-for
  • A pendulum is a real object that is studied by
    physics in order to abstract the laws of its
    movement.

17
Model-input-from
  • A pendulum is a real object that (best)
    exmplifies the physical notion of harmonic
    oscillations.

18
Model-output-from
  • A pendulum is a highly stylised and simplified
    representation of a swinging object.

19
Model-output-for
  • A pendulum is a set of specifications to
    understand/construct artifacts with predictable
    behaviour.

20
Models in scientific research
  • Model denotes a theoretical representation of a
    complex reality that is developed to facilitate
    the study of its behaviour.

abstract, symbolic, theory-laden
praxis mediation
21
Philosophical analyseson models
  • For logical positivism and the received view (c.
    1920-1960), a scientific model was any example of
    a theory the theory was considered the central
    entity for epistemological analysis.
  • The pendulum is one system out of a pool of many
    other systems that obeys some particular laws of
    mechanics.

22
Philosophical analyseson models
  • For the new philosophy of science (c. 1950-1980),
    the model became a paradigmatic example (i.e.,
    particularly worthy of imitation) of a theory.
  • The pendulum embodies the main characteristics of
    simple harmonic motion, and thus serves as
    exemplar to understand other systems.

23
Philosophical analyseson models
  • Finally, for the semantic conception of
    scientific theories (c. 19702010), the model was
    identified with an intended example of a theory
    (that is, an example that the theory is conceived
    to explain).
  • The pendulum is one system out of a pool of very
    few systems for which some specific laws of
    mechanics are proposed.

24
  • The semantic view adds, to the Kuhnian
    reconstruction of models as cases that have
    been well solved and are thus exemplary, the more
    classical requirement that they can all be
    represented in analogous semi-formal ways, and
    formulated as generally and abstractly as
    possible.
  • Thus, semanticism represents a third way
    between the received view and the new philosophy
    of science, purporting to recur to their most
    powerful tools to think about models.
  • This double strategy that pretends to
    recover the best of each of the preceding
    periods constitutes one of the fundamental
    characteristics of this semanticist approach.
    (Lorenzano 2001 38)

25
  • The semantic view synthesises in one construct
    the meanings model-for and model-from.
  • Model combinedly capture the two different
    (and, to common sense, somewhat opposed) meanings
    of the Latin word modus. Modus means both
    manner and measure.

26
  • A manner is to a certain extent identifiable with
    model-for, since it is the way in which something
    exists or occurs.
  • A measure is to a certain extent identifiable
    with model-from it is a degree, intensity,
    proportion, or correspondence by comparison.
  • Every manner is a measure that an embodied set
    of characteristic properties can serve as a canon
    (unit/pattern) for other embodiments or
    realisations to be compared with.
  • A scientific model captures essential elements of
    a system and becomes a way of (analogically)
    understanding other systems.

27
  • The semantic view is compatible with both a
    realist reconstruction of science, and with
    empiricist or instrumentalist reconstructions of
    science.
  • As Fred Suppe (2000, p. S105) puts it,
  • depending on mapping relationships between
    models and phenomena required for theoretical
    adequacy, realist, quasi-realist or antirealist
    verions of the semantic conception of theories
    are obtained.

28
  • Giere, Suppe and van Fraassen shift their
    interest towards how scientific theories give
    meaning to the world on which they are applied,
    and how they make sense for those who are
    applying them (the cognitive agents, including
    students and teachers).
  • They are less interested in the strict logical
    and linguistic structure of theories.
  • Opposing the usual syntactic approach, they
    prioritise a semantic, pragmatic and rhetorical
    approach.

29
  • G, S and vF assume that theories cannot be
    reduced just to the theoretical propositions that
    constitute them rather, theories also contain
    the facts interpreted by them.
  • Scientific theories are not reducible to
    knowledge of propositional nature, since they
    also contain a know-how around the explanations
    and interventions that can be performed with
    them.
  • A theory is therefore a family of models, but
    more than the addition of these models, because
    these are linked by logical and experimental
    relationships that give coherence to the whole
    set.

30
  • G, S and vF consider that theories are best
    identified and characterised by their
    corresponding classes of models.
  • They deem more relevant to meta-theoretically
    study models than theories. This kind of approach
    is called model-based.
  • The focus is now placed on understanding the
    nature of scientific models, rather than on
    placing these models within a theoretical network
    of statements.

31
  • G, S and vF assume that there is no direct
    relationship between what we say (propositions)
    and phenomena.
  • This relationship is mediated by models
    understood as abstract representations of the
    world.
  • Such representations cannot be reduced to
    propositions or to reality.

32
  • These authors consider that the different
    linguistic forms under which the same model can
    be presented are to some extent equivalent.
    They do not assume the primacy of some of these
    forms (the axiomatic, for instance) over the
    others.
  • They are much more flexible than standard
    philosophy of science, since non-rigidly
    formalised knowledge can be considered
    theoretical and can be expressed (defined) with
    very different languages scale models, drawings,
    paradigmatic facts, metaphors, gestures
  • They can be presented in a very simple way,
    emphasizing only their essential elements so that
    they conserve their explanatory power.
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